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INTRODUCTION
The poll tax occupies a unique place in Virginia's
suffrage history.

Basically a twentieth century device

ostensibly originated to provide revenue for the state
by requiring payment of a fee before the exercise of the
franchise, there was probably no other practice quite as
foreign to the expanding suffrage traditions of Virginia's
history as the poll tax.

The only precursor to this tax

was a capitation tax levied intermittently, the first
such tax appearing in 1623 in the form of a levy of ten
pounds of tobacco to meet the debt arising from defenses
against local Indians.

Free Negroes and whites were

required by law to pay a capitation tax until 1787.

In

1813, a capitation tax on all free Negroes and mulattoes
not bound out as apprentices was imposed in an effort
to pressure the state's black population to either become
~pprentices

or leave Virginia.

By 1816, the tax was

·abo-lished, not to appear again until 1850 when another
tax was imposed on free Negroes between the ages of
twenty-one and fifty-five to finance the colonization
then underway in Liberia.

During 1860, an eighty cent

capitation tax on all free male Negroes and whites
twenty-one years of age and over was imposed.

The

2

following year, the discriminatory 1850 act was repealed,
thus making capitation taxes uniform for whites and
Negroes.

i

Starting in 1876, a poll tax as a prerequisite
I

to voting was levied in the state, but with the introduction of the Readjuster regime, the tax was removed, not
having produced the anticipated revenues and not having
become an effective controlling device. 1 Thus when the
new state constitution of 1902 containing a poll tax
provision, among other franchise restricting features, was
~reclaimed,

the state was making a departure from its

historical traditions of taxation and of a legally
unrestricted franchise.

There was little solid evidence

b_ey_ond_ conjecture as to whether the results would be
those that were desired.
In chronicling the political history of the poll
tax from its adoption until 1950, it becomes evident that
~-t

_is a story of two different views of government and of

the degree of participatory democracy allowed by each.
It must be admitted that most arguments did not reach
such an abstract plane of discussion, often being nothing
more than a demagogic appeal to the fears and prejudices
_ _ ~Tipton R. Snavely, The Taxation of Negroes in
Virginia ("University of Virginia Phelps-Stokes Fellowship
Papers," No. 3: Charlottesville, Va., 1916), pp. 9-14.
Hereafter cited as Snavely, Taxation of Negroes.
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of the electorate.

But even in these instances, a

careful examination of the argument reveals the views
of popular participation held by the speaker.

This can

be illustrated by reference to two statements of position
delivered at a time when the poll tax was gaining increased
attention.
In May, 1939, Wilbur

C~

Hall, chairman of the State

Conservative Commission and an intimate member of the
state.political organization directed by Senator Harry F.
Byrd; delivered a speech over radio station WRVA in
Richmond outlining the reasons for retention of the poll
tax ·as a prerequisite to voting..

The state constitutional

convention of 1902, Hall said, had as its main objective
-

the purification of Virginia elections.

The great evils

then existing had come to the state as a result of
Reconstruction and a period of unlimited suffrage, which
allowed "hundreds of thousands" of Negroes without
education or political training to vote.

The sole purpose

of the convention became the elimination of the Negro from
the electorate, putting politics again on a decent footing.

All-this resulted, he thought, in an immediate benefit
for-Virginia.

Scandalous practices ceased, political

s~~ility

replaced instability, the tone of public affairs

~x,:nproved,

and tendencies of a "dangerously radical nature"

disappeared.

Most important to Hall was the fact that

4

Virginia politicians and officeholders had shown "a
fine sense of honor and loyalty" as a result of the
changes instituted in 1902. 2
Aligned against the forces of order in this
picture of political bliss was a liberal element of the
population that desired to allow the looting of the
state by "irresponsible, non-tax-paying voters" who
would return Virginia to the system that had existed
before the constitution of 1902.

To Hall this meant

that government would be turned over to the "most ignorant
and irresponsible elements in the community," that taxes
would be levied by people who paid no taxes, opening the
doors of extravagance and waste and making those that
proposed such programs "more dangerous than the carpetbaggers of the reconstruction period. 113
Implicit in these statements by Hall is the belief
that in order to be a responsible, intelligent voter, a
person had to have a financial stake in the government
that governed him.

A sign of this stake and a way of

showing one's interest in the community and a sense of
2 n 'Retention of the Capitation Tax as a Pre___
requisite to Voting,' An Address Delivered by Wilbur C.
l!all Over Radio Station WRVA, Richmond, Virginia, May 3,
Ig39;" pp. 1-2, Westmoreland Davis Papers, University of
Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va. Hereafter cited
as Davis Papers. Hall ignored the fact that a limited
electorate was also more manageable.
3

rbid., pp. 3-6.

5

civic responsibility was the payment of a small poll tax
in advance of an election.

Therefore, the suffrage
\

system of Virginia was perfectly democratic in Hali,l' s
I

view, and the tax requirement seemed "a reasonable enough
precaution against ignorance and irresponsibility. 114
In contrast to the views expressed by Hall are
those of tax repeal leader, Francis P. Miller, a member
of the House of Delegates during the 1938 and 1940 sessions
and an active anti-Byrd man for the rest of his life.

In

December, 1938, he addressed the Richmond Public Forum
on the question of retention of the poll tax.

Miller

reminded his audience of the history of the suffrage in
~i_rginia,

and while acknowledging the widespread corruption

characteristic of Reconstruction Virginia that led to the
~doption

of the new constitution in 1902, Miller declared

that Virginians now lived in a different age with circumstances changed, which made it essential to reconsider
the constitutional requirements regarding the suffrage in
relation to the principles in which the democrat believes.
For his-own part, Miller said that he was a believer in
the

d_e_m_?_C::E_C:t~~ _~~ory

of suffrage and sovereigni ty,

requiring him to reject all theories that imply that some
<Jl='OUps should rule while other groups be ruled.
- -4

.

- - Ibid., p. 5.

The people

6

as a whole, therefore, constituted the sovereign and every
literate adult should exercise the right of suffrage as
evidence of his membership in the body politic.

While

the circumstances of history prohibited the realization of
the-pure democratic theory, the permanent goal of a
democratic society should be universal adult suffrage.
The

5

distinct division of views exemplified by Hall

and Miller were not always maintained during the controversy
over the poll tax.

Miller represented the minority opinion

but-was influential in forcing the exposure of the
illogical defense of the system.

Hall, on the other hand,

voiced the opinions of the majority of the Byrd organization in Virginia which was using its efforts to maintain
the existing suffrage system. 6
- - --It is obvious from the two preceeding statements
by the opposing sides in the poll tax debate that it was
not a statistician's argument.

In the first place, it

was difficult to obtain accurate figures of qualified

5111

The Poll Tax and the Suffrage,' Speech of Francis
P. Miller at the Richmond Public Forum, Monday evening,
Dec. 19, 1938," box 95, Francis P. Miller Papers, University
of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter
cited as Hiller Papers. Although both Miller's and Hall's
statements are from the late 1930's, a similar division of
views was present in 1902.

~----~P~~ especially the letter of John s. Barbour to
Francis P. h11-ler to which Barbour attached a copy of Hall's
radio remark.= and stated, "This address so nearly covers
my views on the subject that I am taking the liberty of
submitting it to you •••• " Barbour to Miller, Jun. 8, 1939,
ibid.

7

voters from which to draw indisputable conclusions.
Separate lists were maintained for poll tax payments
and for registered voters.

The situation was complicated

further by the fact that many people paid the poll tax
-_but failed to register, or registered to vote but failed
_to pay the tax.

Therefore, this study has avoided

dependence upon poll tax statistics, and when such
:statistics appear during the debates on the subject,
_they are at best rough estimates.
- This study concerns the political and legal aspects
of the poll tax in Virginia's suffrage history.

Since the

Virginia Negro was the object of the constitutional
_provisions adopted in 1902, attention is also given to
the effects of the poll tax on the Negro and his efforts
to regain a voice in politics.

Other historians have

examined the poll tax and its effect on the South as a
whole and its relation to such things as changing economic
conditions and its influence on the Negro population of
_the re_~:!-:<?_I1 ~ ?_ ___ _
The opposition to Virginia's poll tax, cormnencing
_eyen before the adoption of the new state constitution in
--- - - -7 see Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro,
Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York, 1966);
Fredric D. Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South (University,
:Al_a., 1958); v.o. Key, Southern Politics in State and
Nation (New York, 1949), pp. 578-618, hereafter cited as
Key, Southern Politics.

8

1902, continued until the adoption of Federal legislation
in the form of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964.

By

1950, however, the most important debates over the: poll
1,

tax had come to an end.

I

Especially after 1954, when the

Old Dominion entered a period dominated by the doctrines
of interposition and massive resistance, it became
virtually impossible to raise the issue of poll tax reform
to any level of calm and logical debate.

The half century

upon which this study focuses reveals an aspect of one of
the most persistent debates in American history, the true
relationship between the public and its government.

CHAPTER I
FORMING A LIMITED ELECTORATE, 1890-1902
"Discrimination!

Why, that is precisely what we

propose; that, exactly, is what this Convention was
elected for," Carter Glass told the delegates to the
Virginia constitutional convention in Richmond during
1902.

He was speaking in favor of a proposed suffrage

article for the constitution that would become the basis
for voting in the Old Dominion for more than fifty years.
Glass, and the majority of other members of the convention, believed that the plan before them would "eliminate
the darkey as a political factor" in the state in less
than five years, bringing "purified" politics and a
strengthened public service.I

The efforts by Glass and

his fellow politicians to remove Virginia blacks from the
political process were the culmination of years of

lReport of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention, State of Virginia, Held in the
City of Richmond June 12, 1901 to June 26, 1902 (2 vols;
Richmond, 1906), II, pp. 3076-3077. Hereafter cited as
Debates of the Convention.
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discrimination and disfranchisement.

The convention did

not bring into being a new policy but merely gave the sanetion of law to an already existing set of standards.
DEMOCHACY IN THE OLD DOMINION
The process of disfranchising the Negro had been
under way since the Conservatives, or Democrats, gained
control of the state government from the Radicals.

In

1874, the Underwood Constitution was amended to give the
legislature the power to determine the form of city
government, a maneuver designed to assure white control
of cities in the black belt of the state.
tion was again amended in 1876.

The constitu-

To the list of offenses

for which a person was excluded from voting was added
petit larceny,
Negroes.

an offense considered to be common among

A poll tax was also instituted, but its effect

was limited since the tax could be paid any time prior to
voting.2

In 1882, after the Readjuster party under the

direction of William Mahone gained control of state politics, the poll tax was removed, but the supervision of

2william D. Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion,
Virginia Farm Politics, 1885-1900 (Richmond, 1935}, p.
53.

11
elections was centralized and control maintained
i

through the electoral boards that appointed judges of
elections.3

\

In Virginia, and throughout the South, further
legal attempts at disfranchisement were delayed during
the 1880's.

There existed the fear that agrarian inter-

ests and emerging Populists would seize control of state
constitutional conventions and write new organic laws
that would be compatible with their own views.

As long

as there were two strong political elements within a
state, the Negro became an important element in plans for
victory and was wooed for an ally.

The defeated Lodge

Force Bill, which would have provided for Federal supervision of Congressional elections, also demonstrated that
Congress was capable of action against Southern transgressions of Negro rights.4

Perhaps most important in

Virginia was the fear among Democrats that a Republican

3constitution of Virginia, 1876, Art. III, sec. I,
par. 3,--and Art. V, sec. 23.
~_.Y._an Woodward, Origins of the New South, vol IX
of A History of the South, ed. Wendell H. Stephenson and
E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton Rouge, 1951), p. 322~
Hereafter cited as Woodward, Origins of the New South.
4
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controlled Congress would not seat state representatives
because of fraud and the throwing out of the Negro vote
in elections.5

The Negro, therefore, remained a poten-

tial threat in state politics unless some legal means
could be devised to eliminate his vote.

The memories of

Mahoneism reminded Virginians that ambitious politicians
could easily use the Negro vote.
- : •· c

---In order to legally remove the Negro from the polit-

ical process, the Underwood Constitution would have to be
amended.

Article three, section one, of this constitu-

tion enfranchised every twenty-one year old male citizen
of :the United States who had been a resident of the state
for one year.

Section three of the same article offered

those who desired to be rid of the Negro vote a method
for effecting such a change.

This section provided that

in 1888, and each twentieth year thereafter and at any
time.the General Assembly might provide by law, the questio_!l___of --~al~i_ng

-~

constitutional convention should be

presentedto_the qualified voters.

Such a proposal was

presented to the electorate in 1888 but was defeated by a

---5charles E. Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia, 18701902 (Charlottesville, 1961), p. 55. Hereafter cited as
Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia.
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vote of 63,125 to 3,698.6

Neither Republicans nor

Democrats made an issue of the call for a convention.
The Republicans opposed a convention because they saw
nothing to gain.

The Democrats feared the return of

Mahoneism if any attempt was made to alter the constitution.7.
After 1888 the Negro vote ceased to be a determining factor in state elections due to the emergence of a
powerful Democratic party, but remained an
·~a

excuse for

_constant source of election frauds, trickery and irri-

tation that threatened to corrupt the whole body politic
of the Commonwealth."8

The spectre of Negro domination

was paraded before those who criticized these corrupt
practices.

As one observer remarked, "That many other-

wise honest, upright and respectable men believed the end
of Negro disfranchisement justified the means used to

6nebates of the Convention, I, p. 211.
- .. - · · ?Ralph

c.

McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Con-

vention of 1901-1902 ("Johns Hopkins University Studies
in Historical and Political Science," Ser. ILVI, No. 3;
Baltimore, 1928}, p. 33. Hereafter cited as McDanel,
~he.Yirginia Constitutional Convention.
8Richard L. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics,
1865-1902 (Charlottesville, Va., 1919}, pp. 161-62.
Hereafter cited as Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics.
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obtain it cannot be doubted."9

By 1894 these election
i

frauds caused enough concern to result in the passage of

I

.
.
.
the Walton Act in
an attempt to improve
con d'itions.

Up to this time the state had operated under what
was known as the Anderson-McCormick election law.10

This

act provided for General Assembly selection of an electoral board composed of three members for each county and
city~in

the state.

The electoral boards were authorized

to select all other election officials in their jurisdiction.

With a Democratic controlled legislature and the

retention of the open ballot, partisan operation of the
electoral boards was assured.

In practice, each party

supplied its own ballots to voters outside or inside
polling places.

Party workers could accompany voters to

the ballot box to ensure that they voted correctly.11

9McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention,

p.- 33 ;---- - - - -- ----- .

lOActs and Joint Resolutions Passed by the General
Assembly of the State of Virginia, 1883-84, pp. 146-47.
Hereafter cited as Acts of the General Assembly.
:: _ . -~ _llwilliam C. Pendleton, Poli ti cal History of
Appalachian Virginia (Dayton, Va., 1927), p. 374. Hereafter cited as Pendleton, Political History of
Appalachian Virginia.

15

The Walton Act was designed to eliminate the
fraudulent r:ractices under the Anderson-McCormick law and
introduced a modified Australian ballot.

The elector was

to vote on a white paper ticket with the names of candidates printed in black ink below the office they were
running for.

The voter was to deliver to the election

judge a single ballot with lines drawn three-quarters of
the way through the names not voted for and was allowed
two and one-half minutes to mark his ballot.

A special

constable was appointed by the electoral board to assist
those voters who were physically or educationally unable
to mark their ballot.
Special care was taken in regard to the ballots.
In addition to the format specifications, the electoral
board was to have the ballots printed.
disclosure was required of the printer.

An oath of nonThe board then

counted and marked with its seal and sealed the ballots.
Unused ballots were to be "carefully destroyed" before
the ballot boxes were opened.
An attempt was also made to make the electoral
board more representative of the voting population.
vision

Pro-

was made for a minority election judge, but this

feature was weakened by another provision of the act that

16
declared that no election could be voided if there was
not a minority representative serving as an election
judge.

Willful failure to follow the provisions of the

act was made a misdemeanor with a fine of $200.00 and
imprisonment for one month.12
The Walton Act has been variously interpreted.

An

analysis of Virginia government made in 1912 concluded that
the act had been "a great improvement upon the old
system. 13
11

However commendable the objective of the act

may have been, its actual effect seems to have been subverted by human nature and by fraud.

The Walton Act re-

tained the electoral boards instituted under the AndersonMcCormick law, thus insuring their control by partisan
Democrats.

During elections, the electoral judges invari-

ably supplied a Democratic constable to assist those
voters physically or educationally unable to mark their
ballots.14

Since the Republican party had proportionately

12Acts of the General Assembly, 1894, pp. 862-67.
13p. A. Magruder, Recent Administrations in Virginia
("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Ser. XXX, No. l; Baltimore, 1912), p.
85.
14 Pendleton, Political History of Appa·lachian
Virginia, p. 375.
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a much larger following among poor illiterate whites than
the Democratic party, the new ballot provisions caused a
greater number of Republicans to lose their votes.
Negroes were afraid to ask Democratic election judges
for assistance; whites were timid or hesitant to admit
their ignorance before their friends.

The result was

that many voters, both black and white, stayed away from
the polls and those who did vote of ten found a confusing
ballot which they were not able to mark correctly.15
An attempt was made by the General Assembly in 1896
to improve the Walton Act.

The use of a constable had

proved so unacceptable that he was removed from the polling place.

The amended act provided that the judges of

election, or a majority of them, appoint one of their
number to assist electors physically or educationally
unable to mark their ballots.

The judge was to enter

the booth with the voter, read the ballot to him, and
point out those names the voter wished to strike out.16
The amended law resulted in little change in election practice.

A review of contested election cases in

15Morton, The Negro· ·in Virginia Politics, pp. 133-34.
16Acts of the General Assembly, 1896, pp. 763-70.
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the House of Representatives reveals that almost every
conceivable election fraud was used in Virginia at this
time.

In an election of 1896 contested by Jacob Yost,

the Republican candidate for the seat won by H. St.
George Tucker, evidence was presented that ballots were
prepared in such a manner that the names of candidates
were alternated in position to avoid a "smart Republican"
who would vote early and then instruct less intelligent
voters on the manner of voting.

Further evidence was

present that Negro voters were given instruction in
recognizing just one name, and the election was reversed
and Tucker lost his seat.17
There were numerous incidents of judges preparing
ballots in James City, Princess Anne, Surry, and Warwick
Counties.

Democratic registrars refused to register

Republican voters.

An election judge in Isle of Wight

County swore he allowed voters to vote improperly marked
ballots.

Another judge, when asked if he had read the

Virginia election laws, replied, "Part of it - a very

17u. s. Congress, House, House Reports, 54th Cong.,
1st Sess., No. 1636.

19
small part; I don't believe in law nohow. 11 18

Democratic

registrars admitted that many names appearing on poll
books were not upon registration lists.

Residents testi-

fied that although their names appeared on poll lists,
they had not voted.

Poll lists were so clumsily composed

that "they show numbers of persons whose names begin with
A voting together, followed by numbers whose names begin
with B and C, and so on throughout the alphabet.

Dead

men were voted, and men known to be absent in the service
of the United States. 11 19
Ab.use in the preparation of ballots is best illustrated by the highly contested election in the Ninth
Congressional District between General James A. Walker
and Congressman William F. Rhea in 1898.

A Congressional

investigation revealed that the ballots used were complicated and unfair and that any intelligent person would
have had difficulty marking them in the required two and '
one-half minutes.

The ballot used in Scott County was

singled out for its unfairness.

This ballot has to be

18 Richard A. Wise v. William A. Young, ibid., 55th
Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 772.

v.

19Richard A. Wise
William A. Young, ibid., 56th
Cong., 1st Sess., No. 186.

20
seen to be believed, and description is difficult.

On

three newspaper type columns were listed the names of six
candidates for President and Vice President, the names of
the electors for each, their residences, the names of
Walker and Rhea, followed by the titles of the offices
for which they were candidates.

No form, order, or

arrangement is apparent, and the names of the Congressional candidates appear in unexpected positions.

The in-

vestigating committee concluded that the ballots "were
necessarily very misleading and confusing. 20
11

When Governor Charles T. O'Ferrall addressed the
General Assembly at the end of 1897, he recommended
"material changes" in the election laws.

While contend-

ing that elections had become quieter and more orderly
and that opportunities to purchase votes had been minimized, the Governor declared that existing legislation
disfranchised many voters and opened wide the door for
corruption and dishonesty.

O'Ferrall offered as the best

evidence for imperfections the "thousands" of improperly
marked ballots that had been rejected and acknowledged
that election judges had been appointed who were "so

20nouse· Reports, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1504

ft

21
ignorant as not to be able to read or write."
nor proposed the adoption of an

~mblem

The Gover-

ballot which would
\

be displayed in exact replica in the press and at the
I
polls prior to any election, a change that would have reduced the number of improperly marked ballots but would
have done little to remedy the corruption and dishonesty
O'Ferrall had discovered.

Perhaps fortunately, the

General Assembly took no action on his recommendations.21
It is apparent that by the mid-nineties the Negro
and many whites had been practically disfranchised by
corrupt election practices.22

When the question of call-

ing a constitutional convention was put to the people in
1897, it was once again rejected. 2 3

The defeat of the

proposal can be attributed to Democratic confusion on the
subject.

There was no agreement within their ranks as to

what changes in the constitution should be made, and
opposition came from conservative Democrats who feared

21Journal and Documents of the House of Delegates of
the State of Virginia, 1897-98, pp. 39-40. Hereafter cited
as Journal of the House.
22 Morton, The Negro in Virginia· Politics, p. 134.
23nebates of the Convention, I, p. 211. The vote
was 83,435 for, 38,326 against calling a convention.

22
that state Populists might try to gain control of a convention and insert some of their more radical ideas. 24
In addition, there was still the perplexing problem of
devising a method of disfranchisement that would withstand the test of constitutionality necessitated by the
14th and 15th Amendments.

In 1890, Mississippi had pro-

duced a unique device to accomplish this end.

The new

constitution of the state required that a voter be twentyone years old, sane, and a resident of Mississippi for
two years and of his district for one year; he must not
have been convicted of certain crimes, including theft
and bigamy; he was required to pay a two-dollar poll tax
eight months before elections; and he must be able to
read a passage from the state constitution or understand
it when read to him or give a reasonable interpretation
of it.25

Lack of any provisions for bipartisan or bi-

racial representation on registration boards opened opportunities for discrimination.

Mississippi's plan opened

the door for disfranchisement of the Negro.

South

Carolina and Louisiana quickly adopted constitutions with

24The· Times (Richmond, Va.), Feb. 6, 1900.
25woodward,· Ori·gin·s of the New south, p. 322.

23
similar provisions, but it was not until 1898 that there
was assurance the Mississippi plan would pass the test of
constitutionality.
The Supreme Court in 1898 upheld the voting provisions of Mississippi's constitution. 26

To restrict

voting to those who are literate is within the power of
the state, the Court said, and voting was thus subject to
the state's definition of literacy.

It was not shown to

the Court's satisfaction that color played any part in
the administration of the Mississippi tests.

The Court's

decision in Williams v •. Mississippi marked the end of an
era of disfranchisement of the Negro without sanction of
law and opened the door to legal disfranchisement.27
By the mid-nineties the Negro had been eliminated
from the political process of Virginia by fraud, cheating
and bribery, but by the close of the 1890's, the corrupt
practices used against the Negro had caused serious problems for the Democrats.

It was becoming increasingly

evident that the Democrats in power would go to any length,

26williams v. Missi·ssippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
27woodward,· Ori·gi·n·s· o·f the New south 1 p. 322.

24
even against fellow white Democrats, to maintain their
position.28

The real threat to the state was seen by
I

those who viewed the evidence and results of contested
I

elections in the House of Representatives.

From 1874 to

1900 there were twenty contested elections from Virginia
that reached the House.
with alleged fraud.

Sixteen of these cases dealt

Eleven of the sixteen were decided

by a Republican House and resulted in the seating of ·six
Republicans.29

Early in 1900 the Richmond Times des-

cribed Virginia voters as countenancing election fraud to
maintain white supremacy.

But now the electorate, chaf-

ing under the system, had risen up to remove the pretext
for fraud.

"If the ignorant and vicious negro vote is

the cause of corruption at the ballot box, then the cause
must and shall be removed," a course more honorable and
courageous and better for good government and public

28 wythe w. Holt, "The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902. A Reform Movement Which Lacked
Substance," Virg·inia Magazine of History ·and Biography,
LXXVI (Jan., 1968), 70-71.
29 chester H. Rowell,· A Historical and LegaT Digest
. ·of Al"l the co·ntested Electi·on Cases in the House of
Representatives of the United States· from the First to
the Fifty-Sixth Congress, "1"789-1901 (Washington, 1901),
passim.
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morals than making a pretense of letting the Negro vote
and then cheating him at the polls.30
Undaunted by their defeats in 1888 and 1897, proponents of a constitutional convention continued to
pressure for the meeting.

With little opposition, the

General Assembly passed a resolution in March, 1900, calling for a vote on the convention in May of that year.31
Although the Democratic State Convention endorsed the
calling of the convention, there was opposition from
Republicans who realized, like the Democrats, that d±sfrancisement of the Negro also meant disfranchisement of
illiterate whites.
In addition, opposition came from_ officeholders who
feared elimination of their jobs as a result of changes
in the constitution.

Others feared the removal of the

Negro would result in Republican political ascendancy in
the state government.

Some believed the Negro had been

effectively removed and that there was no need for constitutional revision, and there were many illiterate
whites who feared being disfranchised despite Democratic

30Editorial in The Times, Jan. 27, 1900.
3·1Acts of the General Assembly, 1899-1900, p. 835.
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assurances that such would not be the case.32
To insure that the vote on the convention received
the most favorable consideration, the General Assembly
had provided that ballots be printed with only the words
"For Constitutional Convention."

All unmarked ballots

were to be counted as a vote for the convention.33

The

voter who favored the convention was therefore supplied
with a ready-made ballot which he had only to deposit in
the ballot box while those who opposed the convention
were required to receive a ballot, enter a voting booth.
and mark through it and then emerge to deposit the ballot
in the presence of Democratic election officials, their
friends and associates.

This method of voting prompted

one contemporary from the western section of the state to
conclude that "the will of the white people of Virginia
was against the convention, but their will was defeated
by the [Democratic] Machine," and, once the convention

32McDanel, The· Virginia Constitutional· Convention,
pp. 13-15. The Democratic pledge is printed in Debates
· of· the Convention, I, p. 99.
33 Acts· ·of· the· Gene·ral As·s·emhly, 1899-1900, p. 835.
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assembled, this trick was condemned by Republican
members. 34
Despite the opposition aroused by the convention
question, Democrats had the support of the Democratic
press.35

The papers encouraged readers to vote for the

convention and devoted large sections of their editions
to the issues involved.

Typical of the editorial comments

is that of the Richmond Times shortly before the vote was
to be taken.

"Negro suffrage has become a curse to the

South," the Times declared, and the time had come to
remove the curse.

The removal of the black was in the

interest of both races, for it insured "peace and pure
elections and good government."

The paper revealed its

conception of the duty of the white man to the Negro by
declaring that "as he shows himself qualified he will be
permitted to exercise the right of franchise. 36
11

While

34pendleton, Poli ti·cal History of Appal'achian
Virginia, p. 443; Debates of the Convention, I, p. 211;
II I p. 3119.
35 Herrnan Horn, "The Growth and Development of the
Democratic Party in Virginia Since 1890" {unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, Duke University,
1949), pp. 59-60.
Hereafter cited as Horn, "Growth of
the Democratic Party."
36Editorial in The· Times, May 8, 1900.
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holding out the possibility for future Negro

participat~on

in the electoral process, the Times made it increasingly
I
difficult for a white Virginia politician to advocate the
I

black franchise.

After a review of the report of the

Committee on Reconstruction which recommended the 14th
Amendment, the paper concluded "they recommended the enforcement of negro suffrage as a means of humiliating the
Southern Whites" in order to bring them into "a condition
of repentant submission. 113 7

The persistence of such

views opened the way for attacks on those who favored
Negro voting or remained silent as carpetbaggers or
scalawags, a label that no practical politician could
endure.
Although powerless to stop the movement toward the
constitutional convention and disfranchisement, the black
press in Richmond waged a vigorous campaign against the
convention.

The Richmond Planet, edited by John

Mitchell, Jr., waged ,_ its crusade in an indirect manner by
indulging and catering to conservative Virginians for
support, a tactic made necessary by Northern liberal

37Edi torial in -ibid., Nov. 24, 1900 ·-
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indifference and Federal government neglect.38

The

"scarecrow" of Negro domination, Mitchell charged, was
being used to divert attention from the true purposes of
the convention.39

The purposes, as Mitchell saw them,

were the reduction of taxes for the rich, initiation of
governmental reform to curtail corruption, revenge against
a small but wealthy and independent segment of the Negro
population, and degradation of the Negro.

Mitchell

rightly believed that if the Negro lost the vote, he
would be denied the right to hold office.

The next step

was the denial of the right to labor and to earn money
for his support.40

"That any man could believe that po-

litical rascality can be ended by the excuse of constitutional rascality is a surprising thing to us," the Planet
stated.

"It is only polluting the source of all law and

in this makes the situation worse instead of better. 11 41
Mitchell's efforts and those of others opposed to

38James H. Brewer, "Editorials from the Damned,"
Journal o·f southern Hi·story, XXVIII (May, 1962) , 225-226.
39 Editorial in· The· Pl"anet (Richmond, Va.), Apr. 28,
1900.
4 0Brewer, "Editorials from the Damned," 227-229.
41Editorial in The· P-lan·et, Apr. 28, 1900.
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the calling of a convention were fruitless.

When the

votes were counted on May 23, the call for the c6nvenI

tion was approved by a vote of 77 ,362 to 60,375.4:\2

The

surprising aspect of the geographic distribution of votes
was that the cities and black counties returned the
majorities in favor of the convention that offset the
anti-convention sentiment of the rural districts and
white counties of the western section of the state.

The

pro-convention vote by the black counties is partially
explained by the fact that Negro votes were simply not
counted or that blacks were encouraged not to vote.
Strong Republican feeling and the remains of sectional
sentiment pushed the vote against the convention in the
western part of the state. 4 3

It appears that the only

real desire to disfranchise the Negro existed in the
counties where he allegedly thre?.tened white control by
his numbers, or offered an excuse for election fraud.
The irregularities in voting procedures, the size of the

42wynes,· Race· Re·lati·ons· in Virginia, p. 58; McDanel,
The vi·rgin:ia Constitutional Convention, p. 16.
43McDanel,· The· vi·rgin·ia· Constitutio·nal· Convention,
p. 18.
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vote, and the illogical nature of the returns led one
historian to conclude that the constitutional convention
I

of 1902 "was not the result of public demand."44(

I

RECONSTRUCTING SUFFRAGE

Delegates to the convention were not elected until
May 29, 1901.

Of the one hundred delegates chosen,

eighty-eight were Democrats.45

Since the Democrats had

made the calling of the convention for the express purpose of removing the blacks from state politics a party
issue, the course of the proceedings seemed set.

The

convention convened on June 12, 1901 and proceeded to the
consideration of the problems before it, but it was not
until late September that the Elective Franchise Committee submitted its proposals.46

The Elective Franchise Committee was the most important of all the convention committees and had the
most difficult task to perform.

Among its twenty-two

members were some of the leading politicians in the

44wynes, Race Relati·o·n·s· i·n· vi·rginia, pp. 57-58, 62 .•
.4 5McDanel ,· The Virqi·ni·a· Con·stitllti·ona1· Conve·ntion,
p. 19.

4 6oebates of ·the· Convention, I, pp. 599-603, 620628.
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Corcunonwealth.

John W. Daniel was the chairman.

Walter

A. Watson, J. W. Wysor, Henry D. "Hal" Flood, Henry

c.

iI

Stuart, and two Republicans, A. P. Gillespie of Tazewell
I

and Thomas L. Moore of Montgomery, were other leading
figures whose task it was "to strike from the suffrage
the alien and the enemy in Eastern Virginia and

at the

same time leave untouched the worthy but illiterate
Anglo-Saxon of the mountain side and the west beyond. 11 47
There was a wide divergence of opinion within the
convention as to the purpose of the suffrage article.
A. P. Thom, of Norfolk, expressed the view of many of
the delegates from the counties with large Negro populations.

The purpose of the article, in Thom's view, was

not to secure white supremacy because Anglo-Saxons had
the supremacy and would keep it regardless of the methods
to which they might have to resort, but rather to remove
the Negro completely from the electorate regardless of
means and regardless of the number of poor whites that
might be disfranchised.48
Another group, led by Chairman Daniel and Carter

47Ib·i· d., I

I

p • 59 8 •

48Ibi' d., II I p • · 2986 •
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Glass, favored disfranchisement of sufficient Negroes to
insure white supremacy, but did not want to disfranchise
49
The Rev. Richard Mcilwaine, of Prince
any whites.
Edward, and Judge Robertson, of Roanoke County, favored
the disfranchisement of incapable whites as well as
blacks.

Mcilwaine introduced statistics to show that

there were two and one-half times as many felonies per
voter in the white Ninth District as in the black Fourth
District, and advocated the elimination of the "ignorant
and vicious white element" of the western section as well
as the ignorant Negro in the eastern part of the state. 50
Another group of Democrats from west of the Blue
Ridge was satisfied with the conditions as they were,
according to statements by J. B. Richmond of Lee and Scott
counties and George B. Keezell from Rockingham.

But this

group was not opposed to disfranchising the Negro.

They

were willing to assist Eastern Virginia in ridding the
state of the black vote as long as no whites were removed.
Summers, of Washington County, and A. L. Pedigo, of Henry,
expressing the Republican view, said that Negroes should
52
have the right to vote.
49 rbid., p. 3076.
50 rbid., P. 2998.
51 rbid., p. 3008.
52

rbid., I, pp. 210, 213-214.
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The Franchise Committee therefore divided into two
general groups, according to Walter A. Watson.

There were

the "disfranchisers", like Watson, who were willing to
"give up any and everything to disfranchise all the
Negroes."

The other group, "the whitewashers," were those

members who would settle for less than total removal of
the Negro from the electorate.

53

With the committee divided along these lines, it
is not surprising that both majority and minority suffrage
reports were submitted to the convention.

The primary

conflict emerged as a question of the desirability of an
"understanding clause."

The majority report, submitted

by Watson, maintained that such a provision was necessary
to insure electorate purity, meaning the elimination of
illiterates and the Negro, while the minority plan submitted by J.

w.

Wysor submitted that an understanding

clause fairly administered would disfranchise thousands
of whites and result in a property qualification for the
right of suffrage. 54
plans, however.

One feature was present in both

Watson's prefatory explanation of the

majority report stated the-assumption upon which this
provision was based; experience had demonstrated that

53 walter A. Watson Diary, Feb. 7 and Mar. 21, 1902,
Walter A. Watson Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va.
54
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Debates of the Convention, I, pp. 600-604.
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those who participate in the government should contribute
to its support.

For that purpose, the report recommended

the institution of a poll tax in the amount of one dollar
and fifty cents, to be paid by those entitled to vote six
months in advance of the election in which the voter
intended to participate.

The prepayment requirement

was imposed in order to "prevent the corruption of the
franchise by candidates for office on the eve of or during
an election, and in order to confine the voting to those
who value the privilege sufficiently to qualify themselves
for it by their own individual and unaided act'! 5 ~.
The minority report reflected similar reasoning.
The only prerequisite imposed upon the voter under the
Wysor plan was payment, six months in advance, of a poll
tax.

Wysor believed the amount of the tax should properly

be determined by the Finance Conunittee, but he suggested
an amount not in excess of one dollar and fifty cents.
The tax was to serve a two-fold

purpose~

it would provide

revenue for the public schools and "purify and purge" the
most "unworthy and trifling of that race" from the polls. 56
That both plans required prepayment of the poll tax on
the grounds it would prevent corruption in elections is

55

Ibid., p. 600.

56 rbid., pp. 603-604.

The Wysor plan also provided
that no Negro was eligible for office in Virginia.
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a not altogether startling admission of the part played
by fraud in the elections that preceeded the

conv~ntion.

There seems to have been no disagreement as \to the

I

future distribution of funds collected from the poll tax.
Use of these revenues to finance public education was a
part of Virginia history, as it was in the history ·of
other poll tax states.

57

Specifically, the report of the

Finance Committee provided for the collection of a tax of
one dollar and fifty cents per annum on every male resident
over 21 years of age except pensioners of the state for
military service.

One dollar of the tax was to be used

exclusively for the free public schools.

The remainder

was to be paid by the state into the treasury of the city
or county from which i t was collected.

58

It is not

altogether apparent whether there was an "educational
lobby" at work during the convention pursuing the enactment
. particu
. 1 ar provision.
. .
59
o f th is

Prior to 1876, sentiment

57 The Underwood Constitution of 1867-68 (Art. X,
sec. 1 and 5) provided for equal and uniform taxes and a
capitation tax of one dollar per year to be applied to aid
public schools. Cities and counties were permitted a
capitation tax of fifty cents to be used for all purposes.
58 oehates of the Convention, I, p. 2646.
59 Frank B. Williams found pressure by educators was
important in having revenues diverted to schools in his
study of the poll tax in Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee
and Kentucky. See, "The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement
in the South, 1870-1901," Journal of Southern History,
XVIII (Nov., 1952), 469-496.
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was growing to make payment of the tax a precondition for
voting because of a high delinquency rate in capitation
\
payment and the need for more school revenue. 60 The
i
State Superintendent of Public Instruction in his 1873
report recommended doubling the tax and making it a
voting requirement.

The possibility that candidates might

buy votes by paying the poll tax was accepted by the
Superintendent as an argument in favor of the measure
since "a vote buying candidate would take other and
worse means for securing votes if he did not do this. 1161
The proposal was repeated in the school report of 1875,
and given force by the discovery that revenue paid in the
form of coupons from state bonds was diverted to payment
of the state debt and not available for school financing. 62
This was enough reason to assure passage in 1876 of the
constitutional provision for payment of the tax as a
precondition of voting.
Joseph

w.

Southall, Superintendent of Public

Instruction at the time of the 1901 convention, does not
appear to have been as presumptuous as his predecessor.
While not calling for any specific revenue producing
60 snavely, The Taxation of Negroes, p. 17.
61 Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
1873, (Richmond, 1874), p. 120.
62I..
01. d •

p. 18.

,

1875, p. 124; Snavely, Taxation of Negroes,
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measures, Southall did reflect upon the situation of the
Negro in the Virginia educational system.

In 1899, the
\

Superintendent estimated that the Negro cost the state
I

about one-half million dollars in excess of the amount
of taxes paid into the treasury by him.

"This is not

an encouraging state of affairs," Southall concluded,
offering no suggestion for the alleviation of the situation.
As far as participation in government, Southall concluded
"the granting of the elective franchise to these people
without previous preparation was a colossal blunder, if
not a crime."

Evidently he was assured by a reading of

the political picture of the time that the problems for
state education would be corrected by the new constitution. 63
Southall's concern over the proportion of funds
collected from Virginia blacks and the money contributed
by the state to their education surfaced during the
debates of the constitutional convention and produced an
almost unsolvable dilerrana. · Upon recorranendation of the
Franchise Corranittee, the Finance Committee inserted a
provision in its report that the capitation tax was not
to be considered a lien or collectable by legal process
from the personal property exempted from levy or distress

63 Re ort of the Su erintendent of Public Instruction,

1898/1899, pp.

XXXJ.V-XXXVJ.J.i

~· ,.

1900 1901, p.

XJ.V.
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under the poor debtors law.

64

The provision was obviously

designed to further discourage payment of the tax by
Negroes.

Collection of delinquent capitation

always been a problem.

65

\

taxe~

had

I

One method used to force

collection was the placing of a lien upon personal
property, but to continue such a practice would have
worked against other provisions designed to remove the
black as completely as possible from the political process,
resulting in more'rather than fewer Negroes qualified to
vote.

By removing the threat of forced collection, the

~egro

would find no compulsion to pay the poll tax.

The

premise was, of course, that the exemption would work in
favor of the white population.
Support came from those msmbers who desired to
strengthen the franchise provisions.

Other members of

the convention supported the measure because they felt
forced collection by levy was not a democratic principle.
John

c.

Summers of Washington County related that he had

seen nwomen barefooted, children barefooted, old men
tottering with age, and these little despicable collectors

64 oebates of the Convention, II, p. 2862. The poor
law exempted such items as a pair of horses, a mule, a
wagon, or a small house and its furniture, meal and flour,
amounting in value to not less than $150.00.
65 see chart in Appendix A.
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come round and levy upon the last thing in God' s earth
they have. 1166

!
I

Opponents to the exemption provision were vocal,
1

and on March 5, 1902, T. W. Harrison of Fredrick County
introduced an amendment to remove the exemption from the
taxation article.

Echoing the complaint of Superintendent

Southall, Harrison noted that in 1899 the Negro paid
$65,000 in capitation taxes while drawing from the

Treasury over $250,000 in funds for education.

To allow

for non-payment would remove the largest source of revenue
going to Negro public education and shift the burden of
educating the Negro in large measure to the white population. 67

After stating his opposition to the payment of a

capitation tax as a precondition of voting, Henry D. Flood
voiced the resentment that the people of his section of
Virginia felt.

"They are tired of seeing their taxes

appropriated to run negro schools," the Campbell County
delegate said, "and of having non6 of those taxes gotten
out of the negroes, except a paltry sum, beyond what comes
from the capitation tax. 1168

Other delegates questioned

the intended result of the exemption provision, foreseeing
that once the Negro realized that the provisions for

66 oebates of the Convention, II, p. 2650.
67 rbid., 2860-61.
68 rbid., pp. 2863-64.
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prepayment were aimed at him, he would simply shift the
burden of the tax to the candidate who was willing to
pay it, thus opening the way for a greater chance of
fraud. 69
The convention was clearly on the verge of a dead:lock over the purpose of the exemption provision.

The

delegates were being asked to view the section of the
taxation article as a supplement to the franchise provisions of the constitution.

To the majority of the

Franchise Committee, exemption from payment by levy or
distress reenforced other measures to disfranchise the
Negro.

But the revenue qollected from the tax was to be

used to support the public schools, and by not enforcing
collection, the burden of support was shifted to the
white population, a burden that Flood's comments indicate
was not altogether welcome.

The problem was that the

section could not be considered as both a revenue measure
and a franchise measure.
When the question was put to the convention, the
Harrison amendment was defeated by a vote of 46 to 21. 70
The majority of the delegates realized the inconsistency
69 rbid., p. 2862, remarks by O'Flaherty, and p.
2878, remarks by Kendall.
7 oibid., p. 2866.
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of enforcing the prepayment provisions and then collecting the delinquent taxes, thus in effect extending the
period of time during which the poll tax could be paid
and offsetting the disfranchising result desired. 71

The

vote on this amendment also demonstrated the delegates
rejected the contention made by some members that the
Negro would always pay his poll tax whether payment was
compulsory or voluntary.

The rates of delinquency cited

during the consideration of the amendment bolstered the
hope that voluntary payment would increase the rate of
delinquency among the Negro population.
The convention still faced the problem of the
black-belt counties that believed a disproportionate
share of the school taxes they paid went to the support
of Negro schools.

In order to relieve the situation,

the delegate from Dinwiddie, B. J. Epes, introduced an
amendment to section six of the taxation article requiring the Negro to pay "a more equitable proportion of the
burdens of the public school system, and of local expenses·. ·11

The provision provided that the General

Assembly could authorize county boards of supervisors or
city councils to levy an additional capitation tax of
not more than one dollar per year which would be applied
71.

See Meredith's comments, ibid., pp. 2864-65.
The black-belt counties were the south central Virginia
counties.
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to the aid of public schools, or whatever other purposes
should be determined. 72
The Epes provision was enthusiastically

I

su~ported
I

I

by delegates from the black-belt counties.

Rev. Richard

Mcilwaine, Hampden-Sydney professor and delegate from
Prince Edward, declared, "There is a great need of an
amount ••• for school purposes, and if it can be gotten
with the consent of the people, it seems to me that no
movement could be carried through that would be more
fraught with good. 1173

Some support also came from the

western part of the state.

Roanoke delegate William J.

Robertson believed there were two reasons why the amendment was a good one; the people of the black-belt had a
legitimate cause of complaint that would be relieved by
the amendment, and the amendment would inject the tax
question into every local election campaign.

Robertson

submitted that the tax issue was just the issue needed by
.
. .
74
the· peop 1 e o f Virginia.
There was resistance to this concession to the
black-belt counties from delegates who believed that the
additional tax would disqualify as many, if not more,
whites as colored voters.

72
73

rbid., p. 2867.
rbid., p. 2872.

7 flrbia:-•.:,. P. 2 86 9.

Even though in favor of a

44
capitation tax to disqualify white elements who "ought
to be disqualified," R. L. Gordon of Louisa was certain
that the tax would not disqualify any considerable number
of blacks in his section of Virginia.

In the opinion of

Gordon and other delegates who opposed the additional
tax, "if $1.50 does not keep a man from voting, $2.50 will
not keep him from voting."

The man who was willing to pay

the amount imposed by the state to vote "is going to pay
whatever tax is necessary in order to permit him to exercise that right. 1175
The vote on this amendment reveals that the convention recognized a concession was necessary to satisfy the
black-belt counties on the school funding issue.

By a

vote of 44 to 27, the additional tax provision was
adopted.

76

Besides Gordon, A. L. Pedigo from Henry

County and J. M. Hooker from Patrick County, opposition
came from the western and valley sections of Virginia,
the area of Republican strength and a comparatively
sparse Negro population.
No other amendments were added to the section of
the taxation article dealing with the poll tax, although
there were efforts to provide for further exemptions and

75 rbid., pp. 2870-72.

!'J(?Ibi.d~·;·· p. 2873,
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distribution of funds collected for the public schools to
the counties in which they were collected. 77 The defeat
of the second proposal fortunately saved the public education system from being reduced to a state of chaos.
It was not until March 31st that the convention
again considered in detail the suffrage provisions of the
constitution.

Since the first presentation of the ma-

jority and minority reports in September, 1901, it had
become increasingly evident to the Franchise Committee
that the two plans contained differences that could
stall the convention indefinitely if no attempt was made
at a compromise.

To resolve this problem, the Democratic

members met in conference to disentangle the conflicts
between the majority report and the Wysor report.

The

result was the Glass amendment, a compromise plan named
for Carter Glass, delegate from Lynchburg. 78
Convention members found that the most difficult
compromises concerned what was known as the temporary
understanding clause.

When the original majority report

was submitted, no educational test, reading, or writing
prerequisites were placed upon citizens registering to
vote prior to 1904.

After that date, the majority

report required the potential voter to make application
77 rbid., pp. 2876-80.
78 rbid., p. 2943.
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in his own handwriting and give a reasonable explanation
of the general nature of the duties of officers for which
he would vote.

The Wysor report contained no

te~porary

provisions for those persons registering prior td 1904
and required only that applicants be able to read the
constitution in English and write their own name. 79 The
Glass amendment retained the temporary provisions of the
majority report, but after January 1, 1904, the prospective voter was to
••• make application for registration in his
own handwriting, without aid or suggestion
or the use of memorandum, setting forth the
names and residence of his parents, his own
name, age, place and date of birth, his occupation and place of residence at the time for
two years prior to the date of his application: and if he has previously voted, then to
state in what State, County or City, and voting precinct he last voted; and he shall answer
on oath, any and all questions propounded to
him by the registration officer effecting his
qualification as an elector, which said questions shall be reduced to writing; having done
which and made oath to his statement, he sha$b
be duly listed by the Registrar of Election.
Debate on the understanding clause divideq the
convention along the lines of "disfranchisers" and "whitewashers~"

The concern, of course, was to make certain

that the largest number of Negroes were disfranchised
but to insure the enfranchisement of all whites.
79 rbid., I, pp. 600-605.
BOibid., II, p. 2938.

In
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answer to those who feared disfranchisement of as many
whites as blacks by the provision, Carter Glass gave
assurance that the article would "not necessarily deprive
a single white man of the ballot, but will inevitably cut
from the existing electorate four-fifths of the Negro
voters."

"Our politics will be purified," Glass told the
delegates, "and our public service strengthened. 11 81
Despite efforts by Republicans and worried black-belt

delegates to amend the understanding section, it emerged
virtually unaltered.
Similar unanimity was shown when the convention
considered sections of the suffrage article dealing with
the poll tax.

The original minority report contained no

provisions for the accumulation of the poll tax, but the
minority acquiesced in the cumulative feature.

The Glass

amendment required prepayment of all poll taxes assessed
or assessable for the preceding three years six months
in advance of the election in which the potential voter
81 Ibid., pp. 3016-77. Thom expressed the concern
of those who believed the understanding clause would not
keep Negroes from registering because of a growing literacy rate. " ••• It is this fleeting and disappearing
qualification that we people are asked to accept as the
solution of our trouble." Ibid., p. 2965. w. A. Watson
believed the plan effectively removed the "old-time
negro" but put in his place a new issue, "your reader,
your writer, your loafer, your voter, your ginger-cake
school graduate, with a diploma of side whiskers and
beaver hat, pocket pistols, brass knucks, and bicycles ••• "
Ibid., p. 3070.
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intended to participate.

Collection was not to be en-

forced by levy on personal property or otherwise until
i t had become three years past due. 82

':\

John W. Daniel, who had worked on the cornprJrnise
measure with Glass, noted in his introductory remarks on
the amendment that there had been disagreement among the
Democratic conference

o~er

the accumulative provisions.

When debate began, the nature of the disagreement became
apparent.

Henry Flood moved to reduce the period for pre-

payment from three years to one.

This would have allowed

the potential voter to vote if he had paid the tax prior
to the election in which he desired to participate, re..

gardless of whether he had paid the previous two year's
tax.

Evidently Flood's alternative had been thoroughly

discussed in the Democratic caucus; his amendment was
defeated with no discussion after Glass requested the
section be allowed to remain unchanged.

Quietly,

quickly and without substantial opposition, the poll tax
provision was adopted. 83

Final adoption of the suffrage

article came in the closing days of the convention, and
the article emerged largely as presented by Carter
Glass.

84

82

83

Ibid~,

p. 2943.

Ibid., p. 2958.

84~. , p. 3080.

The fin al vote was 59 to 20.
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The convention had not labored in vain.

Virginia

had followed the path blazed by Mississippi and South
carolina with the avowed purpose of removing the Negro
from the electorate.

The franchise in Virginia was offered

to every male citizen, twenty-one years of age, who had
been a resident of the state for two years, of a county,
city or town for one year, and of his precinct for thirty
days, and who had properly registered and paid state poll
taxes. 85
To insure that the largest number of whites in the

state were given the opportunity to register, the delegates
provided a unique feature.

During the years 1902 and 1903,

there was to be a general registration in which male residents having the age and residence requirements were entitled to register if they, (1) had served in time of war
in the army or navy of the United States, or Confederate
States; (2) were a son of a soldier; (3) had paid one
dollar in state taxes on property; or (4) were able to
read any section of the constitution, or have it read to
them, and give a reasonable explanation of that section.
After January 1, 1904, permanent provisions required that
the applicant have paid poll taxes for the preceding three

85 eonstitution of Virginia, 1902, Arta II, sec. 18.
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years, made application to the registrar in his own handwriting, without aid, suggestion or memorandum, stating
his name, age, date and place of birth, residence and
occupation at that time and for the previous two years.
If the applicant had previously voted, he was also to list
the state, county and precinct in which the vote was cast.
Lastly, he was to answer any and all questions "affecting
his qualifications as an elector. 1186
other provisions provided for an annual registration of voters, voting by ballot, and a three-member
electoral board in each city or county, in which representation was to be given "as far as possible" to each
of the two political parties.

The General Assembly was

also given authority to prescribe a property qualification
not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars for voters in
any county, city or town as a prerequisite for voting in
anY election for officers other than members of the General Assembly. 87
The poll tax was set at one dollar and fifty cents.
All poll taxes assessed or assessable were to be personally paid six months prior to the election in which the
applicant desired to participate.

Excluded from payment

86 1bid., sec. 19 and sec. 20.
87 1bid., sec. 25, sec. 27, sec. 31, and sec. 30.
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for the right to register and vote were former soldiers
of the United States or Confederate States.

Collection

was not to be enforced by legal process until the tax had
become three years past due. 88

\

These provisions have little meaning until applied
as qualifications to the potential electorate.

According

to the census of 1900, there were 301,379 white males and
146,122 colored males over twenty-one years of age in

Virginia.

With the exception of idiots, the insane, and

persons convicted of certain crimes, all were eligible to
vote under provisions of the Underwood Constitution, making the potential vote 447,501.

The vote in the Presi-

dential election of 1900 was 264,095.

89

Of the potential

Negro vote of 146,122, over half, or 76,764, were illiterate and would be required to register under the new constitution as a former soldier, the son of a soldier, one
who had paid one dollar in state taxes, or one able to
understand and explain a section of the constitution.
There were few Negroes who were soldiers or sons of
soldiers, and according to a report furnished the convention, there were in the state only 8,144 Negro males

88 1bid., sec. 20, sec. 21, and sec. 22.
8911 Population of Virginia Classified by cOlor, and
Literacy by Counties, 1900," Journal of the Constitutional
Convention of Virqinia (Richmond, 1902), document No. VII.
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assessed for taxes on real estate valued at $300 or over,
the amount that would produce one dollar in taxes. 90
.

In

I

1899, the amount collected from Negroes as tax on! personal
.
91
·
I
property was only $10,433.39.
Assuming that Negro owners
of
property
worth $300 or more were literate, _it is evident
.
.
that few of the illiterate
under

anythi~g

but the

N~groes

were able to

understandi~g

r~gister

clause, and it is

apparent from statements made during the convention that
Vi~ginia

Negroes would not be subject to an impartial
exarnination. 92
Of the potential white vote, only 36,493 were illit-

erate.

Although it is improbable that many of this number

paid a dollar in state taxes, many could register under
either of the soldier clauses, while others would receive
more favorable consideration than the Negro when attempting to

r~gister

under the understanding clause.

It is obvious that the convention did not leave the
removal of the Negro from the electorate to one legal device
9011 communication from the Auditor of Public Accounts,
in Relation to the Number of Male Citizens of the Commonwealth Assessed for Taxes on Real Estate Valued at $300.00
and.over in the Year 1900," ibid., document No. VIII.
9111 communication from the Auditor of Public Accounts
Showing the Amount of Taxes Paid on Real Estate, Personal
Property, Polls, Etc. for the Year 1899," ibid., document
no. IX.
-92oebates of the Convention, II, pp. 2972-73.
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such as an

understandi~g

clause.

By the use of three

different provisions, _the convention hoped to assure the
accomplishment of its task, but fears persisted that the
N~gro

would remain a political factor.

The most distressing

feature of the poll tax provision was its unpredictability.
There was no evidence sufficient to remove all doubts that
the tax

~ght

the N~groes.

bear more heavily on the whites than upon
Further danger exi.sted in

maki~g the tax

· cumulative and requiring its prepayment before election
enthusiasm had been aroused.

As one delegate observed,.

the white man regarded his suffrage as a right, while the
· N~gro regarded it as a privilege and would do a_ great
deal to preserve it that the white man would be "listless"
93

about.

Finally, .there was the matter of the o:r-ganization

N~gro

of the

community.

"They are organized everywhere

and controlled everywhere through the power of the ·church,"
.

.

A. P. Thom submitted.

94

It would be an easy matter for

the black churches to organize the

N~groes

six months in

advance of an election and pay poll taxes in a
proportion than whites.

la~ger

The poll tax alone was therefore not

sufficient to remove the blacks from the electoral process,
but when the

N~gro

realized that he must make out his own

application for registration, mark his own ballot, and pay
93 .....
Ibid., remarks by Thom, p. 2979 ..
94 rbid.
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the poll tax, and face people hostile to his vote, _his
removal would be accomplished.
One could speculate, then, that the effects of the
constitutional provisions regarding voting were intended to
be partly psychological.

Once he learned that his dis-

. franchisement was the object of the constitutional convention, the Negro would not attempt to meet the· requirements necessary to vote.

Since he did not participate in

the-electoral process, there would be no compunction in
allowing the poll tax to become delinquent, and since
the state made.no effort to collect it, the Negro would
take·this to mean silent approval of his action, or at
least a

willi~gness

on the part of the state to be rid

of him·. 95
Some years after the convention, Carter Glass, by
then a member of Congress, confirmed this aspect of the
provisions.

Glass termed the plan he had formulated an

"automatic qualification which would effectively exclude
negroes from registration."

It would accomplish this end,

Glass, declared, not on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude,.but because "the poll tax requirement and the registration requirement were both on contrariety to the known characteristics of the

n~gro.

• • •

[T]he Negro would not, in the abstract, set a high enough
95 Snavely,
.
Taxation of Negroes, pp. 42-43.
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value on the right of suffrage, nor was he sufficiently
thrifty, to pay a poll tax six months in advance of the
election." 96
Glass and the other members of the constitutional
convention had no positive assurances, of course, that
their assessment of the character of the Negro voting population was correct.

The future would reveal, however,

that the psychological effect upon this segment of the
population would be as effective as any restrictive feature
the convention could have hoped to have written into law.
CONCLUSION
With the final adoption of the new Virginia constitution, legal sanction was given to p policy of franchise
exclusion that had begun after the Civil War.

Corruption

in politics, especially corruption involving the Negro
voter, fostered the hope that removal of the majority of
blacks from politics would end the venality that plagued
the state.

Once the source of corruption was removed, it

seemed assured that whites could-once again freely divide
on the basic political issues and enjoy a renewed political
life.

The Negro would be forced to abandon his political

hopes, hopes the white majority considered to be false

96 carter Glass to Thomas W. Harrison, Feb. 25, 1921,
box·2~6, Carter Glass Papers, University of Virginia
Library, Charlottesville, Va.
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and would be returned to his "place" and thus improve race
relations.
Although there was disagreement among members of the
convention over the form and substance of the understanding
clause, .there was unanimity upon the principle that those
citizens who participated in the government should contribute
to its support.

The convention turned to a practice that

would tax the individual for the privilege of casting his
ballot.

The poll tax, it was hoped, would not only provide

additional revenue to a growing state educational system,
but, .more importantly, purify and purge the electorate of that
unworthy element that had been the cause of recent corruption and fraud.

Thus the poll tax became a vital part of

the franchise section of the new constitution.

But there

were those who warned, like a member of the Virginia convention.in 1902, "I tell you now, gentlemen, while I know
it is a hopeless thing to argue against a poll tax prerequisite in the State of Virginia, that thing will rise
up to. give us trouble in the years to come." 97

97

.

· Dehates· o·f the· convention, II, 2865, remarks by
George K. Anderson.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL LIFE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION, 1902-1935
No one could know for certain what the result would
be of the suffrage system designed by the constitutional
convention delegates.

As a result, there was a degree of

anticipation as Virginians waited for registration
reports, figures on poll tax payments and assessments by
their political leaders.

When voter registration began

in September, 1902, the Richmond Dispatch carried daily
reports of registration figures from around the state.
In Richmond, 1,268 whites and fifty-eight Negroes
registered during the first two days of registration.

1

In Chatham, fifty-eight out of fifty-nine whites registered
while only three of fourteen Negroes registered.

In Front

Royal, 134 whites registered while the eleven Negro
applicants who appeared were rejected.

2

The Dispatch

reported Negro registration in Amherst as "a great falling

1 Richmond Dispatch, Sept. 17, 1902.

2 rbid., Sept. 16, 18, 1902.
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off" since they had previously almost equaled the number
of whites registered.

3

It was also reported in Hampton

and Front Royal that Negroes were registered under the
property qualification and a few under the soldier clause
of the new constitution. 4
Some idea of the manner in which Negroes were
confronted by local registrars can be gained from a report
from Blackstone carried by the Dispatch.

In attempting

to register under the understanding clause, one old Negro
was asked if he knew what the General Assembly was.

The

Negro replied that he thought i t was some type of military
gathering.

Another Negro was asked what punishment he

would inflict upon a man who had committed suicide.

The

reply by the Negro was that he would send the man to jail
for twelve months, an answer that brought obvious
enjoyment to onlookers.

5

But i t was not only the Negro

that had to endure such humiliation.

Whites, particularly

Republicans, suffered the same fate.

w. c.

Pendleton

reported that i t was "painful and pitiful" to see the
horror and dread in the faces of Ninth District whites
as they waited to take their turn before "the inquisition. 116

3

rbid., Sept. 18, 1902.

4 rbid., Sept. 17, 1902.

5 rbid., Sept. 16, 1902.
6 Pendleton, Political History of Appalachin
Virginia, p. 458.
;'
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Many had seen their neighbors turned away because they
were not able to answer the registrar's questions, and
I

it took earnest persuasion to get them to submit to the
\

same ordeal.

This was horrible to behold, but it
was still more horrible to see the marks of
humiliation and despair that were stamped
upon the faces of honest but poor white men
who had been refused registration and who
had been robbed of their citizenship without
cause. We saw them as they came from the
presence of the registrars with bowed heads
and agonized faces; and when they spoke, in
many instances, there was a tear in the
voice of the humiliated citizen. 7
To bar Negroes and whites from registering under
the understanding clause of the new constitution was thus

a simple matter.

There were parts of the document that

even intelligent whites could not explain, and if there
was doubt in the registrar's mind, he could always ask
for an explanation of an ex post facto law. 8

Even after

the understanding clause expired in 1903, there remained
in the constitution the clause requiring the applicant
to "answer on oath any and all questions affecting his
qualifications" which allowed the registrar to ask how
many historical flags the United States had, or who
discovered the Rocky Mountains, or whether a minor could
7 Ibid., pp. 458-59.
8

McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention,

p. 48.
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hold office in Virginia. 9

These questions were asked

where the Negro population was large, where the Republican
vote was large, and also to the voters of the state who
I

opposed the dominant organization. 10

That local Jegistrars

were given considerable discretion is undeniable.

When

asked if there were many ordinary respectable citizens
who were unable to comply literally with the law, one
official replied, "Oh, if I see they are decent and
respectable citizens, I

can give them a little hint" to

help them complete their registration. 11
Soon after the new state constitution went into
effect i t was obvious to Negroes and certain white
elements that the chief obstacle to be overcome on the
way to suffrage was the registrar.

As a result, the poll

tax, except for few instances, did not emerge as a point
of immediate attention.

Especially among the Negroes of

the state, efforts were directed at securing the registration of as many qualified voters as possible.

The poll

tax was taken care of for the "faithful" white voter, but

9 Henry W. Anderson, "Popular Government in Virginia,"
University of Virginia Record Extension Series, XI (Jun.,
1927), 20-21; Paul Lewinson, Race, Class and Party
(New
York, 1932), pp. 117-18. The catch in the last question
was that notaries public need only be eighteen years old.
lOAnderson, "Popular Government in Virginia," 21.
llL ewinson,
.
Race, Cl ass an d P ar t y, p. 115 •

61
the Negro was forced into a state of neglect with no
allies to look to for assistance until the 1930's.
FRAUD, VENAL VOTERS AND THE BLACK SATCHEL
The improvement in state elections failed to
materialize.

Fraud continued and new deceptions were

introduced.

In some instances registered prospective

voters were merely not placed on the tax lists and local
treasurers thus refused to accept payment of the poll
tax.

12

In other instances both Democrats and Republicans

resorted to the use of guide or "educational" ballots,
which had all candidates except those of the party marked
out.

13
Probably the worst, and certainly the most expensive,

outcome of the new constitution was the creation of a
class of venal voters that emerged because of the poll
tax requirerrent.

These venal voters, called "floaters"

by the politicians, were arranged in lots as Democrats,
Republicans, or doubtfuls.

There were also groups of

voters who, for a fee, could be persuaded to stay away
from the polls on election day.

Another group, described

by one politician as "the cheapest and most contemptible

12 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 2, 4, 1903. The
paper reported 231 registered voters out of 700 not on
the Berkley tax list.
13 Pendleton, Political History of Appalachin
Virginia, p. 470.
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of the venal voters," were those with property who became
delinquent in payment of the poll tax and required party
managers to pay the tax for them in exchange for their
vote.

14

Almost inunediately then the size of the party

purse became more important to election campaigns.

One

county chairman wrote the head of the State Democratic
Central Committee, J. Taylor Ellyson, that i t had cost
him nbetween One & Two Hundred Dollars" to produce
Democratic majorities in a 1905 election.

15

The ante

was raised considerably when the election was in a highly
contested district such as the Republican Ninth.

The

Democratic chairman of Wise County wrote that money was
urgently needed for a 1906 election.

"Nothing will do

this County any good now," the chairman wrote Ellyson,
nBuT CASH, as the Republicans have all they can use and
we cannot combat CASH with WIND. 1116

Other reports

from the Ninth indicated that the Republicans had made
collections from all over the state and had concentrated
the money in the district, while the Democrats made a

14 rbid., pp. 470-71.
15T.L. Clark to J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 22, 1906,
J. Taylor Ellyson Papers, University of Virginia Library,
Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter cited as Ellyson
Papers.
16 w.J. Snodgrass to
1906, ibid.

J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 26,
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desperate struggle to raise $7,000 within the district
and $1,000 outside. 17

After district Democrats lost

the election, the defeated candidate wrote Chairman
Ellyson that

11

we had about 2,700 democrats who had not

paid their~poll tax, and had at least I think $30,000
money to run against."

If the district Democrats could

have voted, the candidate said, he could have w·on, not
withstanding the odds. 18
In order to assure that the money paid resulted
in a correct vote, Republican and Democratic politicians
had the assistance of loyal election judges who could
enter the polling booth.

The vote buyer would inform

the voter which friendly judge to select, the judge would
enter the booth and see that the ballot was correctly
marked and then signal the buyer to pay the voter.
Another practice, known as the "Tasmanian dodge," was
also employed to assure the vote was delivered.

Party

workers obtained, either through a loyal ballot printer
or election judge, a number of ballots which they marked
for their voters.

The voter would then deposit his

prepared ballot and return the unmarked ballot to the

17 A.A. Campbell to J. Taylor Ellyson, Oct. 29,
1906; W.H. Bond to J.T. Ellyson, Oct. 30, 1906; A.A.
Campbell to J.T. Ellyson, Nov. 3, 1906, ibid.
18 R.P. Bruce to J. Taylor Ellyson, Nov. 12, 1906,
ibid.
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party worker to be marked and given to another venal
voter.

19
The importance of the bountiful political campaign
I

I

fund is well illustrated by the 1910 effort by Democrat
Henry

c.

Stuart to oust Ninth District Republican

Representative

c.

Bascom Slemp.

"Never before in the

district's history," one historian wrote, "had there been
a campaign in which such vast sums of money were spent
by both sides," with some estimates as high as a total
of $500,000 spent by the two parties. 20

The Democrats

realized they must make a concerted effort to pay the
poll tax if they hoped to wrest control of the Ninth
from Slemp.

One local politician from Bland wrote

Democratic Committee Chairman Ellyson, "We are in better
shape in the way of having our poll taxes paid than we
have ever been.

We looked after that matter as close

as i t possibly could be. 1121

Another politician claimed

that Ninth District Democrats were better organized

19 Horn, "Growth of the Democratic Party," pp.
197-98.
20 rbid., p. 192; Guy B. Hathorn, "Congressional
Campaign--rn-the Fighting Ninth: The Contest Between
c. Bascom Slemp and Henry C. Stuart," Virginia Magazine
of History and Biography, LXVI (Jul., 1958), 337-344.
21 George T. Byrd to J. Taylor Ellyson, Aug. 16, 1910.
Ellyson Papers.
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because of the new constitution and poll tax requirement
and reported, "Our condition as to payment of the poll
'

tax is encouraging •••• The Republicans have made small,
I

if any, gains in this direction because they have \been
in the habit of keeping their men paid up all the
while. 1122 The Democrats worked hard, but as the election
drew closer, requests for more money flowed in to Chairman
Ellyson and one Democrat pleaded for $2,000 to $3,000 as
a "life saving act. 1123
Balloting in the Ninth District contest was close
with the unofficial vote count giving Slemp a lead of
217 votes.

Henry

c.

Stuart refused to concede the

election and called for an investigation, implying that
the Republicans had been able to vote unqualified voters.
Subsequently, Stuart did not push for the investigation
24
and Slemp retained his seat.
The Republicans were able to maintain control of
the Ninth through a costly, depleting use of campaign
22 s.B. Quillen to J. Taylor Ellyson, Aug. 20, 1910,
ibid. See also W.D. Smith to J.T. Ellyson, Aug. 15, 1910,
ibid.
23 J. Murray Hooker to J. Taylor Ellyson, Sept. 30,
1910; c.B. Willis to J.T. Ellyson, Aug. 25, 1910; Claude
Swanson to J.T. Ellyson, Sept. 8,.15, 1910. J.T. Ellyson
to E. Peyton Turner, Sept. 19, 1910, ibid.
24 Hathorn, "Congressional Campaign in the Fighting
Ninth," 344.
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funds, a tactic that could not be employed across the
state.

And they began to learn the price they and their

el~ctorate

had to pay as a result of the poll tax even

prior to the Slemp-Stuart contest.
One of the first publicized accounts of block
payment of poll taxes had occurred in Russell County in
May, 1905.

Two Democrats allegedly paid the tax for 107

loyal party members the day after the expiration date for
tax payments.

The Republican commonwealth's attorney

threatened prosecution but there is no report that any
further action resulted. 25
In 1906, J.P. Royall from Tazewell, leader of a
small Republican minority in the House of Delegates,
introduced measures that would have provided for elimination
of the poll tax requirement from the constitution.

26

The

bills were never reported out of committee, but the
editorial response of the Times-Dispatch reveals some
interesting aspects of what one element of the state
thought the purposes, advantages, and results of the poll
tax were.

25

' Th e Negro in
. V'irginia
' .
An d rew Buni,
Po l '1 t 'ics,
1902-1965, (Charlottesville, 1967), p. 29. Hereafter
cited as Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics.
'

26

Journal of the Senate, 1906, pp. 52, 58.
Journal of the House, 1906, pp. 75, 167.
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To abolish the payment of the poll tax as a
prerequisite to voting would be, the newspaper declared,
"a public misfortune," throwing down the bars at the polls
to "negroes and bummers."

The tax had eliminated a large

nwnber of objectionable voters, the Negro was no longer
a factor in elections, and "shiftless whites" no longer
had to be paid for their vote because of the poll tax.
The result was, the newspaper concluded, that the·state
had the best electorate since the Civil War.

27

Recalling

the issuance of tax receipts to the "faithful" during the
Readjuster period, the Times-Dispatch submitted that the
payment provisions of the tax prevented vote buying and
left nothing to the discretion of the election officials,
thus minimizing opportunities for "improper practices.

1128

nThe man who is unwilling to pay such a tax for the
privilege of voting," the paper declared, "is not a
desirable voter, and the State is better off without his
vote than with it. 1129

It was just such arguments that

tax repeal forces would find themselves arguing against
for many years to come.

27 d"t . 1
E i oria in Times-DisEatch, Jan. 25, 1906.
28 Editorial in ibid., Jan. 31, 1906.
29 E d"itoria
. 1 in ibid., Jan. 25, 28, 1906.
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By 1916, another source of possible election
fraud had been introduced into the state's political
system.

In an effort to make it possible for more

people to participate in elections, the General Assembly
adopted a measure providing that any voter "who was
absent from city, county, or precinct on regular business
or habitual duties on the day of election" could vote
by mail, provided he applied for a ballot by registered
mail and had the marked ballot properly witnessed. 30
State politicians soon discovered that these absentee
voting procedures could produce Democratic majorities
. c 1 ose coun t"1es. 31
in

Victories that were won by use

of the absentee ballot were attributed to the "black
satchel" vote, a term derived from the method in which
absentee ballots were delivered.
Subsequent amendments to the absentee voting law
furthered its use in buying votes.

In 1922, the

application by registered mail feature was removed and
the voter was allowed to apply for a ballot up to fifteen
days prior to an election, instead of thirty days prior

30 Acts of the General Assembly, 1916, pp. ·636-37.
31Key, Southern Politics, p. 454.

Key discusses
the importance of absentee voting in a chapter on the
conduct of elections in the South, ibid., pp. 443-462.
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as the 1906 law required.

32

Another amendment in 1924

allowed application to be made from five to sixty days
before the election by any voter who may be absent from
I

his precinct.

!,

In addition, the local registrar was

required to forward ballots by registered mail, but the
voter could either hand his ballot to the registrar or
return i t by mail.

33

In 1926 the General Assembly removed

the requirement that absentee ballots be forwarded by
registered mail.

All that was now required was that a

absentee voter present an application to the local
registrar, obtain a sealed ballot in return, and then
mark his ballot before a notary public, a highly convenient
system.

34

Political workers were quick to realize the
opportunities the absent voters system afforded.

Local

voters often received unsolicited absentee ballots with
postage, a sample ballot properly marked, and money, while
other party workers would arrive at the front door of
venal voters with the local registrar and notary public.
Even though the constitutionality of certain sections

32Acts of the General Assembly, 1922, p. 268.
33

~., 1924, p. 644.

34

Ibid., 1926, p. 391.

35 Times-Dispatch, Aug. 4, 1917:- Horn, "Growth
of the Democratic Party," p. 201.

35
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of the law were eventually challenged, and the General
Assembly acted in an effort to improve the law, fraudulent
use of the absent voter law continued to be a part of
Virginia politics into the 1940's. 36
All of the features of Virginia politics just
described were at work in one of the few instances in the
early part of the twentieth century when the poll tax
became a political campaign issue, the 1921 campaign for
governor.

Although Virginia Republicans were well aware

of the abuses of state election laws, and especially the
poll tax provisions, no real effort to present reform as
a political issue was made until this time.

Part of the

explanation of the Republican position is that the party
was certainly on the defensive, trying to avoid the
"race issue" that the election laws necessarily evoked,
thus trying to avoid raising a bogus issue that might
37
cloud any real issues at stake.
The man chosen by the Republican convention
meeting in Norfolk to run for governor was Henry W.
Anderson, a successful Richmond corporation lawyer.
In his acceptance speech, Anderson launched a broad
36Moore v. Pullem, 150 Va. 174 (1928); Acts of
the General Assembly, 1930, p. 5.

37 Arthur s. Link, "The Negro as a Factor in the
Campaign of 1912," Journal of Southern History, XIII
(Feb., 1947), 82.
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attack against state Democrats, charging them with
extravagance, failure to administer state affairs· in
the public interest, excessive taxation, and with providing unsatisfactory education facilities.

38

He

I

specifically criticized Corporation and Circuit Court
judges for their partisan electoral board appointments,
attacked registration requirements as severe and strictly
enforced against the Republican minority and blasted the
poll tax as a repressive measure.

Anderson proposed as

remedies to these problems a pledge of prompt and complete
revision of the constitution which would include removal
of election machinery from the hands of local judges,
creation of bipartisan electoral boards, simplification
of registration requirements and the ballot, and that
"the iniquitious poll tax as a prerequisite to voting
be abolished. 1139
Well aware that the Democrats could turn his
proposals against him and charge that he was attempting
to return the state to pre-1902 conditions, Anderson set
forth what he termed an open minded approach to the race

38 Times-Dispatch, Jul. 15, 1921; Henry W. Anderson,
Freedom in Virginia. An Address by Henry W. Anderson, Esq.,
Nominee of the Republican Party for Governor, Delivered
Before the Reoublican State Convention at Norfolk, Jul 14,
1921
n.p., n.d. , pp. 1-10. Hereafter cited as Anderson,
Freedom in Virginia.
39Anderson, Freedom in Virginia, pp. 10-11, 25-26.
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question.

After a Republican review of Virginia political

history, Anderson concluded that justice to the people
of both races demanded the continuance of white supremacy •
••• The white people of Virginia,
constituting over two-thirds of the
population and owning 95 per cent of the
property of the State, with their long
experience in self-government, are morally
charged with the duty to present and future
generations to see that the State and local
governments of Virginia are conducted and
administered in accord~fice with the
principles stated ••••
The Republican candidate obviously believed that this
exposition would allow him to conduct his campaign
solely on the issue of good or bad management of state
affairs, and thus began his active campaign by attacking
the Democratic "officeholders trust. ,.4l

But the Democrats

were not willing to let the Republicans escape so easily.
Democratic gubernatorial candidate E. Lee Trinkle
opened his attack on the Republicans at Clintwood in
September.

Trinkle countered the G.O.P. charges by

attacking the continuing Reconstruction policies of the
party and the Republican treatment of Woodrow Wilson.

If

the Republicans were to succeed with their planned
constitutional revision, Trinkle warned, it would mean
40 Ibid., pp. 19-23; Times-Dispatch, Jul. 15, 1921
41 Ibid., Sept. 6, 1921; Henry W. Anderson, Address
of Henry W. Anderson, Esq., Opening the State Campaign,
Delivered at Lexin ton, Virginia, Monda , Se t. 5, 1921
n.p., n.d. , pp.• 18-24.
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that in a few years the doors would be open for the Negro,
with the Negro once again holding the balance of power
in the state.

The promised repeal of the poll tax was

a sop to catch the Negro vote and a demonstration of the
"cheap expediency" of the Republican party.

After

Virginia had repudiated the Republicans, the Democratic
candidate declared, the G.O.P. labored to regain control
by Negro aid.

Then in an attempt to reform, they had

cast the Negro out again, hoping in the process to win
favor.

42

The obvious implication was that the Republicans

had not really changed, that there still existed the
threat of Negro resurgence aided by the Republicans.
Anderson attempted to assert again that the
question at issue was one of good management of state
affairs, saying that 800,000 white voters would ensure
that there was no threat to white supremacy, and he
attacked the Democrats for their handling of the race
issue.

To demonstrate Democratic inconsistency, Anderson

claimed an illiterate Negro was made an election judge
over the protest of Republicans, and the G.O.P. candidate
asserted that there were twenty-five other Negroes

. as JU
. a ges across
serving

v·irginia.
. . 43

42 Times-Dispatch, Sept. 28, 1921.
43

Ibid., Oct. 16, 1921.
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The Democrats were relentless however.

Shortly

before the November election, newspapers in Richmond and
Roanoke published letters to Democratic Chairman Henry
Flood from Senators Swanson and Glass.

Carter Glass claimed

that Anderson was trying to change horses in mid-stream by
first advocating just treatment of the Negro and then
complaining about their appointment as election judges.
addition, Glass told Flood that by eliminating the poll
tax, the G.O.P. Candidate proposed "to tear down the
barriers ••• and thus clear the way to the ballot box for
every shiftless and ignorant darkey who may desire to
exercise an unrestricted right to participate in the
governmen t o f the St a t e •••• .. 44

Senator Swanson's letter

to Chairman Flood followed the same lines, saying that
Democrats stood for white supremacy while Republicans
stood for political equality among the races.

Swanson

singled out that portion.of the Republican platform
calling for removal of the poll tax, calling it their
"cloven hoof."

"The plea for unlimited suffrage made

by the republican [sic] party, " Swanson wrote, "is an
.
insidious way of bringing the negro back to politics. 1145

44
. 45

1bid., Nov. 1, 1921 •
..
Roanoke Times, Nov. 4, 1921.

In

75
In the closing days of the campaign, Chairman Flood
could confidently predict an overwhelming Democratic
\

victory·, while the only thing Henry Anderson could do
was again insist that the real issue of the campaign
was the management of state affairs.

46

On election day the Democratic victory was
complete.

Anderson lost his own precinct to Trinkle.

The Negro vote was judged to be "negligible" with the
majority of blacks standing by their regular Republican
affiliations.

Bascom Slemp blamed the resounding

defeat on industrial depression and the raising of false
issues by the Democrats.

47

But perhaps Carter Glass

correctly brought the issues into focus for most
Virginians.

The Republican platform, Glass stated,

reduced the contest to the issue of repeal of the
constitutional safeguards against "effective participation
of the black man in the politics of the State," and
Glass offered the fitting epitaph for the gubernatorial
contest.

"Colonel Anderson has been buried," the Senator

stated, "in the same grave in which the people of Virginia
)

in 1902 buried unrestricted suffrage."

48

46 Times-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1921.
47 rbid., Nov. 9, 1921; Roanoke Times, Nov. 10, 1921 •
. 48 Roanoke Times, Nov. 10, 1921.
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The 1921 election effectively demonstrated that
to campaign for electoral reform, especially repeal of
the poll tax, meant certain political defeat.

With no

one to force this issue, the Democrats, controlling the
election machinery, had no trouble maintaining their
superiority.

Yet careful observers saw that something

was happening to the electorate.

Just three years after

the Anderson defeat, the Richmond News Leader, alarmed
at the waning electorate, called for the creation of a
new opposition party at any cost, believing that it was
because the Republican opposition had disappeared that
Virginia had become negligent in the franchise.

49

After

a review of the voting records of Democratic Pittsylvania
County, with a 40 per cent black population, with that
of Republican Augusta County, with only 14 per cent of
its population Negro, the newspaper concluded that whites
in Pittsylvania rio longer went to the polls because they
knew there was no chance of a Negro victory, while in
Augusta County, white Democrats did not go because they
knew other parts of the state would bring up the necessary
Democratic majority.

"In state and national politics,"

the News Leader observed, "they have yielded with the

49

Editorial in News Leader, Dec. 26, 1924.
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rest to the lethargy the present constitution so temptingly
provides.

1150

While the newspaper was primarily concerned

with admonishing the citizenry for its lack of political
consciousness, the editorials laid to rest the contention
that the decline in voting was due to the disfranchisement
of the Negro by pointing out that the actual decline was
more than the percentage of the Negro population in the
state.

51
The 1921 election in which repeal of the poll tax

was advocated by Virginia Republicans and the 1924
pleadings by the Richmond News Leader for an aroused voter
consciousness are indicative of the increasing attention
being given to the condition of the suffrage in Virginia.
The quest for poll tax repeal by the Republicans contributed to the overwhelming victory of the Democrats in
1921, but if the advice given in 1924 to create a new
opposition party at any cost was taken seriously, it
might be expected that the issue would once again come
before the electorate.

In the meantime, it was largely

left to the Negro population to do what was possible

50

Editorial in ibid., Nov. 22, 1924.

51 Editorial in ibid., Nov. 19, 1924. See also
editorial in ibid., Nov. 8, Dec. 2, 1924. The News Leader
discovered that prior to 1902 voting in Richmond averaged
126 per 1,000 population. Between 1902 and 1920, the
average was 44 per 1,000 population. From 1920, when
women were granted suffrage, to 1924, the average vote
was 79 per 1,000 population. Editorial in ibid., Nov. 7,
1924.
--
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to regain a voice in politics.

Their voice was understand-

ably weak at first but gained in strength as time, progressed.
THE NEGRO'S FIGHT FOR SUFFRAGE
Negroes and white Republicans soon realized that
the chief obstacle to the franchise was the local registrar.
The Negro could not look to local Republicans for assistance
since the party was attempting to disassociate itself from
the Negro.

This became evident shortly after the new

constitution went into effect.

Angered by the removal

of a Negro bailiff of the Circuit Court of Appeals, several
v.ocal Richmond and Henrico white Republicans observed
that Negroes "had almost been forced out of the party under
the present organization and year by year were finding
themselves more and more in disfavor with the white leaders,"
the majority of whom acquiesced in Democratic disfranchisement of the race. 52 The process of exclusion
continued until it culminated in the "lily white" and
"lily black" Republican parties during the 1921 election
for governor.
As a result, the Virginia Negro's fight to recover
political influence proceeded along two parallel lines of
52 rbid., May 19, 1904. Outside of positions in the
post office, Negroes had received no recognition in
appointment to Federal positions except one department
collector for the Internal Revenue, two or three court
messengers and several janitors.
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effort, one legal and the other political.

The largest

effort by Negroes to regain the franchise after 1902 was
\

directed to action in the courts.

\

Virginia Negroes desired to test the legalily of
the new constitution even before registration under.its
provisions began.

In August, 1902, the Virginia Educational

and Industrial Association, continuing plans begun a year
earlier, met in Richmond to decide how to raise funds to
test the legality of the new constitution.

Three thousand

dollars had already been raised and the organization had
assurances of support from former Virginia politician and
lawyer Johns. Wise and Richmond judge L.L. Lewis. 53
Shortly thereafter the publication of the Negro Advocate
was announced to serve as an organ of opinion for those
favoring the defeat of the new constitution. 54 The
announced resistance by Negroes aroused the Richmond
Dispatch to declare the effort "ill advised, wild and
foolish" because it would bring whites closer together.
nThe white in Virginia will not allow themselves to the
thwarted"in maintaining political control, and if the
Supreme Court should throw obstacles in the path, the
newspaper declared that "a new and safe path will be
53 nispatch, Aug. 16, 1902.
54

~., Sept. 16, 1902.
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found," and warned that a new convention would not treat
the Negro as "leniently and liberally. 1155
Unfortunately, no copies of the Negro Advocate
i
exist from which to judge the response of the black
conununity to this threat of harsher action if the Negro
should continue his pressure.

But i t is obvious that

those opposing the constitution were not deterred.

In

November, 1902, William H. Jones, John Hill, and Edgar
Lee, all represented by John

s.

Wise, filed in the U.S.

Circuit Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to
prevent a canvass of the votes cast in a House of
Representatives contest.

The three men claimed to have

been refused registration in the Third Congressional
District and argued that the new constitution had not
been submitted to the people for ratification and that the
purpose of the Democratic party that controlled the
convention had been disfranchisement of the Negro voters
of Virginia.

The petitioners therefore asked that the

election be held null, void and of no effect.

The

Circuit Court denied the petition on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, and the case was brought to the Supreme
Court. 56

In its opinion, the Court denied the requested

55 Editorial in ibid., Aug. 21, 1902.
56 Jones, et al. v. Montaque, et al., 24 S.C. 611
(1904).
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petition on the grounds that the election sought to be
prohibited had already been concluded.

Justice Brewer,

writing the majority opinion, declared that any action the
Court might take would only be ineffectual.

"Under the

circumstances there is nothing but a moot case remaining,"
the justice declared.

57

Those who had hoped for gains in suffrage through the
courts were sadly disappointed by the decision.

In Wise's

view, the Negro was a "friendless institution politically"
and the Supreme Court and Congress were passing the question of Negro suffrage back and forth in a game "amusing
to everybody, except the Negro. 1158

Unfortunately for the

Negro, the state and Federal courts made no attempt to
change their viewpoint on the question and continued to
disclaim jurisdiction in cases concerning suffrage pro-

. .
. s t ate consti•tu t•ions. 59
visions
in
One further Virginia case illustrates the attitude of
the courts in regard to these contests testing the validity
of the suffrage provisions.

In November, 1908, the United

57 Ibid.

...

Selden v .• Montague, 24 s.c. 613 (1904), 194
U.S. 153, was a suit in equity seeking an injunction against
the canvass in the 1902 election brought to the Supreme
Court at the same time. John s. Wise was also the petitioner's lawyer. The case was dismissed on the same grounds
as Jones v • .Montague.
58
.
..
~Leader~ _Jun. 8, Dec. 16, 1904.
59

carter G. Woodson, "Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship as Qualified by the United States Supreme Court,"
Journal of Negro History, VI (Jan., 1921), 37-43.
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States Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of Brickhouse
v. Brook et al.

Brickhouse claimed damages of $5,000

because of the refusal of his vote during the
1902 election.

John

s.

Noverr~er,

Wise, representing Brickhouse,

again argued that the Virginia constitution was invalid
because the document was not framed by authorized delegates
and because it had been proclaimed rather than submitted
to a vote.

In its opinion, the Circuit Court skirted the

question of the legality of the constitution.

After

noting that the task of the courts was only to decide the
rights of the people under adopted constitutions, the
Circuit Court declared that the question of whether or
not the people of Virginia had duly adopted the constitution was a political question to be decided by the legislative and executive departments of the government.

"Those

departments having recognized and promulgated that Constitution, having declared it valid and in force," the opinion
stated, "it consequently is the fundamental law of Virginia

. . . .1160
0

The efforts by Negroes and their allies to have the
1902 Virginia constitution overturned in the courts thus
came to an end.

One historian has noted, however, that

although the Negro was disfranchised, none of the cases
during the period tested the real issue involved.

The

60 Brickhouse v. Brook et al., 165 F.R. 534 (1908).
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real question was whether the constitutional convention
of 1902 had the right to proclaim the new constitution
contrary to the provisions of the Underwood Constitution. 61
As far as the poll tax was concerned, the Virginia
courts encouraged irregularities in its use.

In a case

before the State Supreme Court in 1908, it was declared
that treasurers should include in their poll lists only
the names of persons who had personally paid their poll
taxes. 62 What constituted personal payment was not
decided until the following year when the court declared
that the poll, tax need only be paid out of a person's
estate and not the estate of another.

In addition, the

payment need not be by the voter in person, the court
declared, but could be made by any authorized agent or
clerk or "in other ways. 1163
Subsequently, the only other cases to reach the
State Supreme Court touching upon the payment of the poll
tax occurred in 1939.

A Virginia resident in that year

made application to the Commissioner of Revenue in Richmond
for a license to practice law.

A section of the Tax Code

61McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention, 145.
62 Tazewell v. Herman, 108 Va. 416 {1908).
63 Tilton. v •. Herman, .109 Va. 503 {1909); Allen W. Moger,
Virginia, Bourbonism to Byrd (Charlottesville, 1968), pp.
195-98.

84

of VI \'ginia required as a prerequisite prepayment of poll
taxuu,

The lawyer certified that he had not paid,his

poll tax for 1937 and was refused the necessary likense.
I1

The l',)sulting suit stemmed from the fact the state constitut;ll,\\ prohibited enforced collection by legal process
unt;l\ the poll tax had become three years past due,' and
the Htate Supreme Court overturned the portion of the
tax

'-~\.'de

requiring the prepayment.

The Court declared that

the l\\\position of the poll tax was "not intended primarily
for lhe production of revenue, but to limit the right of
suffl:"-ge to those who took sufficient interest in the

affC\l\~s of the State to qualify themselves to vote. 1164
Obvi~\\sly, the decision had no great impact on Negro voting

sine~ it allowed continued non-payment of the poll tax
rath\)\~ than making tax payment mandatory.
'~he

first serious challenge to the existing suffrage

systt)\\\ came as a result of the United States Supreme Court

dec:b~ton in Nixon v. Herndon which declared the rules
bar~\\\g Negroes from the Texas Democratic primary constituted
a dt~\\\al of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
However, when Richmond Negroes attempted to
vote tn a 1928 primary, Democratic party officials asserted
that: the Texas decision did not apply because the Virginia
\\14

.

Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va. 463 (1939).
,.;;5 . ..
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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statute on party primaries gave the party the right to
make its own regulations. 66 When a suit was instituted to
I

resolve the question, however, the district judge :found
that the 1924 Democratic party rule limiting

votin~

to

whites was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

state legislature, having once undertaken to regulate
primary elections and having authorized them to be held
at public expense, could not, the court ruled, do
indirectly what the more direct Texas statute had done. 67
Appropriately, portions of the Virginia Negro population
greeted the decision as a great breakthrough. 68
An even more important ruling was handed down by the
State Supreme Court in 1931.

In October, 1929, W. E. Davis

tried to register to vote in Hampton.
Thomas

c.

The registrar,

Allen, refused to register Davis on the grounds

that he had failed to make application in proper form and
had failed to answer to the satisfaction of the registrar
certain questions affecting his qualifications as an
elector.

In the resulting suit, evidence was presented as

to Davis's responses to questions asked.
Question.
Answer.

66

67

When is payment of Poll Tax Not Requared
After a Pearson have obtaine the age of
sixty years.

Tirnes-Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1928.
...

... . ·····

West v. Bliley et al. r 33 F. (2d) 177 (1929), 42 F.
(2d) 101\1930}.
68 Planet, Jun. 21, 1930.
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Question.
Answer.

What are the Requisites to enable one to
Register in Va
he will have to Be 21 years of age and
a citizen -- of the State for one year
in the City Town or county for 6 month
Precinct in which he ofers to vote 30
Days and Pay all State Tax for 3 years
Back say for 1926, 27 & 28 • • • • 69

While admitting that the application and answers to
questions filed by Davis showed he had comparatively little
education, the Court noted that the state constitution
provided for no test of knowledge or understanding other
than that the applicant make application in his own handwriting, without aid, suggestion or memorandum.

The ques-

tions asked by the Hampton registrar obviously elicited no
information from Davis which he was required by the constitution to have in order to vote, seemingly being designed
instead to test his understanding or knowledge of the law.
As a result, the State Supreme Court declared that the
registrar was not authorized to refuse Davis registration
because of his failure to correctly answer these questions.

70

As might be expected, the court's decision was greatly
applauded by the Negro community.

The local registrar had

long remained an obstacle to Negro voting, especially in
the Hampton area where they had turned down professors at
Hampton Institute and numerous professional and business

69 navis v. Allen, 157 Va. 84 (1931). This passage is
duplicated as it appears in the text of the decision.
?Oibid.
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rnen. 71

The Norfolk Journal and Guide declared that the

Davis decision was "perhaps the most important decree of a
State Court bearing upon the exercise of the suffrage"
since enactment of suffrage restrictions, and noted the
significance of having leadership that was capable of
bringing the issue to a just conclusion "in such a hostile
political environment. 1172
Opposition to Negro registration and vo·ting remained
despite court rulings on the white primary and allowable
application procedures.
the courts.

But now the Negro had an ally in

When Negroes were refused ballots in an

August, 1931 primary vote in Jefferson Ward in Portsmouth,
the city circuit judge ordered their registration. 73 In
1933, the Democratic Committees in Elizabeth City County
and Portsmouth attempted to require an oath from primary
voters and ruled that only whites could vote in the primary.
It was estimated that the oath alone would slow voting at
any polling place to 1,000 a day. 74 When a suit for damages

71Journal and Guide, Oct. 10, 1931.
72 Editorial in ibid.
73 rbid., Aug. 8, 1931.
74 rbid., Apr. 29, May 20, 1933. The Journal and Guide
also repoFEe'O that Suffolk election officials sought to ban
Negro voting but were prevented by the Attorney General by
threat of prosecution. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1933.
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resulting from the denial of registration to a local business man and the head of the biology department of Hampton
Institute reached the state courts, Negroes won a clarification of the earlier decision regarding primary elections.
The Democratic party could not, the decision said, deny
its privileges to those who subscribed to its principles
and tenets, nor could i t lawfully discriminate because of
race, color or previous condition of servitude. 75
At this point, the Negro community could turn its
attention to organizing to make its potential strength
felt and also to attack the major obstacle remaining in
the path to suffrage - the poll tax.

As was noted, after

adoption of the disfranchising constitution of 1902, the Virginia Negro found himself in a political limbo, unwanted
by Republicans and despised by Democrats.

But the portion

of Virginia Negroes who still were able to vote clung to
the Republican party.

Henry W. Anderson's campaign in 1921

75 Ibid., Aug 26, Oct. 14, Nov. 4, 18, 1933. Some
Democratic elements persisted in their attempts to deny the
Negro access to the party primary. During the 1934 General
Assembly, House Floor Leader Ashton Dovell and Senator Harry
Holt introduced a resolution to establish a party financed
and controlled primary system. After passing the House, the
measure was defeated in the Senate, but only after pressure
was reportedly applied by Senato;~Byrd and Governor Peery.
One reason for the defeat, according to the Journal and Guide
was that party leaders did not want the primary stripped of
its legal safeguards which saved it from manipulation. Ibid.,
Mar. 17, 1934.
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not only saw the poll tax emerge as a campaign issue but
also saw the creation of a "lily black" Republican faction
out of frustration with party attitudes toward the Negro.
The black Republican movement began shortly after the
Republican convention nominating Anderson and produced a
ticket headed by John Mitchell, editor of the Richmond
Planet, for governor, Theodore Nash for lieutenant governor
and J. Thomas Newsome for attorney general.

With a plat-

form stressing equal rights as voting citizens of Virginia,
the Negro Republicans avoided the poll tax issue that was
to damage white Republicans.

76

In addition to the lack of voting strength, the lily
blacks found dissension in their own ranks.

The opposition

was led by P. B. Young, editor of the Norfolk Journal and
Guide, who had been offered the position of lieutenant
governor on the black ticket but had declined.

Young

asserted that the black movement was badly timed and that
the bitter speeches of Negro Republicans aroused white
and Negro race hatred.

77

As a result, the two factions fell

to bickering among themselves, undoubtedly hurting whatever
slim chance they had of being any influence in the election.
The 16,000 votes for Mitchell predicted by the Planet turned

76 Planet, Aug. 20, Sept. 10, 14, 1921; Journal and
Guide, Sept. 3, 16, 1921.
77 rbid., Jul. 30, Oct. 22, 1921.
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into 5,046 at the polls.

To P. B. Young, this was both

an indication that Negroes would not countenance Mitchell's
type of "radical leadership," and also a message to white
Republicans that they could not win in Virginia by erecting
barriers against the political rights of Negroes within
78
To the Planet, the failure was due to 36,000
the party.
eligible Negroes who failed to meet registration requirements and make poll tax payments. 79
One result of the Negro's experience in this election
was the .beginning of a gradual shift of Negro voters to the
Democratic party. 80 However, even after the court decisions
permitting the Negro to vote in the white Democratic
primaries, black participation increased ever so slowly.
The Journal and Guide discerned three reasons why the Negro
did not immediately rush into Democratic primaries.

First

·was the fact that some Negroes still remained Republicans.
Secondly, the past history of Negro disfranchisement gave
the impression that the law would be circumvented and his
vote would be cast out.

Finally, the newspaper observed

78 Planet, Nov. 5, 1921: Journal and Guide, Nov. 12,
1921 •.
79 Planet, Nov. 26, 1921.
80 Buni, The Negro in Virginia .Politi~s, pp. 90-123,
described in detail the Virginia Negro's move to the
Democratic party during the years 1922 to 1940, and the
continued exclusion of the race from the Republican party.
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that there was a movement underway to make more politically
mature decisions.

Many Negro leaders were beginning to

urge the members of their race to vote for the candidate
(
I

of the party which promised them most in return, and
the rank and file were slowly coming over to this view.
11

It may be that a decade or two hence we shall· see the

Negro participating in large numbers in the Democratic
primaries in Virginia, and exercising potent influence
upon the outcome," the Norfolk paper estimated. 81
The decade of the 1930's was therefore marked by an
effort to organize in order to become a political force.
While there was some criticism of the poll tax requirement,
most

of the attention was directed toward stressing the

importance of poll tax payment.

The main force behind

this drive was the various Negro organizations that began
to emerge to enable Virginia Negroes to make the more
politically mature decisions referred to by the Journal
and Guide.
The organization that could of fer the most statewide
influence was the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, organized in Richmond and Falls Church
in 1915. 82 Prior to 1935, the number of state branches
81

.
Journal and Guide, Sept. 12, 1931 •
..

..

..

....

.. ..

.

..... .

82 Annual Report of the N.-A. A. c. P. for the Years
1917 and 1918 (New York, 1918), p. 85.
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belonging to the organization was only twenty, but after
formation of the State Conference of Branches in that year,
increasing interest resulted in the organization of over
Sl.
.xty

local branches. 83

Th e N • A • A • c·• P • L ega l Conuni"ttee

supplied much of the expertise necessary to prosecute
cases such as the aforementioned case of W. E. Davis
against T. C. Allen and the elimination of the understanding
and educational questions asked by local registrars was a
major goal of the organization in Virginia.
Working to assist the N. A. A.

c.

84

P. in voter

registration and payment of poll taxes were various local
organizations.

Groups such as the Norfolk Civic League,

Nonpareil Literary, Social and Beneficial Association
and Bachelor Benedicts, although social in nature, admitted
only registered voters.

Other organizations, such as

the Young Men's Progressive League, set aside money for
payment of the poll tax for members not able to pay.

In

addition, large city Independent Voter Leagues provided a
medium for promotion of interest and action in all political
matters affecting the Negro and worked particularly hard
to get registered voters to pay their poll taxes.

Activity

by these groups was supplemented by Negro Citizen Voter
83
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Journal and Guide, Jun. 21, 1930.
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Leagues, which conducted "gum-shoe" campaigns at election
time and sent letters to registered voters reminding them
I

of tax payment deadlines, and by city Democratic clubs.
II

Of ten these organizations had backing from other Negro
groups and churches. 85 Negro college students participated
ma~ing

a house to house canvass in Negro districts and

carrying signs reading, "A Voteless People Is A Defenseless
People - Pay Your Poll Taxes By May 4, at the Court House."
Too often, however, reports from the local canvass indicated
Negro indifference and the opinion that voting was "white
folks business. 1186
One attempt to organize the various socia1., fraternal
and civic groups on a statewide basis to stimulate the
exercis.e of suffrage by the Negro was made in 1932.

The

call for such a nonpartisan group was instituted by

A.

w.

E. Bassette, a Hampton attorney, and Portsmouth attorney

Thomas H. Reid, and resulted in the creation of the United
Civic League of Virginia, with Bassette serving as president.
The league vowed not only to prepare its members for the
exercise of the duties of citizenship but also promised
to protect and defend its members against "injustice and
discrimination in the administration of government, and
85 Ibid., Dec. 19, 26, 1931, Mar. 5, 1932, Aug. 5,
1933, May 4, 1935.
86 rbid., May 4, 1935.
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against enactment of laws which retard their progress as
citizens of Virginia."

The league would supply

b~ckground

information on candidates for public office and inform its
\
members of happenings of a public nature affecting the
Negro.

A legal committee was to provide its services

free, and plans were instituted to form local civic leagues
in every town, city and county.

87

Editor P. B. Young of

the Norfolk Journal and Guide keynoted the organizational
meeting stressing the importance of Negro action to improve
the Negro I s posi• t'ion. 88
Evidently, the organization stimulated activity.

The

Journal and Guide credited the United Civic League with
aiding the high political enthusiasm prior to the 1932
primaries.

Large crowds appeared to listen to President

Bassette explain the function of the United Civic League,
and in Covington, a group associated with the league was
able to secure the appointment of a local school principal
who advocated increased attention to the needs of local
county training schools.

89

The United Civic League undoubtedly achieved only
limited success, for by 1941, an active member of the league
organized the Virginia Voters' League in an effort to band

.

87

88
89

Ibid., Mar 12, 19, 1932.

rbld.,

Mar. 19, 1932.

rbid., Apr. 2, Jul. 16, 1932.
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together local voters leagues and civic associations under
one head that could coordinate their activities.

The

director of the new league, from 1941 to the time of his
death in 1950, was Luther P. Jackson, histor.y professor
at Virginia State College, secretary of the Virginia Teachers
Association and long-time participant in N. A. A. c. P.
activities in Virginia. 90 The slogan of the Virginia
Voters' League became "Pay the poll tax in order to
abolish the poll tax. 1191
Jackson saw a number of reasons for non-payraent of the
poll tax.

First there was the great delinquency among

Negroes in the payment of all taxes.

This was complicated

by an ignorance of the final date for payment of the poll
tax and the belief that the tax could only be paid at
the time when other taxes were paid.

There was also a

lack of interest in politics among Negroes caused by the
prepayment requirement, ignorance of the fact that the
funds from the tax went to support the public schools,
and the escape offered by the no lien provisions of the
.
t"ion. 92
state cons t itu

To remedy at least some of these

90 Times-Dispatch, Apr. 13, 1950; Dorothy B. -Porter,
.,,Luther P. Jackson Bibliographical Notes," Negro History
Bulletin, XIII {Jun., 1950), 213-215 •
. ... ······
................... .
91Annual Re ort of the .Virginia Voters' League, The
Voting Status of Uegroes in Virginia, 1943. Petersburg, 1944),
p. 1. Hereafter cited as Annual Report of V.V.L.
92
Ibid., 1944, p.8.
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conditions, the Virginia Voters' League published an
annual report that surrunarized the advances made

Negro

i~
\

registration, listed procedures and requirements fbr

I

registration, supplied a registration application and gave
information on Negro candidates for public office in
Virginia.

There is no accurate estimate of the eventual

size of the league available.

While 10,000 copies of the

first annual report of the league were published, a letter
to a poll tax repeal advocate in 1949 indicates that
Jackson, through the Virginia Voters' League, was "in
touch 1 ' with only 900 persons. 93 But Jackson undoubtedly
reached a wider audience by means of his weekly "Rights
and Duties in a Democracy" column, begun in 1942, that
appeared in the Journal and Guide.

Writing on subjects

such as "intricacies of the Poll Tax," "Failing to
Register, 11 and "Paying the Poll Tax, but Failing to
Register," Jackson stressed the importance of Negro
participation in politics if the race was to have a part
in its own future. 94
Jackson's efforts coincided with those of the Journal
and Guide, the leading Negro newspaper in Virginia.
Especially after the Davis v. Allen decision, the newspaper
93

.
.
Ibid., 1943, p. l.; Luther P. Jackson to Francis P.
Miller, NOV'. 4, 1949, box 76, Miller Papers.
94.. . ........ ······ .... .
Journal and Guide, Oct. 24, Nov. 7, Dec. 1942.
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reported both the ease with which registration was now
possible and the increased Negro registration figures,
along with reports of new registration drives undertaken
by local organizations.

Notification of poll tax payment

deadlines was a prominent and continuing practice, as was
criticism of the Democratic party efforts to continue
the limited primary.

"Good sense," the newspaper said,

demanded that Democrats give up the rattling of "the
sabre in the tents of a mythical white supremacy" before
they forced Negroes and whites into the Communist party. 95
Nor did the paper let the Democrats escape with other
"political tricks" such as the mailing of poll tax bills
to whites only.

The Journal and Guide

caught the Richmond

city treasurer, who claimed that no tax bills were sent
out for less than five dollars, in a prevarication by
producing serial numbers of bills sent to white voters
for one dollar and fifty cents, and exposed the practice
of treasurers that made Negroes believe they owed two
96
years poll tax when in fact they owed three.
Another politically informative device used by the
Norfolk paper was a questionnaire sent to candidates for
95 Editorial in ibid., May 27, 1933. See also ibid.,
Apr. 2, Oct. 8, 1932, May 13, Aug. 5, 1933 .
...

.. ... . ..

96 rbid., Dec. 9, 16, 1933i Times-Dispatch, Dec. 5,
8, 1933.-
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public office at election time.

The newspaper faithfully

published the answers by the candidates to such questions
as their views on jury service for Negroes, the salary
scales for Negro teachers, equal pay for blacks in public
works projects, and whether they favored repeal or
modification of the poll tax law as a prerequisite to
voting.

While some candidates responded in a manner

unique to politicians, the Journal and Guide was impressed
by the liberal tone of many responses and reported that
the questionnaire had definitely had a "very evident"
effect. 97
The Norfolk newspaper, however, never lessened its
attack on the poll tax.

While.attempting to communicate

to its readers that payment of the tax was a responsibility
of citizenship, the newspaper stressed the political
expediency of voting.

Very few groups of any race who

did not take the pains to make themselves of some importance
politically received any consideration at the hands of
those who control the government, the paper observed.
"A voteless people is a helpless people politically and

have no influence with anybody," therefore it was necessary
for the Negro to take the first step himself if he wished
.

97 Journal and Guide, Jul. 29, 1933, Aug. 3, 1935.
The paper also faithfully reported the names of politicians
who failed to reply to their questionnaire.

f
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to remedy his own disabilities.

At present, the poll

tax was "merely a subterfuge to keep certain people from
voting," but with increased effort from the Negro population, the hold of the dominant political machine could be
broken, resulting in the removal of the "last illegitimate
descendent of the original disfranchisement devices, and
••• the return of the government to the people. 1198

The

Journal and Guide, like the Virginia Voters' League,
believed it was necessary to "Pay the poll tax in order
to abolish the poll tax."
CONCLUSION
Virginia's attempt to reform her suffrage system in
1902 undeniably did not bring the good government that was
desired.

Resourceful politicians resorted to the use of

political fraud in elections, found a willing class of
venal voters, and circumvented election procedures with
the widespread abuse of an absentee voters law.

Since

state election machinery was controlled in most areas by
the Democratic organization, the losers in the process
were Virginia Republicans and the Negro.

The Republicans

discovered in 1921 that to campaign on the election reform
issue, especially to advocate removal of the poll tax, was
to raise cries of endangering white supremacy and to court

98 Editorials in ibid., May 20, 1933, Sept. 29, Oct.
20, Nov. 3, 1934, Jan.~26, 1935.

100
political disaster.

Unwanted by the Republicans and

ignored by state Democrats, the Negro learned early that
the only chance for a voice in his own future rested with
Negro political action.

!I

•

But the 1921 lily black experience

illustrated effectively the great distance it was necessary
to travel before the Negro could gain the control he
desired.
Long perserverance in state and Federal courts
eventually resulted in the slight opening that was
necessary, first the admittance to the South's white
primary, and then the escape from the capriciousness of
the local registrar.

This accomplished, the Virginia

Negro could turn to what the Journal and Guide described
as the last illegitimate descendant of the original
disfranchising devices, the poll tax.

Once the way was

open, the Uegro community proved amazingly resourceful,
perhaps even more so than whites.

With the assistance

of the N.A.A.C.P., the United Civic League of Virginia,
the Virginia Voters' League, newspapers, and other social,
fraternal and religious groups, a campaign was undertake'il
to stress to the Negro the importance of participation in
the political process.

It was a slow process.

But a

new political awareness emerged, recognizing the .political
importance of placing even its comparitively small support
in the right place.

At a Norfolk Civic League meeting in

1933 initiating a drive for 1,000 voters as new members,

...__..___
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the league members agreed upon the necessity of working with
Virginia Democrats if they hoped to achieve anything. 99
The Virginia Voters' League and the editorials of
the Norfolk Journal and Guide reflect the Negro's attitude
toward the poll tax during this period.

If the Negro was

to be of consequence politically, it was necessary to
register and pay the poll tax.

Once the Negro was of

consequence politically, he could use his influence in an
effort to abolish the poll tax.

But the Virginia Negro

needed further assistance in the fight against the tax.
That assistance emerged from several unlikely sources during
the late 1930's.

99

Journal and Guide, Jul. 22, 1933.
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CHAPTER III
"RESPECTABLE" OPPOSITION APPEARS, 1936-1945
In 1942, Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond
Time~r-DLs·p·atch,

observed that "From the crags above Harper's

Ferry to the Mesas fringing the Rio Grande, a revolt is
brewing against the poll tax. 111 The poll tax had persisted,
Dabney believed, because a portion of the population viewed
it as still necessary for "white supremacy," because
politicians with power saw the status quo and their own
existence threatened by its removal, and because the
attitude of the disfranchised whites was indifferent or
inarticulate.

The political and social consequences of

retention of the levy were burdensome:

the tax tended to

encourage corruption and contributed to the partial atrophy
of the democratic process while placing obstacles in the
way of needed social and labor legislation in the states
where the beneficiaries of such legislation could note vote. 2
1 virginius Dabney,· Be·1·ow the· p·otomac,· A Book About
· ·th·e· Net-t South (New York, 1942) , p·. 106. Hereafter cited
as Dabney,· Be·1·ow th·e· Potomac. Dabney ' s "Sh al 1 the Sou th ' s
Poll Tax Go?" New York· Times Magazine, Feb. 12, 19 39 , pp.
9, 20, expresses essentially the same ideas relative to the
poll tax.
·2Ibid., pp. 113-114.

1Q3
Dabney's comments reveal that the poll tax had
finally emerged as a respectable issue of debate, not just
a subject to be relinquished to carping Republicans
and
!
Negroes.

I
I

By 1942, a number of events had transpired that

brought the matter to increased public attention.

Of

particular importance are the activities of Virginia governors
Westmoreland Davis, the state's chief executive from 1918
to 1922 who had left the Governor's mansion to edit an
agricultural journal, and James H. Price, a Democratic
organization man who had come out publicly for poll tax
repeal in the gubernatorial campaign of 1938 and pursued
his efforts once he entered the statehouse.
From 1942 until 1949, the tempo of activity of the
poll tax repeal forces appeared to increase geometrically.
Public discussion of the poll tax led to legislative discussion, which was stimulated further by the consideration
of Federal action to eliminate the tax as a prerequisite
to voting in national elections.

Then, in trying to deal

with a situation created by Congress's declaration of war,
Virginia politicians were forced to face a test of strength
between poll tax repeal forces and those elements that
considered retention of the levy essential to good government.

Finally, Virginia was reminded of the abuses possible

under its election system in a contested election for
lieutenant governor late in 1945.
Ultimately these events led to a situation discussed
in the following chapter.

Between 1938 and 1945, the revolt
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against the poll tax was brought from the point of brewing
to the point of boiling and confirmed the prediction of
that Constitutional Convention delegate of 1902 who foresaw that the poll tax prerequisite would "rise up to give
.

us trouble in the years to come. 113
THE' SOUTHERN' PLANTER ATTACKS THE TAX
In 1942, Virginius Dabney credited the Richmond
published Southern· Pl·an'ter with the "first important
contribution made to poll tax literature during the past
. 4
several decades."
This is a somewhat unusual and surprising claim on two counts.

First of all, the· Southern

Pl'anter had been established in 1841 as a non-political
agricultural monthly publicizing the advantages of the
new scientific farming procedures.

Secondly, the editor

of the magazine at the time Dabney wrote was a former
. governor, Westmoreland Davis.
Davis, a Democrat in the gentleman-farmer-aristocrat
tradition, had been governor of Virginia from 1918 to 1922,
a period of Virginia government marked by a central theme
of economy and efficiency.

As governor, he had centralized

state budgeting under the executive, issued the first
executive budget in 1920, established a state purchasing
agency and had instituted prison reforms.

After leaving

· 3 Deb'~te·s· of· the· c·onventi·on, II, p. 2865, remarks by
George K. Anderson.
4Dabney ,- Be'l'ow the Potomac, p. 108.
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the governorship, he was defeated in 1922 for a Senate
seat by Claude Swanson. 5 While remaining politically
aware, Davis devoted the majority of his energies until
his death in 19 42 to the· SbUth·e·rn· Planter.
There is nothing in Davis's life or activities prior
to the late 1930's to suggest that he ever questioned the
rigid voter qualifications placed upon the Virginia
electorate.

Instead, it appears that Davis's concern for

poll tax repeal grew out of the Depression and its effect
upon the farmer.

During the Roosevelt era, Davis, through

the· SbUthe·r·n· Pl·anter, appealed for direct relief of the
farmer, _thus becoming "one of the New Deal' s foremost
friends in the upper South. 116

Being a defender of the New

Deal policy meant attacking the foes of the Roosevelt
program, and in Virginia this meant attacking Harry F.
I

Byrd and the state Democratic organization.

So with "a

spirit of liberal criticism" in the air, Davis became, as
his biographer notes, "the first significant white Democrat
in the Old Dominion to step forward and frontally assault
the poll tax. 117
The attack on the tax began in July, 1936, and
continued until March, 1941, a period during which the
..... : ..... ~Ja~k- T. Kirby, we·stmo·reland Davi·s·:· vi·rginia· Planter. Pb'l"iti·ci'an·,· '1'859-·1942 (Charlottesville, 1968), pp. 75, 97.
·6!hi.a., pp. 185-86 •
.7

Ib·i.a. ;

p • 19 3 •
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circulation of the· S'outherh· p·1·ahter in six states reached
8
the 300,000 level.
In a series of editorials and articles,
the magazine focused its attention upon the effect of the
poll tax on Virginia politics and upon the farmer.

The

election laws of the state had diminished interest in
government in Virginia, the· Plahter declared, and had
"enabled a political organization to grow up that is
unequaled in ruthlessness anywhere in this country. 119
The cumulative and prepayment features were "a tremendous
hardship on our citizens of low incomes - the farmer, the
workingmen and their wives. 1110 If anyone doubted that the
farmer was eager to vote, Davis offered the evidence
provided by recent Agricultural Adjustment Administration
tobacco referenda in which the farmer vote exceeded the
total vote for President in the Virginia tobacco growing
.
11
regions.
The· southe·rn· Pl'anter and Davis were especially active
as the 1938 session of the General Assembly approached.
·8·rbid. , p • 191.
9

"Government by the People, II editorial in' s·outh·ern
. PTahter, XCVII (Jul.' 1936)' P· 4.
1011 The Virginia Poll Tax," editorial in· 'ibid., XCVII
(Oc~., 1936), p. 20.
1111 The Right to Vote," editorial in· ·ibid., XCVIII (Jan.,
1937), p. 4; "The Right to Vote," editorial in ibid., C
(Mar.·, 19 39) , p. 6.
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After urging that women's clubs, the Granqe, the Virginia
State Farm Bureau Federation, and all other rural groups
. 12
;
work to get the poll tax paid,
letters were seqt by the
I

I

Planter to various leaders of farmer organizations in the
state.

"If we need the revenue, which the poll tax affords,"

one letter declared, "let's assess it_ generally and collect
it without any relation to voting," thus not allowing
people to escape taxation by surrendering a voice in the
. government. 13 To the president of the Agricultural Conference Board, the· Planter recommended that the Grange
urge the General Assembly to pass. an enabling act permitting
·the people of the state to change the constitution. 14 Once
the legislature convened, letters were sent to all members
of the General Assembly with reprints of three articles
·from the· PTanter on the poll tax. 15
Some idea of the course, and effectiveness, of the
SO'Uthe·rn· Pl'anter • s attack on the poll tax is offered by
one of its more ambitious editorials, "The Poll Tax - A
Burden Upon Education. 1116

One shibboleth of poll tax

1211 The Right to Vote," editorial in· ibid., XCVIII
--.
(Jan., 1937), p. 4.
13 P. D. Sanders to Mark Turner, Nov. 29, 1937, box
122, Davis Papers.
14 P. D. Sanders to C. Nelson Bech, Nov. 29, 1937, ·ibid.
15Letters to members of the Virginia General Assembly
from the· Southe-rn· Pl·anter, Feb. 14, 1938,· 'ibid.
1611 The Poll Tax - A Burden Upon Education," editorial
in· sou·the·rn· PTanter XCIX (Jan., 1938), pp. 5, 25.
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defenders was that the tax was necessary to secure revenue
for the public school system of the state.

Accompanied by

a careful compilation of statistics, the Planter revealed
that two-thirds of the adult population of Virginia escaped
making any poll tax payment, thus robbing the state school
system of $1,315,528 in 1935 alone.

Further investiga-

tion revealed that from one-fifth to one-third of all
persons assessable with capitation taxes were never assessed,
and that often from one-third to one-half of the assessments made were actually never paid.

"Hence," the Planter

declared, "we • • • picture the voter poll tax as an arch..,.
enemy of education • •
Other editorials attacked the absentee voting ballot
as the "little brother" of the poll tax allowing the
prostitution of the spirit and letter of the law by "poli18
ticians eager for personal advantage."
When Federal action
to eliminate the tax was being considered, the p1·anter
added its voice in support. 19 And as world war became more
of a possibility, the magazine declared that "doublebarrelled democracy demands that the responsibility to

l.7Ihid.

c

18 "Menace
'
of the Mail Ballot, " editorial in· ·ibid. ,
(Feb. I 1938) I 8.
19 "The Poll Tax Must Go," editorial in· 'ihid. , CI

(May, 1940) , 4.
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defend the country in time of war carries with it the
20
right to vote in time of peace."
One informative article
by a member of the Virginia Department of Taxation traced
the suffrage history of the state from the colonial period,
demonstrating that up until the beginning of the twentieth
century, Virginia's suffrage had been an expanding one and
concluded that citizens of the state should demand an
amendment to remove the poll tax, "the vicious limitation
f rame d f or Negroes b u t

.
th e wh.i t e vo t ers • • • • 11 2 1
cruci. f ying

The intensity of discussion of the poll tax was definitely
raised by the appearance of the· southern· p1·anter articles •
The Richmond Time·s--ni·spatch reprinted one of the· p·1·anter' s
editorials against the tax, and Virginius Dabney used the
delinquency rate argument to support tax modification in
22
his book on the South.
Other publications gave the
information supplied by Davis exposure outside of both
. . . an d th e f armer aud ience. 23 Loca1 Dernocra t 'ic
Virginia
0

20"Double....;.Barrelled Dernocracy,n editorial in ibid.,
CII (Mar., 1941), 8.
21 John H. Russell, "Highlights of Virginia Suffrage
History," ibid., XCIX (Feb., 1938), 5, 21-24.
22 Time·s·-nisoatch, Nov. 23, 1937; Dabney,· B'e'l'ow the
Potomac, p. 117.
23 clipping from L'OU'i'sVi'l'l'e' co·urie·r·-·Journ·a1 I Apr. 9,
1939, box 95, Miller Papers; George c. Stoney, "Suffrage
in the South I Part I I The Poll Tax I II su·rvey Gr·aphic I XXIX
(Jan., 1940), 5-9, 41-43.
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organi.zations debated the question of whether the tax
should be retained and requested information from the
Planter.

24

State politicians reported to Davis that there

was sentiment among influential members of the Senate of
Virginia to repeal or .modify the tax and to remove many
of the iniquities of. the absentee ballot. 25 The Virginia
Young Democrats considered the poll tax enough of a politi.cal question to authorize a conuni ttee to study the possibilities of changes in the election laws.

Unfortunately,

the committee report made no suggestions for modifications
but offered an insight into the thinking any subsequent
efforts at repeal would have to overcome.

As long as a

sizeable portion of the electorate participate, the
conunittee declared, "good government is not dependent upon
a universal and wholesale representation at the polls."
These Young Democrats feared that removal of the poll tax
"would tend to place in the

hand~.of

any demagogue the

power to destroy the very objects of good government,"
allowing persons with "no sense of responsibility" to be
cajoled into going to the polls and "voting for all types
of proposals and candidates. 1126
24
Mrs. w. P. Elmore to Westmoreland Davis, Apr. 3,
1939, box 122 Davis ;t>apeJ;s.

25
Representative Norman R. Hamilton to Westmoreland
Davis, Nov. 30, 1937, ibid.
2611 Report of the Conunittee on the Study of the

Capitation Tax as a Pre-requisite to Voting, 0 Virginia
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While the Young Democrats studied and debated, the
General Assembly of 1938 considered possible changes in
the election law relative to the poll tax.

Early in the

session, it became apparent that outright repeal of the tax
was an impossibility when the Senate defeated such a proposal. 27

But two other resolutions with .more limited ob-

jectives did receive the attention of the House Committee
on Privileges and Elections.

One measure, introduced by

Washington County delegate, William N. Neff, sought changes
in the law that would have allowed the General Assembly to
handle poll tax regulations and stipulated payment any
time from one to three years. 28 The second resolution was
submitted by Richmond delegate A. O. Boschen and sought to
reduce the tax to one dollar, require only one year's payment, and allow payment up to thirty days prior to an

Democrat, V (Jul., 1939}, 4-6, box 95, Miller Papers. Members of the committee were Mrs. John Marshall, Charles R.
Fenwick, Daniel Weymouth, R. L. Anderson, Richard s. Wright,
and M. Raymond Doubles. Doubles, chairman of the committee,
did submit a minority report in which he generally agreed
with the majority but recommended that a city or county
provide for one day's work as a substitute for payment of
the poll tax.
27 Times-Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1938. Senator Vivian Page
introduced the proposal.
2811 House Joint Resolution B, 1938 Session, 11 series 1,
box 10, Robert Whitehead ;papers, University of Virgi.nia
Library, Charlottesvi.lle, Va. Hereafter cited as Whitehead
Papers.
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.
e 1 ec t ion.

The two resolutions were supported by such

independent Democrats as former State Senator

c.

O'Conor

Goolrick, Francis P. Miller, Robert Whitehead and former
delegate Melvin B. Nunnally from Richmond but failed to
win the approval of committee chairman, George A.
Massenburg. 30
The proposal by Neff was presented as an indirect result of the articles appearing in the Southern Planter and
the direct efforts of Francis P. Miller, General Assembly
member from Fairfax County.

Miller was a member of the

Virginia Policy Committee, a non-governmental organization
studying problems of state interest.

The policy committee

had adopted resolutions in late 1937 proposing, among
other things, the reduction of the poll tax to one dollar
and the creation by the Governor of a study commission to
eliminate election law abuses. 31 After reading the articles appearing in the Planter, Miller wrote several prominent and influential Virginians, including Neff, praising
the articles and the resulting coverage and asking if they
agreed that the first step toward liberalization would be
29 "House Joint Resolution No. 1, 1938 Session," ibid.;
Francis P. Mi.ller to Charles Picket, Apr. 7, 1941, box9'5';"
};tiller Papers.

JOTimes-Di~spatch, Feb. 23, 1938.
31 "Virginia Policy Conunittee Resolutions, Oct. 9-10(
1937," boJC 95, lliller Papers. The Virginia Policy Committee
was the affiliate of the National Policy Committee.
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removal of voting regulations from the constitution in order
that the General Assembly have final authority over the
i
matter. 32 Neff responded that sucn a proposal wocild
"command a great deal of support", and Miller urged Neff to
introduce a resolution to accomplish the result during the
forthcoming General Assembly session. 33
It is unfortunate that the General Assembly did not
give more consideration to the proposals presented in
1938, but the efforts by Neff, aoschen and Miller amply

illustrate the effect of the Southern Planter articles on
the poll tax discussion.

With few exceptions over the

preceeding third of a century, criticism of the poll tax
had been the domain of Virginia Negroes and Republicans.
The articles appearing in the Planter assaulting the poll
tax helped give respectability to the revolt against the
tax.

The Planter was white, Protestant and Democratic,

which guaranteed a hearing by an audience larger than
state Republicans and Negroes could appeal to.

The manner

in which the argument was presented and the underplaying
of the Negro's grievances to those of the poor white made
the attack .more acceptable to some Virginians threatened by

32Francis P. Mi.ller to Virginius Dabney, Dec. 3 1937;
1
F. ;J? • .Mill.er to W. N. Neff, Dec. 7, 193 7; Howard B. Bloomer,

editor of the Arlington Sun, to F. P. Miller, Dec. 7, 1937,
ibid.
~33w. N. Neff to Francis P • .Miller, Dec. 9, 1937; F.
P. Miller to W. N. Neff, Dec. 17, 1937; W. N. Neff to F. P.
Miller, Dec. 23, 1937, ibid.
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the loss of "white supremacy."

Again, as Virginius

Dabney noted, the poll tax was under fire, and that fire
was getting hotter. 34
GOVERNOR PRICE AND THE GOOCH REPORT
After the failure to secure election law reform
duri.ng the 1938 General Assembly session, poll tax repeal
forces resorted to a more oblique approach, and found a
powerful ally in State Controller LeRoy Hodges, long time
advocate of poll tax reform.

Hodges estimated that

$1,200,000 in state revenues were lost annually through
the failure to collect poll taxes and revealed that only
forty percent of the amount due the state had been collected over the past three years.

As a result, the State

Controller's office desired to initiate stronger measures
to enforce collection. 35

This tactic was designed to

stir a popular rebellion against the tax, and Hodges admitted privately that "if the people do not want the poll
taxes enforced, then I think the next General Assembly
should nullify the statutes. 1136 Hodges's effort met with
little success, however, probably because it would have

34Dabney, Below the Potomac, p. 126.
35
Press release tram LeRoy Hodges, Jan. 30, 1939,
box 95 ( Miller ;!?ape.rs.
36
LeRoy Hodges to Francis P. Miller, Feb. 2, 1939;
clipping from Louisville Courier-Journal, Apr. 9, 1939,
ibid.
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required the cooperation of local tax officials, loyal
organization men.
New enthusiasm emerged and the possibility for poll
tax reform increased the following year when Governor
James H. Price advocated such in an address .to the General
Assembly.

Repeal forces had contacted Price prior to his

assuming office in 1938 and found him receptive to the
proposals of the Virginia Policy Committee and willing to
submit the poll tax problem to a governmental study. 37
In his 1940 message, Price referred the study to the
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, requesting revision
and codification of all election laws. 38

It was generally

recognized, the Governor declared, that the state's election machinery was in need of repair.

Many citizens were

disfranchised because of "mistakes" in records; block payment of the poll tax had become a "racket", and the absentee voter's law was "openly violated."

Addressing him-

self directly to the matter of the poll tax, Governor
Price said,
The poll tax has become, in the last analysis,
an instrument of fraud and vicious practices. • •
If this form of tax is to be continued, it should
be safeguarded and possibly reduced in amount so
that .more people would individually become interested in its pay,.ment. • .Condi.tions have changed
31

c.

O'Conor Goolrick to Francis. l> • .Miller, Dec. 18,

1937, ibid.

38 Journal of the Senate, 19 4 O, document no. 1, p. 22.
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since 1902 , and I believe that our attitude
should be more liberal • • • Personally, I feel
that i.t [the tax] should be retained, a smaller
tax imposed, and a more earnest effort made
to collect i.t. 39
As a result of Price's recommendations, a bill making
the block payment of poll taxes a f elo~y was introduced in
the General Assembly.

The debate on the measure reveals

much about the existing abuse of Virginia's election laws.
Delegate V. C. Smith of Buchanan County stated that "if
you put this law into effect, you won't have half the
people in the Ni.nth district voting," while a Hanover
County delegate reported that one prominent man had told
him that "if you don't pass this bill, you are going to
break another man of this town and myself because we have
to get up money to pay the poll taxes for all the people."
The effort at reform apparently appeared futile to some
delegates for, as one Virginia legislator remarked, "if
you make the block buying of poll taxes a felony, no jury
will ever convict the accused person. 1140
Despite the fact that the proposed legislation had
the direct support of Governor Price and the indirect
approval of Senator Byrd, the measure was defeatea. 41

In

39 rbid., pp. 27-28.
40 Times-Di.spatch, Mar. 1, 1940.

41 The Winchester Evening Star, a newspaper owned by
Senator Byrd, endorsed the bill as being in the cause of
good government. Editorial from the Winchester Evening Star,
quoted by ibid., Mar. 2, 1940.
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an effort to claim some credit for reform of the election
laws, the General Assembly did pass a bill supposedly designed to prevent block buying.

The act required that

local treasurers report to the commonwealth's attorney any
payment of poll taxes for political purposes, but the
measure was emasculated by imposing no penalty for failure
to report such payments.

42

The effect of the legislation,

as the Portsmouth Star pointed out, would be to "merely
legalize the present practices" because candidates frequently had their political workers collect authorization
coupons from assessed voters allowing someone else to
pay their poll taxes.

The candidate for office then gave

the collected slips and the necessary money to the treasurer in exchange for the poll tax receipts.

43

Even though the General Assembly stumbled in its
attempt to revise the election laws, the Virginia Advisory
Legislative Council acted to carry out the study recommended by Governor Price.

Late in March, 1941, Senator

Leonard G. Muse of Roanoke, a member of the Council,
authorized the creation of three subcommittees to investigate and report changes which should be made to the
constitutional, absent voters, and statutory voting

42

43

Acts of the General Assembly, 1940, p. 390.

Editorial from the Portsmouth Star, quoted by the
Times-Dispatch, l1ar. 3, 1940.
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procedures.

The three members appointed to the subconunittee

investigating consti.tutional voting procedures were
Robert K. Gooch, a University of Virginia professor,
Radford attorney Ted Dalton, a Republican, and Col. James
44
P. Woods of Roanoke, a traditional Democrat.
The
principal matter of concern for this subcommittee, Senator
Muse told the members, was the question of retention of
the poll tax.

45

The subcommittee held two hearings, one in Richmond,
the other in Roanoke.

At the Richmond hearing in July,

there were six speakers against the poll tax while only
one person, Capt. Nathaniel Ewell of Charlottesville,
appeared in defense.

Moss Plunkett of Roanoke, then

running in the Democratic primary for lieutenant governor,
attacked the tax as violating the spirit and letter of the
Virginia Bill of Rights and asked that legislative action
be instituted to allow the voters to decide if the levy

44

Robert K. Gooch, The Poll Tax in Vir inia Suffra e
Histor
A Premature Proposal for Reform Charlottesville,
969 _, pp. 7, 11-12. Hereafter cited as Gooch, The Poll
Tax in Virginia Suffrage History. This book is a reprint
of the 1941 report. The 1941 report of the subcommittee,
whi.ch became known as the Gooch report, entitled "Report
of the Subcommittee for a Study of Constitutional Provisions
Concerning Voting in Virginia" can also be found in the
Hutchinson Papers, box 18, and the Byrd papers, box 179.
45 Leonard G. Muse to Robert K. Gooch, Mar. 26, 1941,
quoted in ibid., p. 12.
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should be retained.

Senator Hunsdon Cary of Henrico, also

running in the primary race for Governor, asserted that repeal of the poll tax would awaken the electorate and thus
cure some of the state's ills.

In defense of the tax,

Ewell could only say that he believed "the bulk of the
people we get rid of (as voters) are those not mentally
qualified. 1146

The same forces, led by Plunkett, attacked

the tax at the subcommittee hearing in Roanoke on August
23.

Once again there was but a single defender, local
attorney James c. Martin. 47
Aft.er collecting a mass of information at the hearings and from other sources, the subcommittee prepared and
submitted its report to the Virginia Advisory Legislative
Council in early November, 1941.

The subcommittee report

advocated two changes in the election laws of the· state.
After noting that registration was often the final factor
preventing voter participation in elections, the majority
of the subcommittee concluded that the fundamental defect
46 Times-Dispatch, Jul. 6, 1941. Other people advocating repeal were David G. George, chai.rman of the Virginia
Electoral Reform League, Ray Thomason, regional director of
the c. I. o., R. H. Wilton of the Virginia Federation of
Labo,r, Howard Davis of Richmond and Howard Carwile of
Cha,rlotte.
47 Ibid., Aug. 24, 1941; Roanoke Times, Aug. 24, 1941.
Others present attacking the tax included Virgil Goode of
Rocky Mount, a member of the House of Delegates and Robert
c. Jackson, former Roanoke city attorney.

120

in the registration system was the discretionary authority
of registration officials.

To remedy the defect, a fairly

and impartially administered literacy test was reconunended.
The second recommendation was that the poll tax be elimi. .
na t e d as a prerequisite
to vo t.ing. 48
The Gooch report is unique among government sponsored
studies because of i.ts brief eloquence and·the force of its
logic.

This is illustrated by the discussion of the evi-

dence considered before reaching the conclusion that the
poll tax should be removed.

The subcommittee recognized the

difficulties presented by its recommendation.

First, there

was the problem of amending the state constitution, and
then there was the historical fact of a restricted suffrage
for the previous half century.

The result, as the majority

assessed it, was that suffrage restriction "has entered into the people's habits of thought; and a consequent inertia
exists" taking the form of unquestioning acceptance and unreasoned hostility to change. 49

Despite the obstacles to be

overcome, "advocacy of retenti.on of the poll tax and genuine
belief in political democracy are basically irreconcilable,"
leading the subcommittee to conclude that the principal,
i f not the only, argument to be made concerning the effect

48

Gooch, The Poll Tax in Virgini.a Suffrage History,
pp. 15 ' 2 6 ' 2 9 •
49 rbid., pp. 15-16.
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of liberalizing the suffrage in Virginia was that "the
government of the State would be placed upon a democratic
basis -- the only basis worthy of the best tradition of
the Conunonwealth. 1150
Addressing directly the questions raised hy those
who advocated retention of the tax, the Gooch report stated
that the assertion that more people paid the poll tax than
voted in the elections was a canard.

Such a charge im-

plied that the poll tax did not operate as a limitation
upon the elective franchise.

If the supporters of reten-

tion believed this to be true, they could not consistently
object to the removal of the tax.

"If the poll tax pro-

visions do not serve the purpose of restricting the suffrage," the report declared, "they do not serve any purpose at all. 1151

The contention that payment of the tax

was a desirable test of interest in government was, the
subconunittee found, simply an unsupported assertion whose
opposite was equally as plausible.

From all the evidence

and testimony, the only logical conclusion that could be
reached was that no test or penalty was justifiable. 52
When the final report of the Virginia Advisory
Legislative Council was presented to Governor

~rice

in

December, 1941, the changes reconunended in Virginia's

SOih'd
~·1 pp. 18-19, 22.
52 rbid., pp. 25-26.

51Ih'd
---2:;._•

I

p. 22.
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election laws were that the absentee voting procedures be
amended, the time during which the polls were open be
lengthened, that provisi.ons be made for special primaries,
and that a three judge court be authorized to hear contested election cases.

The only indication of other sub-

conunittee findings was the statement that "several subconunittees made other recommendations upon which the
Council did not find it possible to agree. • • •

The

only existing evidence of the Council meeting of November
7, at which the Gooch report was discussed, indicates that
evidently no interest was aroused by the Gooch report re54
.
conunen d a t ions.
Thus the Gooch report remained hidden
attention.

fro~

It is now evident that the Advisory

public

~ouncil

intended for it to remain hidden, for the Gooch =eport
was unusually ordered filed "under lock and key" in the
office of the Legislative Reference Bureau.SS

I~ would

have remained hidden had it not been for the efforts of
Moss Plunkett, now head of the Virginia Electora2 Reform

s3 "Report

of the Virginia Advisory Legi.sla-=.ive
Council, Dec. 12, 1941," box 17, Governor James ~- Price
Executive Papers, Virginia State Library, Richmo:=i.5, Va.
54 Gooch, The Poll Tax in Virginia Suffrage 3istory,
pp. 33-34.
55 .
E. R. Combs to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 16, i:;.42, box
133, Harry F. Byrd :Papers, University of Virgini.~ Library,
Charlottesville, Va. Hereafter cited as Byrd Pa-;:.'-ers. It
is interesting to note that even Senator Byrd die not know
about the existence of the report until November, 1942.
See, Harry F. Byrd to E. R. Combs, Nov. 10, 1942,. ibid.
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League organized in June, 1941, to fight for the elimination of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting.
In February, 1942, a joint Senate and House Privileges
and Elections Committee was to hear testimony on Senator
Vivian Page's bill to abolish the poll tax prerequisite. 56
The pending hearing prompted the Times-Dispatch to
editorially ask what had happened to the Gooch report.
"Thunderous silence has enveloped the whole matter since
early last fall," the newspaper noted, and the silence
could only be interpreted to mean that "the report contained a minimum of whitewash and a maximum of forthright
criticism of the status quo, and that its contents did not
find favor with the political powers that be. 1157 At the
hearing on the Page bill, Moss Plunkett produced a copy of
the Gooch report and proceeded to read it to the members of
the House and Senate present "for fear that they had never
seen or heard of the report. 1158 The exhumation of the
report prompted the Times-Dispatch to state that it "must
have been a first-magnitude bombshell for those who had
kept this documentary dynamite under wraps for several
56Times-Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1942.
57 Editorial in ibid., Feb. 12, 1942.
58 rbid., Feb. 13, 1942; U. s. Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, Hearings, on
S. 1280, Poll Taxes, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, p. 72.
Cited hereafter as Senate Subcommittee of the Judiciary,
Hearings on S. 1280, 1942.
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months," and declared the poll tax a "relic of a by-gone
era" and called for its repeal along with substantial
changes in the registration laws. 59

I

The revelation of the Gooch report did not aid the
passage of Senator Page's bill, for it was never reported
out of the Privileges and Elections Committee.

But the

Gooch report, an examinati.on of the poll tax question undertaken by a division of the state government at the request
of the Governor, had surfaced, and its conclusions were a
contribution to the growing argument against retention of
the levy as prerequisite to voting.

Moss Plunkett con-

cluded his testimony in support of Page's bill by stating,
"the day of final reckoning is almost at hand, even in
Old Virginia." 60
THE PRESSURE FOR REPEAL CONTINUES
Despite General Assembly inaction on Senator Page's
proposal, the pressure for modification of state election
laws was maintained.

Additional legislation was intro-

duced by Robert Whitehead to enforce collection of delinquent poll taxes. 61

In fact, Whitehead's arguments in

support of his resolution are reminiscent of the 1902

59 Editorial in Times-Dispatch, Feb. 14, 1942.
60

rbid., Feb. 1-3 / 1942.

6111 House Joint Resolution No. 27, Feb. 16, 1942,"

seri.es 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers.
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debates of the constitutional conventi.on.

The objects

of attack were the two sections of the state constitution
i

prohibi.ting collection of the poll tax by legal process

I

until it had become three years past due and prohibiting
the placing of a li.en upon personal property exempted
under the poor debtors law. 62 Several delegates to the
constitutional convention objected to the provisions
allowing these exemptions on the grounds that the state
school system would be robbed of badly needed revenue. 63
Whitehead estimated that the state lost one million
dollars per year that could be used for the schools be64
.
. .
cause o f th e exemp t ion provisions.
If the two provisions
were removed, Whitehead believed that the electorate would
be increased and the revenue collected would also increase.
The poll tax had become "a mere fee, payable or not at
will" for admission to the ballot box. 65 The result was
that the people of Virginia had become "content to go
their own way and let the other people pay the taxes and
.
66
and do the voting."
Like Senator Page's bill,
62 constituti.on of Virginia, 1902, sec. 22 and 173.
63nebates of the Convention, II., pp. 2860-61, remarks

by T. W. Harrison.
64 Robert Whi.tehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24,
1944, series 1, box 10, Whitehead papers.
65 Robert Whitehead to Howard H. Davi.s, Jul. 15, 1941,
ibi.d.
66 Robert Whitehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24,
1944, ibid.
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Whitehead's effort failed to gain the approval of the
Privileges and Elections Committee and the 1942 General
Assembly sessi.on passed without seeing any changeJ in the

~,I

election laws.

At this point attention turned to events unfolding
in Washington as the Senate considered a measure introduced
by Senator Claude Pepper of Florida that would have removed
the poll tax requirement to voting or registering to vote
in primaries or general elections for national office.
First, however, mention should be made of a brief contraversy that demonstrates the anamolies that could be expected from the position taken by the Byrd organization in
Virginia on the payment of poll taxes.

In February, 1942,

it had come to light that the Federal Security
Administration, a New Deal agency making small household
budget loans, had included in its calculations for loans
going to families in southern states provisions for funds
with which the poll tax could be paid. 67 President
Roosevelt approved of the procedure, considering the tax
a legitimate liability of the individual, and reaffirmed
hi.s life-long oppositi.on to the poll tax, but Senators
from the poll tax states immediately exploded.

Senator

Byrd was perhaps ..most vocal, as he was the chairman of a
Senate committee considering the possibi.li.ties of continuing the Federal Security Administration.
67 New York Times, Feb. 14, 1942.

"Such loans,"
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Senator Byrd declared, "are in direct violation with the
constitutions and laws of States which prohibit the payment of poll taxes by any one other than the prospective
voter. 1168

It seems that Senator Byrd was not willing to

countenance Federal action similar to the political facts
of life in Virginia.
The debate over the Federal Security Administration
had barely subsided when the Senate began hearings on
Senator Pepper's poll tax repeal measure.

Testifying be-

fore the subcommittee holding the hearings were various
.members of the Virginia repeal effort.

Moss Plunkett,

appearing as the chairman of the Virginia Electoral Reform
League, introduced the subcommittee to the contents of the
Gooch report and testified to his observations of block
payment of poll taxes. 69 David G. George, director of the
Southern Electoral Reform League, also testified concerning
the procedures used to secure the absentee vote in
Virginia. 70

Dr. Frederick K. Beutel, a professor of law

68 Ibid.

69 senate Subconunittee of the Judiciary, Hearings on
s. 1280, 1942, pp. 72-78. Plunkett testified that during
hJ...S recent campaign for lieutenant governor he was told
"there would be no possibility of .my .matching the 85,000
votes which the poll tax crowd has in its vest pocket in
Virginia, • • • and that it would take over $100,000 to
finance the necessary campaign in the State." Ibid.,
p. 78.
'JOib'd
--2:_·, pp. 90-93.
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from the College of William and Mary, told the subcommittee
that, because of the necessity of frequent moves and the
differing poll tax requirements in the states where he had
lived, he and his family had voted in only two elections
since 1928.

The poll tax, Dr. Beutel contended, was thus

disfranchising a large portion of the professional population who, like himself, found i.t necessary to change
resi.. d ency o f ten. 71
Perhaps most enlightening of all was the testimony
given by Virginia Attorney General Abram P. Staples.
Staples's testimony reveals the legal argument constructed by those opposed to enactment of Federal legislation abolishing the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting,
and can be taken as the position of the state political
organization he represented relative to the power of
Congress to establish restrictions upon the poll tax.
Briefly, Staples asserted that the Federal Constitution
reserved to the states the exclusive power to determine
the manner of choosing its electors to vote for President
and Vi.ce President, and conferred no power on Congress
to legislate on the subject.

71 Ibid., ~P· 110-14.

Certain sections of the
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Constitution reserved to the states the exclusive power
to prescribe the qualifications of the electors for members to the Senate and House, and this power was not modified by the power delegated to Congress· to regulate the
time, place and manner of holding elections. 72 The requirement of poll tax payment, the Attorney General contended, was a "qualification" of an elector and not subject to Congressional modification.

Even if it was not

considered a qualification, the poll tax fell within the
reserved powers of the states over suffrage, as well as
within the taxing powers.

Finally, the Virginia Attorney

General told the subcommittee that since the Federal
Constitution protected the right to vote of only those
qualified under state statutes, the question of whether a
state had exercised its constitutional power to prescribe
qualifications of electors in an unconstitutional manner
73
was a question for the courts to decide.
The testimony by the repeal forces during the hearings

72 The sections of the Constitution referred to by
Staples are Article I, secti.on 2, and the 17th Amendment.
Ibid • I p • 3 5 9 •
73 1bid., pp. 359-81.

For supporting views, see the
statements submi.tted by J. Torn Watson, attorney general of
Florida, John M. Daniel, attorney general of South
Carolina, and Arthur J. Edwards( ibid., pp. 404-28. For
opposing views, see the statements submitted by the
American Civil Liberties Union and the c. Ie o., ibid.,
pp. 185-88, 330-35.
-
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elicited replies from other Virginia officials.

The State

Auditor of Public Accounts, the Comptroller of the
'

Commonwealth, and Senator Byrd's political lieutenant E.

l

R. Combs, who was Clerk of the Senate and chairman of the
State Compensation Board, replied to the charges made by
Virginia poll tax repeal forces.

74

Combs was so outraged

by Dr. Beutel's statement that he went to the president
of the Virginia Bar Association to request a counter statement, and informed Senator Byrd that he considered it
"outrageous" for William and Mary to keep Beutel on its
. view
.
payro11 in
o f h'is t es t 'imony. 75
The pressure eased somewhat when the Senate subcomrnittee issued its final report rejecting Federal legislation in favor of a constitutional amendment.

76

However,

Southern Senators were quickly forced to mobilize the
following month to oppose consideration of a House approved
;ll ou tl awing
.
. . t e t o vo t.ing. 77
t h e po 11 tax as a prerequisi
b~
While major attention during the next year was
directed to contemplated Federal repeal action, the
Virginia General Assembly of 1944 was again presented with
election law modification proposals.

74

Robert Whitehead

rbid., pp. 428-31

75 E. R. Combs to Harry F. Byrd, Apr. 15, 1942,
box 133, Byrd Papers.
76 New York T'imes , 0 c t • 3 , 1942 •
77 rbid., Nov. 10, 1942.
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again introduced a bill to provide for the elimination
from the state consti.tution of the two provisions, rel

stricting collection of the delinquent poll taxes; but
!I

the measure died in committee.

Whitehead did succeed in

getting approval for legislation requiring local treasurers
to send out notices for all taxes assessed, not just for
amounts over five dollars as the existing law requirea. 78
The measure gave the delinquent poll tax voter the opportunity to at least know the status of his tax.

The

General Assembly in addition passed legislation creating
an "Armed Forces poll tax fund."

This was a patriotic

gesture designed to facilitate voting by Vitginia residents
serving in the armed forces which established a fund for
the payment of poll taxes and outlined a system for absentee registration and voting.by soldiers and sailors. 79
By late August, 1944, the Times-Dispatch noted that
the "snowball" of poll tax repeal was gaining strength.BO
And it did appear that a growing number of Democratic organization men were announcing their opinions on the subject.

Representative David E. Satterfield declared that

the time had come for elimination of the tax and also
proposed revision of the

r~gistration

system in order to

78 Robert Whitehead to A. Willis Robertson, Nov. 24,
1944, series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers.
79 Acts of the General Assembly, 1944, pp. 408-25.
BOEditorial in Times-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1944.
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make it a "fair and impartial test of literacy. 1181

Probably

the strongest voice to emerge at this time was that of L.
Preston Collins of .Marion, administration leader in the
House of Delegates and the 1940 manager of the State
Democratic campaign.

Collins declared that he favored

the poll tax but believed "a nominal poll tax should have
nothing to do with the right to vote."

Significance was

attached to his statement, of course, because of the
position he held.in Democratic party councils. 82
Any speculation, and hope on the part of the repeal
forces, that Collins's statement indicated a shift in
viewpoint by the Byrd organization toward abolition of the
poll levy was quickly dashed as a result of the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals decision on the constitutionality
of the recently established "Armed Forces poll tax fund."
In declaring the act unconstitutional, the Court noted
that it lacked uniformity because the amount to be paid
could vary from zero to four dollars and fifty cents.

The

Court's opinion also concluded that the poll tax was not
"personally" paid as was required and that the system of
temporary or absentee registration introduced by the
legislation was not a situation contemplated by the state
. t'ion. 83
constitu

. 82 .
81 rbid., Aug. 30, 1944.
· Ibid., Sept. 8, 1944.
83 Ibid., Nov. 20, .1944; Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va.
338 ll94~
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As a result of the Supreme Court's opinion, there
was an immediate announcement by Governor Darden in favor
of calling a constitutional convention to give the servicemen the right to vote.

l

As might be expected, 1there

was also an immediate declaration that the disfranchised
at home were entitled to the same consideration as
Virginia's servicemen. 84 Quickly then a controversy had
emerged as to whether a constitutional convention should
be called restricted to the sole issue of giving the servicemen the vote, as Darden desired, or whether the convention should be an open one able to consider the possible
abolition of the poll tax.
While Darden polled General Assembly members on their
opinions, forces favoring an open convention emerged.

The

Southern Electoral Reform League, the Virginia Electoral
Reform League, the A. F. L. and the C. I. O. added their
voices for an unrestricted convention, while the TimesDispatch reported that the leading press of the state
favored letting the voters decide if the convention was to
85 Darden, however, remained adamant and called
b e open.
a special session of the General Assembly to convene
December 15th, saying that his only consideration was the
84 Times-Dispatch, Nov. 25 1944.
1
85 rbid., Nov. 30, 1944; editorial in ibid., Nov. 26,
1944, quoted the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, the Roanoke Times
and the Portsmouth Star as favoring a voter's decision on
an open convention.~
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war voters and that he had no intention of submitting
anything else for consideration. 86
i

The administration bill providing for a limited
I

I

constitutional convention met a storm of debate in the
special session of the General Assembly, but the Governor
had polled the assembly well and he had the necessary
votes to secure passage of his legislation.

The House

and Senate passed identical bills providing for a referendum on a constitutional convention limited to enfranchisement of service personnel in what the Times-Dispatch called
a "raw performance" during which the people were gagged. 87
But the controversy was not yet over.

Moss Plunkett

announced that he would seek an injunction to stop the
referendum, while John Locke Green, Republican treasurer
of Arlington, filed a suit to force the removal of the
"informatory," or restricting, statement from the referendum ballot.

This was followed by an announcement

that Attorney General Staples and State Comptroller Gilmer
would institute a "friendly" test case on the legislature's
.

ac t ion.

88

86

rbid., Dec.

s,

6, 1944.

87 Editorial in ibid., Dec. 15, 1944. The vote in the
House was 84 to 6, while the Senate voted 33 to 2 for
Darden\s proposal. Ibid., Dec. 16, 1944 1 and News Leader,
Dec. 16 1 1944.

88 Times-Dispatch, Dec. 17, 21, 1944; Lynchburg News,
Dec. 19, 1944.
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The question hung in balance until mid-January, 1945,
when the State Supreme Court heard the merged petitions of
Green and Gilmer.

On January 19th, the decision was up89
I
held by a six to one vote by the Court.
No formal decision was issued, however, until late February.

It is

interesting that the dissenting justice in the case was
Chief Justice Clarence J. Campbell, a member of the constitutional convention of 1902 who had voted for the poll
tax and who also acknowledged his subsequent long aff iliation with the Byrd organization in his dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Campbell said that since the 1902 convention
never intended the use of informatory statements on referenda, it was his "conscientious conviction that the act in
question is subversive of my every concept of democratic
.
. 1 es. ,.90
princip

The restricted constitutional convention eventually
convened and revised the state constitution to give
Virginia's servicemen the vote without having to pay the
poll tax. 91 There was one more incident the following
year which illustrated that the opportunity for fraud in
state elections was still very much an issue.

The

Democratic primaries in August, 1945, saw the poll tax

89 Times-Dispatch, Jan. 19, 1945.
90 staples

v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613 (1945)-.

91Acts of the General Assembly, special session, 1945,
pp. 3-7.
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emerge only mildly as an issue.

The successful guber-

natorial candidate, William Tuck, said he would ask the
General Assembly to submit the matter to the people in a
referendum, but announced no personal position on the
poll tax. 92 The real controversy of the election grew out
of the narrow victory given Charles R. Fenwick, from
Arlington, for lieutenant governor _over L. Preston Collins
of Marion, both Byrd machine stalwarts.

The state-wide

vote gave Fenwick 572 more votes than Collins, but there
was such a disparity in the Ninth District Wise County
returns that Collins's friends urged him to press for a
recount. 93
After a speedy investigation, Collins filed suit in
the Circuit Court in Richmond charging vote count irregularities in Pound and Broad Mill precincts of Wise County.
The brief filed by Collins quoted the Pound registrar as
saying only one hundred votes were cast while 418 votes
for Fenwick were reported.

Collins also charged that no

election was held in one precinct and that "certain election officials" had enclosed sample ballots and instructions
94
to vote for Fenwick with mailed absentee ballots.
92 Times-Dispatch, Aug. 8, 1945.
93 rbid., Aug. 10, 15, 17, 1945. The Wise County vote
was 3,307 for Fenwick, 122 for Collins while the total Ninth
District vote was 5,466 for Fenwick, 4,117 for Collins.
94 rbi'd., AUg. 22 I 1945 •
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Circuit Judge Julian Gunn ordered the poll books,
ballots, and applications for mail ballots opened for
Collins as Fenwick's campaign manager Willis E. Cohoon
criticized Collins's action as a "disservice" to himself
and his party and hinted the Fenwick forces would be
interested in the counties where Collins received similar
.
' t 'ies. 95
maJori

The Fenwick forces did eventually file

counter charges, but a grand jury investigation subsequently concluded that what errors there were were the
result of honest mistakes and no evidence of fraud
existed. 96
The seriousness .of. this political controversy became more apparent when Preston Collins arrived in Wise
County to find that all twenty-six of the county's poll
books were missing from the clerk's office. 97

J. A.

Gardner, clerk of the Circuit Court in Wise, theorized
that the poll books were apparently stolen while he was
enjoying a post-primary vacation.

One poll book was

eventually found, but the investigation of available
officially certified returns revealed that the returns for
Pound contained only 101 ballots instead of the 400 listed,
that some ballots exhibited a similarity in markings and

95 Ibid .-, Aug. 23,
24, 1945.
96

Ibid.

I

Aug. 27, 30, Sept. 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 29, 1945.

97 Ihid., Aug. 25, 1945.
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that many were not "strung" as required by law.

In the

meantime, the Wise Commonwealth Attorney started an investi-

l

gation to find the lost poll books. 98

I

State Republicans relished the discomfort caused the
Democrats, going so far as to offer the Governor the assistance of six "widely known" Republican cor:LTfionwealth's
attorneys to assist in investigating the case, and took
advantage of the dirty linen by asserting that since there
were voting irregularities, state Democrats were removed
from the obligation of voting for Tuck in the upcoming
race for governor. 99 State Democrats, on the other hand,
were deeply embarassed by the disclosure of how political
business was conducted in their organization.

Governor
.

Darden said that Virginians were "shocked and humiliated"
by the events, while the head of the Democratic State
Central Committee promised strong party action to prevent
similar fraud in the future and "unequivocally" condemned
the theft of the election records.

Even candidate Tuck,

who had avoided a clear stand on election law reform during the primaries, emerged with a promise to strengthen
the election laws and even suggested making the act of
alteration of election records a felony.loo

98 rbid.

1

Even Senator

Aug. 26, 28, Sept. 3 1 4, 14, -·15, 1945.

99 rbid., Sept. 11, 13, 15, 1945. Darden refused the
generous offer of help from the Republicans.
lOOibid., Aug. 29, Sept. 14, 18, 24, 1945.
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Byrd seemed to place no restraint upon the
investigation.

scop~

of the

"The gravity of the charges made," Byrd

announced, "demands a searching investigation without the
suppression of any of the pertinent f ac~s or the protection of any person or persons who may be involved. 11101
The climax of the Wise County episode came when
Judge Gunn ordered that Preston Collins's name be placed on
the ballot as the official party nominee for lieutenant
governor.

In his opinion, Gunn declared that he was cer-

tain neither Fenwick or Collins were cognizant of the violations of the law by Wise County officials because both
were men of high character, not associated with the "political crooks and ballot thieves. 11102 But the judge, in
reviewing the entire incident, found much to be puzzled
with.

"In broad daylight," Gunn stated, "someone went into

the clerks office, into the vault, • • • took the poll books
and walked out without the deputy clerk or anyone else
seeing him or them -- 'tis strange, 'tis passing strange. 11103
CONCLUSION
During the period from 1936 to 1945, Virginia poll
tax repeal forces did not achieve their objective on either
the Federal or state level, but there was a measure of

101Ibid • f Aug. 29, 1945.
l0 2Ibid., Sept. 30, Oct. 2, 1945.
l0 3 Ibid., Sept. 30, 1945.
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success obtained.

Consideration of the questions surround-

ing removal of the tax had been extended by the efforts of
the Southern Planter and Westmoreland Davis.

At least one

state Democratic leader, Governor James Price, recognized
that the poll tax had seriously effected the conduct of
state politics, that changes were necessary and took action.

The Senate subcommittee hearings that took place

in 1942 focused the attention of the rest of the country
on the local political practices of Virginia and other
poll tax states, increasing the pressure for some action.
Finally, the voter scandals in Wise County in 1945 effectively demonstrated to state political leaders that the
time had passed when election frauds would be silently
countenanced, even within the Democratic party.
Two other observations can be made about this period.
State Democratic leaders were not yet ready to undertake
any drastic change regarding the poll tax.

The study

commissioned by Governor Price that recommended elimination of the poll tax and modification of the literacy test
to make it fair and impartial was placed under lock and key
and treated only as a matter with which the supervising
committee could not agree.

When an opportunity was

afforded whereby the state political leaders could have
made modifications of the state constitution if they had
seriously desired to do so, they decided that it was better
to secure only the vote for Virginians in the armed forces
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rather than to extend the same consideration to those who
remained on the homefront.

I
'

Secondly, the period from 1936 to 1945 saw the gradu~

I

al erosion of the basis for support of the poll tax as a
prerequisite to voting.

Articles appearing in the

Southern Planter and other publications portrayed the poll
tax requirement as running against the historical tradition of Virginia, and even against the cherished beliefs
of the founders of the Democratic party.

Through the

efforts of Westmoreland Davis and LeRoy Hodges, the disclosure was made that Virginia was losing hundreds of ·
thousands of dollars by insufficient efforts to assess
and collect the poll tax, thus weakening the argument that
the levy was essential to the financial continuance of the
state school system.

The Gooch report also brought into

question another tenet of supporters of the poll tax.

If

it could be argued in defense of the tax that more people
paid it than eventually voted, thus implying there was no
restriction of suffrage in the process, the Gooch conunittee
asked what the poll tax requirement did accomplish.

Their

conclusion was that if the tax did not restrict, then it
did not do anything and supporters could not consistently
argue for retention.
episode.

Lastly, there was the Fenwick-Collins

Many-'Virginia Democrats obviously believed, ·as

the Young Democrats' ..study of 1939-suggests, that the
removal of the tax would allow persons with no sense of
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responsibility to be cajoled into destroying the objects
of good government.

The question to be asked after the

Collins investigation revelations was just what aspects of
good government were preserved by election laws that
would allow such fraud to take place.
There was still one argument that supporters of retention of the poll tax could use.

If left alone, it was

argued, the poll tax states would work out their own solutions to the tax question, probably even considering the
complete removal of the tax, as North Carolina and Florida
had done.

But the seriousness of the intentions of organi-

zation political leaders who proposed changes on their
own was open to question.
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I

I
CHAPTER IV
THE FIGHT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE, 1946-1949
The agitation of the ten previous years was but a
prelude to the events that transpired between 1946 and
1949.

Strangely, however, the major positions that had

developed during the early 1940's were reversed.

The

State Democratic organization led by Senator Byrd could
no longer ignore the strong demands for poll tax reform.
Opinion for reform crested with the disclosure of the Wise
County primary frauds in 1945, and public pressure for repeal increased due largely to the educational efforts of
groups such as the Virginia Electoral Reform League.
Also, there was the fear that there would be national
action to repeal the poll tax.

In early 1945, Byrd had

received a subpoena from an organization known as "Parents
and Wives of Fighting Americans" to appear in a contested
election case instituted by Moss Plunkett in an effort at
1
yet another test of the constitutionality of the tax.
At about the same time, the Southern Electoral Reform
1
Arthur Dunn to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 9, 1945, box
192, Byrd Papers.
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League outlined its new attack on the tax.

Contending

that the poll tax abridged the right to vote, the League
was prepared to demand that the poll tax states either
give up the tax or face the possibility of reduced representation as provided for in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.

2

Political necessity demands that an organization such
as the one that existed in Virginia respond to public
pressure if it has the intention of maintaining control.
Thus, the Byrd organization found it necessary to yield a
bit on the poll tax question, but it carefully attempted
to guarantee its continued mastery over state elections.
The former organization antagonists suddenly found themselves aligned with the force that had for so long been
able to maintain that which they despised.

The alliance,

however, proved to be an exceedingly short one.
THE CAMPBELL AMENDMENTS
Poll tax repeal forces in Virginia had gained increased momentum by late 1944.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch

observed that the tax issue was one of two issues that had

2Arthur Dunn to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 21, 1945; clipping from New York Post, Jan .. 10, 1945, ibid. Byrd and
the other Congressmen-8ummoned did not appear at the hearing of the case on the advice of Rep. Hatton w. Sumners
(D-Tex.~, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
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brought criticism to the Virginia Democratic leadership.
While a governmental study had undertaken to recommend
changes in the state's school systems, the primary source
I

i

of criticism, there had been no serious attempt to institute suffrage reform.

3

Even among the members of the

Byrd organization support for some sort of reform was
emerging.

The first top-flight member of the Byrd machine

to advocate repeal of the poll tax was T. McCall Frazier,
former director of the Division of Motor Vehicles and
member of the Alcohol Beverage Control Board from the
Ninth District.

Frazier blamed the poll tax for much of

the state's ills, charging that the tax not only restricted the electorate "in order that it may be more easily
controlled by small cliques," but also that it placed "the
dollar mark on public office" putting it "beyond the reach
of the man of modest means."

Although there was specula-

tion that word had been passed down "the line" for the
statement, Frazier maintained that he spoke only for himself, stating that the situation he described was a "recognized fact" in the Third District.

4

Since Governor

Darden had been publicly represented as favoring abolition,
and since there had been no repudiation of the stand, the
Governor and the organization were urged to back Frazier

3 Editorial in Times·-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1944; clipping
from Times-Dispatch, series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers.
4 Time·s·-Dispatch, Aug. 2 4, Sept. 3, 19 44.
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and press for repeal, but they remained silent. 5
The course of the controversy over the proposed
constitutional convention to give servicemen the vote
revealed that Darden and the organization were not yet
prepared to present a plan of reform, but this did not
lessen the attacks by proponents of reform.

The election

scandals could not be easily dismissed.
Pressure for the abolition of the poll tax and
suffrage reform had become so strong that the General
Assembly, upon recommendation from the Governor, passed a
joint resolution at the special session in 1945 to create
a commission to study and report changes in the suffrage
laws to.the next session of the legislature. 6

Senator

Stuart Campbell was selected as chairman of the nine member committee, which became known as the Campbell Committee.

c.

Robert

Vaden, W. L. Prieur, Vernon

c.

Smith, and J.

Frank Wysor were also appointed to serve as members.

7

While Vaden had previously sponsored proposals to change
the suffrage laws, none of the other members were particularly noted for their reform activity.

5

Editorial in~., Aug. 24, 1944.

6 Journal ·o·f ·the· Senate, special session, 19 45, pp.
20, 32, 80-81, 109. The joint resolution was passed by
the Senate on March 23rd by a vote of 38 to O. The House
approved the measure the following day.
7

~., 1946, document no. 8, p. 1.
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Commissioned studies and reports have numerous
political advantages.

They give the appearance of acti-

vity when, in fact, there may be very little.

They con-

sume time which allows public attention to be diverted to
other matters.

In addition, studies often result in re-

ports that effectively avoid the major question.

This

last point is illustrated by a report issued by the
Democratic State Central Committee on December 1, 1945,
just two weeks before the Campbell Commission submitted
its report to the General Assembly.

The Democratic com-

.mission, headed by Horace Edwards, considered no changes
t~at

would require a constitutional amendment, thus con-

tinuing the constitutional poll tax provisions.

To in-

sure "fairness and honesty," the commission recommended
measures to stop block payments of poll taxes, insure
personal payment of the tax, and provide for certification
of voting lists by local treasurers. 8
The Campbell Commission could have pursued a similar
course of action if it had chosen.

The General Assembly

resolution establishing the suffrage commission instructed
.
9
that it "study and report" changes in the suffrage laws.
8nemocrati.c State Central Committee, "Recommendations
for Revision of Election Laws, Dec. 1, 1945," pp. 1, 14-17,
box 192, Byrd Papers. The other members of the committee
included Virginia G. Jeffereys, John B. Spiers, Gardner
:Sooth, and Lawarence Peyton.
9Journal of the Senate, special session, 1945, p. 20.
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The majority of the conunittee was aligned with the Byrd
organization and could have effectively skirted the poll
tax question and have been assured of organization support.
Instead, conunission members chose to consider poll tax
repeal the main issue and real reason for the study.
There were several reasons for assuming this position.
First was the seemingly inuninent repeal of the poll tax
as a prerequisite to voting either through Federal legislation or by constitutional amendment.

This would have

left Virginia without a major portion of its franchise
requirements, thus opening the door to increased registration and threatening the life of the Byrd organization and
possibly producing hastily conceived legislation.
might also threaten seats in Congress.

It

Secondly, the ac-

tion of the General Assembly that had exempted veterans
from the payment of the tax made the continuance of the
tax difficult.

It was estimated by a member of the com-

mission that 200,000 soldiers would return to the Old
Dominion by 1947 who would not have to pay to vote.

An

incidental result of the veterans exemption was that it
played havoc with the assessment and collection of the
poll tax, not an ideal situation since cries persisted
for increased vigi.lance in the collection of revenue from

the tax. 10
10J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Apr. 28, 1945;
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Although he made no public statement, Senator Byrd,
concerned over the course the commission might take,
wrote to E. R. Combs that "if the commission recommends
the repeal of the poll tax, it will have a very great
effect and will make it more difficult to get a proper
alternative. 1111 In order to assure that the "proper alternative" was considered by the commission, Byrd turned to
one of his associates, J. Frank Wysor, Democratic treasurer
of Pulaski County and Campbell Commission member.

Byrd

and Wysor met at Mountain Lake, near Blacksburg, in early
July to consider the plan and recommendations the study
commission would make.

Wysor described the resulting out-

line as the "answer to a maiden's prayer," and informed
Byrd that "the more I have worked over it, the better I am
pleased with it. 1112
The plan that emerged was strikingly similar to the
final report the Campbell Commission issued five months
later.

The section of the state constitution providing

for the General Assembly levy of a capitation tax would be·
repealed.

In its place would be a "State School Head Tax"

Wysor to Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945; Wysor to E. R. Combs, Feb. 1,
1948, box 195; Wysor to Watkins Abbitt, Jun. 29, 1949, box
202, Byrd Papers.
11 Harry F. Byrd to E. R. Combs, Apr. 30, 1945, box
185, ibid.
12J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jul. 11, 1945, box
195, ibid.
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of one dollar and fifty cents with the legislature given
the right to raise the tax to three dollars.

The, tax was
!

to be assessed against each person 21 years of age, with

I

no exemptions, and collected as other taxes were with the
revenue being racially segregated as to source and also
distributed to the schools on a segregated basis.
II

'Article

of the state constitution, the franchise article, would

be rewritten to exclude all references to the poll tax.
The application procedure for registration would remain
unchanged, but Wysor believed "it would seem advisable to
make this more difficult. 1113
Upon implementation of the Byrd-Wysor plan, central
registrars under state supervision would take over all
registration books and administer an annual registration.
Two classes of voters were created: persons registered
prior to January 1, 1904, and persons registered after
that date.

The first group was the "permanent" class, not

subject to the annual reregistration.

Persons in the

second group, those required to register annually, would
b~

automatically reregistered if they paid their state

school head tax.

Otherwise, reregistration application

13 11 study Of the Right Of Suffrage:

Skeleton of a
suggested plan to, take the place of the present laws, including the State Capitation Tax -- on a referendum,"
p. l, enclosure to letter from Wysor to Byrd, Jul. 11,
1945, ibid.
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was required to be submitted to the central registrars. 14
Although registration books were to be kept open

~uring

the entire year, closing dates for registration tci parti(

cipate in a forthcoming election were set at least three
15
months in advance.
It is not hard to see how this plan offered the
"proper alternative" to the poll tax.

The main features

of the proposal were the annual registration requirement
and the closing dates for registration.

Under the exist-

ing system, the potential voter had to register but once
and then see that he maintained his poll tax payments.
The Byrd-Wysor plan would have forced the voter to register annually, or pay a school tax that might be as high as
three dollars.

While the existing system allowed regis-

tration up to 30 days prior to an election, the new proposal closed registration books at least 90 days prior to
an election.

Thus, in order to relinquish the grip of the

poll tax, the Byrd organization was prepared to present a
program that placed the electorate under increased registration requirements and the possibility of a higher
financial obligation in order to vote.
Stuart Campbell readily accepted the Byrd-Wysor
14

.
Wysor suggested a color-coded card system to differentiate between the different rolls, sex and races.
1511 Study Of The Ri.ght Of Suffrage," pp. 2-4, ibid.
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plan, suggesting only that the new tax be called a "State
Scho61 Tax" and that the closing dates be pushed further
back.

It was decided that during the public hearings
l
held by the commission, proposals should be made by political friends somewhat along the lines of Wysor's outline.16

Therefore, fully five months before the committee

submitted its report, and before any public hearings had
been held, Byrd and Wysor had reached their own conclusions as to what form any new suffrage proposals regarding
the poll tax should take and had gained approval of the
plan by the committee chairman.
But what Wysor had failed to tell Campbell was that
he and Senator Byrd had decided to limit the action of the
committee so that no definite plan would be submitted until
the 1948 General Assembly convened.

What was desired was

a general outline of proposals with no specific recommendations for legislation until 1948.

This approach was de-

signed to delay "controversy", in Wysor's words, and to
avoid the possibility of an immediately discredited proposal resulting from adoption of Federal legislation. 17
The first public hearings by the Campbell Commission
16J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jul. 11, 1945, ibid.
Wysor added a postscript that he and Campbell agreed ~
to say anything about the proposals to Governor Darden
until "a little later."
17J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, ibid.
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were held in Richmond on August 14, 1945.

It, appears

that the public proponents of poll tax repeal were not
\

prepared to present a specific plan for legislation at the
'I

hearings, being satisfied with merely restating their objections to the existing election laws.

Wysor was elated

that this first hearing was "a perfect flop" and speculated that subsequent hearings would be little different. 18
This proved to be true, and as a result the Campbell
Commission was allowed to follow its own course of action.
While Wysor tried to delay consideration of a fixed
plan, the majority of the commission decided it was
charged, by virtue of the resolution establishing it, with
the study of the election laws and preparation of a plan
to be submitted to the Governor with statutes drawn up
to put the recommendations into effect, and, by early
November, there were three plans under consideration by
the commission. 19 The first plan was that of Chairman
Campbell, and was essentially the July outline by Byrd.
The second was a proposal by

w.

L. Prieur that agreed with

the abolition of the poll tax but separated the payment of
taxes in any form from the right of registration and
18

.
J. ~. Wysor to Howard W. Smith, Aug. 28, 1945,
ibid. Wysor told Congressman Smith that 11 only Plunkett
and a few labor leaders were there," and that they did not
have ..much to contribute. See also, Times-Dispatch, Aug.
15, 194.5.
19
J. F. Wysor to :Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, ibid.
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franchise, and did not provide for a state electoral
board. 20 A compromise measure was also considered, but
i

the Campbell plan was subsequently revised to include a
~

!

part of Prieur's plan providing that reregistration be
accomplished by voting in the previous general election.
When the final vote on the two plans was taken on
November 10th, the Campbell proposal carried by a vote of
6 to 3. 21 Although Wysor had not been able to prevent the
commission from presenting draft legislation, he concluded
that the resulting proposals were "a good plan and well
worked out. 1122
When presented to the Governor on December 15, 1945,
the Campbell proposal closely followed the outline composed in July, and is interesting in several respects.
Of primary importance is the acknowledgement by the commission of the motivation of pending Federal action ·to
amend the Constitution to prohibit the poll tax.

Although

the report contained the recommendation that payment of
20 Journal of the Senate, 1946, document no. 8, pp.
27-28.
21 J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 11, 1945, box
195, Byrd Papers. Wysor voted for the Prieur plan and
described his acti.on as "a rather inconsistent vote." The
other vote against the Campbell plan probably came from
Vernon c. Smith.
22 rbid. Campbell had sent Byrd a draft copy of the
commission's proposals on November 7th, and seemed certain there was no threat to the plan. Stuart Campbell to
Harry F. Byrd, Nov. 7, 1945, box 185, ibid.
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taxes be equivalent to renewal of voter registration, the
members believed that this would not conflict with any
Federal action to be taken.

Since such a possibility

would have jeopardized the entire plan, it was decided to
have these specific recommendations incorporated into the
statutory recommendati.ons, which the General Assembly
cou ld th en c h ange as i. t saw f i. t • 23 The effect of such a
scheme would have been to remove the definition of who
could vote in elections from the state constitution and
place it securely in the hands of the General Assembly.
The second interesting feature of the report was
that there were six of the nine members who were not in
complete agreement with its recommendations.

John Paul,

W. R. Shaffer, and Charles J. Smith issued concurring reports that recommended repeal of the Absent Voters law.
Vernon

c .. Smith and Wysor dissented from that much of the

plan recommending elimination of the poll tax, while W.
L. Prieur issued a minority report that agreed with the

abolition of the tax but believed there should be a cornplete separation between the payment of taxes and the
right of registration and franchise. 24
Finally, the report implied an unchanged attitude
in regard to the poll tax even though its elimination was

23 Journal of the Senate, 1946, document no. 8, p .. 14.
24 rbi'd., pp. 26 - 41 •
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reconunended.

In the words of the conunission report, an

"impartial review" of the facts had disclosed that "there
is no definite relation between the number of poll taxes
paid and the number of votes cast. •• 25 Repeal proponents
had been arguing just the opposite since the inception of
the tax, but their point was not that there were voters who
did not vote even after having paid the tax but that the
total size of the electorate was being diminished as a
result of the tax.

Protests against the tax seemingly had

little effect upon the attitude of the Campbell Conunission.
Besides discontinuance of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting, there were five major features to the
suffrage plan.

Periodic renewal of registration was to

substitute as evidence that the voter continued to be a
resident of his district and was qualified to vote.

A

newly created State Board of Elections was to supervise
and bring uniformity to the application of election laws.
Administration of absentee voting was to be conducted by
the electoral board rather than by local registrars.

To

compensate for the loss of revenue from the poll tax, a
school tax was instituted.

An important conclusion of

the commission was the recommendation that no change be
• regi.s
. t ra t'i.on
mad e in

.

requir~en

t s. 26

25 ~·r
b'·a
p. 4.

26Ib'd

_2:_·' pp. 6-10.

Other provisions provided for
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The three member, bipartisan Board of Elections was
to be appointed by the Governor.

In turn the State Board

would appoint bipartisan local boards who would appoint
both the clerks and local judges of elections and conduct
. t ration.
.
27
regis

The division of voters into two classes,

as reconunended in the Byrd proposal, was maintained.

Per-

sons registered after 1904 were required to renew their
registration periodically.

The Commission proposed annual

registration in the belief it would "cause less confusiori • • • and • • • furnish annually a complete, authentic
and current list of all persons entitled to vote in any
precinct. 1128

Registration could be accomplished by any

one of three methods:

personal application to the local

board; payment of all taxes, except real estate taxes,
assessed for the preceeding year against the individual;
or voting in the preceeding year's election.

Such alter-

natives, the Commission believed, would have the two-fold
result of encouraging voting by "rewarding" those who
voted with the privilege to vote the following year and by
making citizens conscious of their responsibilities and

secured electi.on ballot boxes, prepubli.cation of ballots,
instructi-0n of election officials, final resolution of
contested electi.ons before a three judge court, and
standardizati.on o;f penali.ties .for violation of election
laws.

27Ih'd
_J._._•

I

pp. 12-14,

28 b'd
!.2:._ • I pp • 11 I

21 •

16~19.
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thus aid in the prompt collection of taxes. 29
One of the taxes to be collected was the new school
tax.

This tax was to be collected as any other personal

tax, but it was suggested collection be facilitated by
requiring school tax payment as a condition for the issuance of any license or permit.

The tax was not to exceed

three dollars per year but the commission recommended one
dollar and fifty cents as an appropriate amount.

The

resulting tax revenue was to be applied exclusively to the
aid of public schools.

The General Assembly could author-

ize any city or county boards of supervisors to levy an
additional one dollar for local purposes. 3 Conceivably

°

then, a young couple wishing to be married might have to
pay eight dollars for their license in addition to the
license fee.
THE OPPOSITION ORGANIZES
When Governor Darden presented the Campbell report
to the General Assembly in January, 1946, he expressed his
general agreement with its reconunendations.

The poll tax

should be eliminated, Darden declared, because "in a free
society the ballot should rest in the hands of all persons o.f demonstrated competence who evidence an attachment

29Ib .. d

~·I

p. 21.

30 b'd
~·' pp. 14 - 15 •
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to and an interest in the welfare of the State."

The

Governor also agreed with the recormnendation for a State
Board of Elections but believed that local boards should
be chosen locally and that re-registration be required
only every three or four years because of the expense invalved in the proposed annual registration.

Darden sup-

ported the idea of a school tax and suggested adoption of
the three month closing date for registration books proposed in the Prieur minority report. 31
The General Assembly's evaluation was not as kind as
the Governor's, and attacks on the Cormnission's report
were led by both stalwarts of the Democratic organization
and Independents.

Delegate

c.

G. Quesenbery argued that

the changes suggested would "restrict us more than the
poll tax does. 1132

Subsequently Quesenbery was joined by

Delegate Spiers of Radford, and offered a substitute resolution providing for the repeal of the poll tax without
the other provisions of the Campbell plan.

The public

would only be confused and intimidated by the Campbell
plan, Spiers maintained, and they were not willing "to
put on their wrists any newly forged shackles of more
power and restraint than the poll tax. 1133
31 Ibid. , document no. 1, pp. 6-7.
.
32 Times-Dispatch, Feb. 21, 1946.
33

Ibid.
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In the Senate, Senators Breeden and Tyler of Norfolk
offered an amendment to the Campbell plan, based upon the
minority report of W. L. Prieur, that provided for the
abolition of the poll tax as a requirement for voting and
substituted in its place a literacy test.

The senators

proclaimed that their resolution would give the people an
opportuni.ty to vote on the abolition of the tax "in as
clear and simple a manner as possible" and at the same time
provide a method for having an "intelligent and enlarged
electorate. 1134
The Campbell plan passed the House of Delegates by a
vote of fifty-seven to thirty-seven on February 20th and
the Senate shortly approved the joint resolution proposing
amendments to the sections of the state constitution regarding suffrage by a vote of thirty-four to three. 35

J.

F. Wysor reported to Senator Byrd that he was relieved
that Stuart Campbell had been able to get the suffrage
laws through without amendments.

"Getting this fixed as

it is will keep it from being made an issue of this year,"
Wysor told Byrd, "unless the would-be repealers actually
analyze what the proposals really mean. 1136

But the

34 1bid., Yeb. 16, 1946.
35 rbi.d., Feb. 21, 1946; Journal of the Senate, 1946,
pp. 529-541. The three votes against the resolution were
those of Senators Hillard, Neff and Robinette.
36J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 22, 1946, box
195, Byrd Papers.
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constitution of Virginia required that proposed amendments
be passed by two successive sessions of the General Assembly
before being submitted to the voters, and this afforded
ample time for poll tax repealers to analyze what the proposals would really mean. 37
There was no session of the General Assembly in 1947
and therefore no podi.um for views on the Campbell amend~ents

for most state politicians.

But the poll tax issue

,

remained in the national and state limelight because of
other events.

In Washington in June, Harry S. Truman

pledged his support for positive safeguards of civil rights
in a speech to the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People at the Lincoln Memoria1. 38
During the first two weeks in July, the Conunittee on
House Administration held hearings on House Resolution 29
and seven other resolutions that made unlawful the requirernent of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in a primary or other election for national officers.

The conunit-

tee heard the Treasurer of Arlington County, John Locke
Green, deliver two long statements in support of the antipoll tax legi.slation.

Green had filed suit in Federal

Court on the grounds that Virginia election procedures
violated the

~ourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments and

37 constitution of Virginia, 1945, sec. 196.
38 New York ~irnes, Jun. 5, 1947, p. 1.

162

sought to enjoin assessment of poll taxes. 39
also heard John

s.

The committee

Barbour, prominent Virginia attorney

and member of the 1902 constitutional convention, defend
suffrage restriction.

Citing the case of Minor v.

Happersett, decided by a unanimous Supreme Court in the
1870 's,_ Barbour submi.tted that when the Constitution con-

ferred citizenship, it did not confer the right of suffrage. 40
While Federal action was still being considered, the
President's Committee on Civil Rights issued its report.
Committee Chairman Charles Wilson, president of General
Electric Corporation, declared the time had come to create
a permanent, nation-wide system of guardianship for the

civil rights of Americans, and to assure affirmative action
by Federal and state organs, the Committee made thirty-five
specific recommendations.

High on its list was abolition

of the poll tax.

President Truman promised a close and
careful study of the report. 41
Reaction to the report of the President's committee
in Virginia was negative.

The Committee on Civi.l Rights

had rolled into one report practically every piece of
39 u. s. Congress, House, Subconunittee on Elections
of the Committee on House Administration, Hearings, on
H. R. 29, H. R. 7, H. R. 66, H. R. 225, H. R. 230, H. R.
668, H. R. 1435 and H. R. 4040, Poll Taxes, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., pp. 1, 92-94. Green's suit was eventually

dismissed as a .moot question.
40 rbid. I p. 154.
41 New York Times, Oct. 30, 1947, pp. l, 14-15.
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legislation which the majority of Southern senators had
opposed in recent years.

The Times-Dispatch, while doubt-

ing the constitutionality of some of the measures !if
!I

passed, warned that "the results in the Southern States
would be even worse than those in the nation under prohibi.ti.on" because the commission tried to deal with the
"explosive" issue of race relati.ons. 42
The Committee on Civil Rights' report brought to a
head a situation that eventually led to the creation of the
States Rights Democratic Party in Birmingham, Alabama.
In February, 1948, President Truman announced his endorsement of the Conunittee's findings and proposed to Congress
a ten point program of action, part of which urged greater

protection of the right to vote through statutory protection and the abolition of the poll tax. 43 At the Democratic
National Convention in Philadelphia in July, there was the
dramatic walk-out by the Mississippi and Alabama delegations as the convention approved a civil rights platform
calling for the abolition of poll taxes in Federal elections, a national anti-lynch law, creation of the Fair
Employment Practices Commission and a system of non-segregation in the armed forces. 44

The organization of the

42 Bdi.torial in Times-Dispatch, Oct. 31, 194 7.

43 New York Times, Feb. 3, 1948, p. 22.
44 rbid., Jul. 15, 1948, p. 1.
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Dixiecrat party quickly followed and at the end of the
month, the President's anti-poll tax move in Congress
was stopped by a filibuster by Southern senators.1 5
I

The President's action in regard to his civil rights
program caused open hostility in Virginia.

Late in

February, 1948, the Byrd organization and Governor Tuck
introduced a proposal in the General Assembly that would
allow the state party convention to determine for whom the
state Democratic electors would be instructed to vote.
Although the proposal had Senator Byrd's endorsement, the
General Assembly refused to go along and the organization
had to accept an "anti-Truman" proposal that placed the
names of Truman's electors near the bottom of the November
ballot. 46

Nevertheless, Truman's actions resulted in a

strong response from supporters of the Thurmond-Wright
Dixiecrat ticket.

Speaking to a States Rights group at

the University of Virginia, Richmond attorney Collins
Denny, with the characteristic venom that marked much of
the campaign, described the situation in which many
Southerners found themselves.

"The Truman people would

give us two choices," Denny told his audience of about 150
people.

"They say we must either accept the rot and filth

45 rbid., Jul. 18, 1948, p. 1: Jul. 30, 1948, pp. 1, 3.
4 6Ibid., Mar. 21, 1948, sec. IY, p.
Southernl?OI'itics, p. 336.

i, and Key,
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that has soiled the house of our fathers, or else we
must leave the house and vote for Dewey."

There was a

third choice and that was to support the States Rights
\
Democratic Party. 47
It was against this background of developing events
that the second vote on proposing the Campbell amendments
came in the closing days of the 1948 General Assembly
session.

There was little, if any, discussion on the

matter.

The House passed the measure by a vote of 74 to
48
.
1 y f or sub mission.
. .
15 wh i'l e th e s ena t e vo t e d unanimous

When Robert

c.

Vaden brought the measure to the floor of

the Senate, one Senator asked for an explanation.

There

was a long silence, then Vaden yielded the floor to Senator
Robert

o.

Norris for the explanation.

Again, there was

silence until Norris said, "I have not been advised what
the resolution is about."

The Lieutenant Governor then

explained the measure and the vote was taken "in some
confusion. 1149 Almost as an afterthought, Senator Edward
Breeden noticed that there was no legislation providing
for a referendum on the measure.

The referendum

47 Times-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1948; see also ibid.,
.
Sept. 24, 25, 1948.
48 rbi.d., .Mar. 13, 1948. The Times-Dispatch reported
~·the vote--as-35 for, one against, with Lloyd Robinette casting the dissenting vote. The Senate Journal, however, reports the vote as 28 to O. Journal o.f the Senate, 1948,
PP• 1034-1035.
49 Times-Dispatch, Mar. 13, 1948.
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legislation was subsequently given speedy consideration by
both chambers and Tuesday after the first Monday of
November, 1949, was set as the date for the referendum on
the amendrnents. 50
The General Assembly could have set the date for the
referendum any time during 1948, but chose instead November,
1949, and it appears that the Byrd organization was instrumental in having the vote delayed.

~he

reported reason

for the delay was that proper attention and consideration
would not have been given to this state proposition because of the Presidential election in the fall of 1948. 51
However, a more valid explanation would be that Democratic
stalwarts were not entirely pleased with the possibility
of an expanded electorate, especially if Congressional
action on poll tax repeal did not materialize.

"If

Congress takes no action," J. Frank Wysor informed E. R.
Combs, "I doubt if the plan will carry unless we make a
very strong effort to put it over. 1152

Considering the

possibility that if Congress took no action, there was the
probability of any action being deferred for several
years, Wysor argued that the referendum be postponed until

SOibid., Mar. 15 1 1948; Acts of the General Assembly,
19-48, p. 1062.
51Times-Dispatch-, Mar. 13, 1948.
52J. F. Wysor to E. R. COI"'..bs, Feb. l, 1948, Feb. 4,
1948, box 195, Byrd Papers.
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1949 or 1950. 53

As a result, Byrd advised that the refer-

endum be postponed until after the Virginia gubernatorial
primary in 1949. 54 But Wysor also recognized the danger
in a delay of the vote.

"These people who have been de-

manding abolishme.nt of the poll tax are not going to be
enthusiastic about this proposal when they find that it
will continue to keep the electorate curtailed. 1155
Considered as a political move, the delay of the vote
offered advantages.

The anti-Truman sentiments of the

state organization were evident by February, 1948, and a
referendum on the poll tax prior to the Presidential election, if successful, would have placed on the registration
books a large number of voters who could be expected to
show their appreciation by voting for Truman.

A favorable

vote on the Campbell amendments in November, 1948, on the
other hand, would have presented the possibility of a real
Republican threat in the upcoming gubernatorial election
in 1949.

In fact, it did not take the Republicans long

to seize the delay as an issue in the 1948 contest.
H. Woods, the Republican candidate for the

u. s.

Robert

Senate,

charged in October that the Democrati.c machine had not
wanted the poll tax collected properly because it would
53 J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Feb. 1, 1948, ibid.
54
narry F. nyrd ~o J. F. Wysor, Feb. 3, 1948, ibid.

SSJ. F. Wysor to E. R. Combs, Feb. 1, 1948, ibid.
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have put too many persons on the voting rolls and
therefore had delayed the vote on tax repeal out of consideration for the gubernatorial primary.

"To carry out

its purpose," Woods told his radio audience,

11

the Byrd-

Robertson-Tuck machine had its legislative puppets defer
the vote on the constitutional amendment until November,
1949. 1156
Although it was never openly acknowledged, there is
also another reason why the delay could have worked to the
advantage of the state organization.

A part of the strate-

gy of the Dixiecrat Party was to deny the South's 127
electoral votes to the other national parties, thus throwing the election into the House of Representatives where
each state had one vote.

In such a situation, it would

have been impossible for any candidate to receive a majority without the eleven votes from the South.

This placed

these states in a position to extract promises from those
they would back.

One of these promises would have been

that no Federal action be taken to repeal the poll tax in
the seven states where it still existed. 57

The major

motivation ,for repeal in states like Virginia would thus
have been removed.

The Byrd organization could then give

56 Times-Dispatch, Oct. 3, 1948 sec. 2.
1
57
sarah M. Lemmon, 0 The Ideology of the 'Dixiecrat'
.Movement, 11 Social Forces, -XXX (Dec., 1951) , 167 i New York
Ti1nes, Oct. 30, 1948, p. 1.
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a sigh of relief, withdraw its support from the Campbell
plan and watch as it died, with no fear that there was a

need for such an alternative.

\

The Campbell amendments took a backseat to national
issues during the remainder of 1948 and did not emerge
again until after the Presidential election had passed and
campaigning for the gubernatorial primary in August of
1949 began.

The gubernatorial race was as furious and wide

open as the November election and saw four Democratic candidates competing for the voter's favors.

John

s.

Battle

was the Byrd organization candidate, being chased by
Horace H. Edwards, Francis P. Miller, and Remmie L.
Arnold.

Edwards was the former State Chairman of the

Democratic State Central Committee, while Miller represented the respectable progressive element of the state
and was a Roosevelt New Deal advocate.

Arnold, a fountain

pen manufacturer, was described as being somewhat to the
right of Battle. 58 As might be eY.pected, it was Miller
who injected the Campbell amendments into the campaign.
The gubernatorial primary was the most bitter politi.cal contest the state had seen in some time.

In the

clos.ing days of the campaign t there were charges that the
Alcohol Beverage Control Board was exerting pressure on its
58 cabell Phi.llips, "New Rumblings in the Old
.Dominion," New York Times .Magazine, Jun. 19, 1949, pp. 10,

34-35.
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employees to vote for Battle, and Arnold's campaign
manager reported that he had been offered $10,000 to
desert his candidate. 59 Edwards and Arnold attacked the
fiscal situati.on of Virginia and ''the old .machine" and its
professional politicians who forgot their promises to the
people, while the real contest developed between Miller and
Battle. 60 Being the machine candidate, Battle hailed its
responsibility for good government in Virginia and
attacked Miller as "definitely nailed as the candidate of
out-of-state CIO and labor league organizers. 1161

Miller

called the Byrd organization "the old man of the sea on
Virginia's back," blaming it for inadequate state services
because of its backward-looking, unimaginative and undemocratic leadership.

The contest gained nationwide

attention to see if the progressive tide that had carried
Truman back to the White House would sweep Virginia also. 62
The proposed Campbell amendments might well have
become the major issue in the contest had it not been for
Battle's charge that Miller was backed by out-of-state
labor groups,

Battle charged Miller with being a CIO

candidate set on changing Virginia's labor laws because
of a letter the Battle camp had secured that was sent to

59 Times-Dispatch, Jul. 31, Aug. 1, 1949.
61
60 rbid., Aug. 2, 1949.
Ibid.
62 rbid., Jul. 30, 31, 1949.
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state union members by James C. Petrillo, Musicians Union
czar, that urged support of Miller. 63

Miller branded the

charges as a "tissue of lies" but nevertheless spent most
of the campaign attempting to counter its influence.
At first Miller merely attacked the evils of the
poll tax, blaming it for the elimination of the Republican
party and the increase in voter apathy.

The tax had sur-

vived, Miller said, because it was in the design of the
Byrd organization which had "become completely insensitive
to the democratic way of doing things. 1164

Later, Miller

pointed to the Campbell amendments and the anti-Truman
legislation passed by the General

Asse~~ly

as evidence of

the intent of the Byrd organization to deprive Virginians
of the benefits of progressive programs being enjoyed by
other states. 65

Battle gave his support to the pending

proposals, although he doubted their "propriety", and
favored any reasonable literacy test and method of annual
registration devised by the General Assembly, but was
opposed to the appointment of local boards by judges and
the three dollar school tax. 66
63 The uPetrillo letter" was eventually published by

the Battle forces. See the political advertisement in the
Times-Dispatch, Jul. 20, 1949, p. 11.
6

~Newspaper clipping from the Alexandria Gazette,
box 95, Miller Papers; ~irnes-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1948.
65 rbid., Jul. 22, 23, 31, 1949.

66 rbid,, Jul. 26, 1949.
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The vote in the primary approached the 300,000 mark
and Battle emerged the victor by a margin of 24,00Q votes
over Miller-

While the Campbell amendments were not the

central campaign issue in this gubernatorial primary, the
campaign did arouse a more careful consideration a.rnong the
liberal elements in the state of the actual effect of the
pending proposals.

In January, 1949, Virgil H. Goode,

Franklin County Conunonwealth Attorney and former General
Assembly member, announced a personal state-wide camr;aign
against the amendments, which he described as a "political
wolf in sheep' s clothing. "

Goode claimed the support of

several members of the General Assembly and various liberal
groups and organizations in the state but did not na:'lJ
them.

ci:.-:~.;,li

Attacking the amendments as "unnecessarily

cated, cumbersome and • • • not easily

understand~:~,w

predicted more discouragement for voting in
the amendments were approved.

elec~~~~z

"I don't believe .:.::

Goode
if

~J;

poll tax as a voting requirement," Goode said, ":.-;-: :
don't think this is the way to abolish it -- by

;:2:,z~!tut

. ing something worse. 1167
The ensuing controversy centered around

e.~

.,-:-::'iing

of the referendum to be submitted to Virginians :..:.

.M~ller

in opposing the amendments but all three ~::..-:..-~
approval of a referendum to repeal
the poll tax ~~
.
67
Ibid., Jan. 13, 14, 1949; News Leader, :~- :~,
1949
-~

November.
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Question: Shall Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
25, 28, 31, 35, 38, and 173 of the Constitution
of Virginia, which sections relate to the elective franchise, and, among other things, provide
for the elimination of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting, registration and renewal of
registration of voters, the establishment of a
State Board of Elections, and the levying of a
school tax in lieu of the present capitation tax,
be amended; and shall the Constitution be further
amended by adding Section 31-a, providing for
local boards of elections, and 38-a, prescribing
the effective date of these amendments?68
The problem was that the sections of the Constitution referred to did not provide for the elimination of the poll
tax and the other features of the Campbell plan but merely
said which sections would be amended,

A more precise

wording would have included the phrase "so as to provide"
after the list of the sections affected and before the
list of changes desired.

This small point was sufficient

to raise the question of how the changes were to be made.
Upon investigation, one soon discovered that the General
Assembly was invested with the authority to effect the
changes.

In other words, the General Assembly could

determine the qualification for state voters and change
them as they saw fi.t, wi.th no constitutional limitations.
This discovery was enough to stimulate the state's liberal
forces to action.
Robert Whitehead raised this issue shortly after the
68 see Virginia Right to Vote League broadside in
appendix.
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gubernatorial primary in August in a letter to Attorney
General J. Lindsay Almond.

Whitehead asserted that the

wording of the questi.on submi.tting the amendments to the
people did not do what i.t said and was "false" and "misleading", and asked for Almond's opinion.

The Attorney

General replied that the confusion could be blamed on
"an inadvertence which went unnoticed by the members of
the Legislature," but maintained that the referendum
question validated by a majority vote would repeal the
poll tax, provide for new registration and annual reregistration, and allow for a three dollar school tax if
the General Assembly so provided.

"The otherwise mis-

leading effect of the form of the question is overwhelmed by the known and obvious," Almond declared. 69
Almond's opinion aroused the political independents
and poll tax repeal forces.

Organized local opposition

had already begun to appear by the end of September.

At a

meeting at the YWCA on September 26, the Richmond
Committee Against the Proposed Amendments to the
Constitution was organized with Democratic, labor and
Negro support.

In a letter to prospective members, the

committee declared that Lt desired to see the poll tax
~e~ealed,

but that Lts members believed the Campbell plan

69 Newspaper clipping, uni.dentLfied, box 95, .Miller
~apers; Times-Dispatch, Sept. 14, Oct. S, 1949.
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"could become a severer burden on voters than the poll
tax ever was. 1170

On October 6, twenty-three people met

in Richmond in an effort to organize to promote discussion of the Campbell amendments and inform the public of
their deficiencies.

The group was composed of individuals

from several sections of the state but most prominent were
former .Miller backers

Whitehead, Beecher Stallard, and

Louis Spilman, publisher of the Waynesboro News-Virginian
-- and followers of Horace Edwards and Renunie Arnold. 71
The result was the formation of an organization consisting
of Democrats, Republicans, Independents and labor forces,
with the design of defeating the Campbell amendments, to
be known as the Virginia Right to Vote League. 72
Virgil Goode was selected as chairman but the fight
was led by Miller, Whitehead and Martin Hutchinson.

Both

70 Mimeographed letter from the Richmond Conunittee
Against the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, Sept.
30, 1949, box 18, Martin A. Hutchinson Papers, University
of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter
cited as Hutchinson Papers. People attending the organizational meeting included Hutchinson, Charles C. Webber of
the C.I.O. Political Action Conunittee, Dr. J. M. Tinsley of
the NAACP, Dr. Leon Reid of the Richmond Civic Council,
Marvin Caplan of the B'nai B'rith, and Adele Clark of the
League of Women Voters. "People attending the anti-voting
amendment meeting at the YWCA on Sept. 26, 1949," ibid.
The letter to prospective members was signed by Tinsley,
Clark, Caplan, and Howard H. Davis of the Richmond
Conunittee for Civil Rights.
71 Times-Dispatch, Oct. 6t 1949.
72 Ibid., Oct. 9, 1949.
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Miller and Whitehead attacked the pending proposals as
confusing and misrepresenting, calling the amendments "a
'

cockeyed jack-in-the-box," and declared the amendclents a
\

I

matter that concerned all members of both parties in the
state.

The League adopted resolutions calling for the

defeat of the referendum in November and the sununoning of
a constitutional convention in 1950 to end the poll tax
and establish a literacy test as the only requirement for
voting. 73
Specifically, the anti-amendment forces feared the
discretion given to the General Assembly in determining
voter qualifications.

If the amendments were passed, it

would be impossible to say what the essential qualif ications of a voter would be until after the legislature took
action.

The League would rather have seen the fundamental
74
qualifications fixed in the state constitution.
The fear
was that the question of voter qualification would become a
political issue in future elections and result in an unacceptable degree of instability.

In addition, since no

limitation was placed upon the power of the legislature in

fixing qualifications, anti-amendment forces feared the
abuse of any literacy test requirement that might be devised
73 Ibid.
74 "Notes on Proposed Amendments. to the Constitution,"
undated, p. 3, box 18, Hutchinson Papers.
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and desired that this also be incorporated into the constitution rather than be subject to change by the!legislature.

Finally, the requirement that voters re-i.egister
!I

120 days prior to an election was deemed unreasonable since
the present system allowed voters to register thirty days
prior.

This single feature of the Campbell plan was

"highly objectionable" to League members and reason enough
by itself to call for defeat of what Hutchinson termed a
"hand-me-down constitution. 1175 Dr. Luther P. Jackson,
Negro professor of history at Virginia State College who
had studied Negro voting since 1940, estimated that the
periodic registration requirement alone would reduce the
number of voters by ten to fifteen percent, while other
Negro and labor leaders were especially fearful of the
literacy requirement because of the proportionately higher
percentage of illiteracy among their organizations. 76
To the already existing organizational structure of
the labor unions, League of Women Voters, NAACP, and the
Virginia Civil Rights Organization, the defeated gubernatorial candidates brought their state-wide organizations
of supporters.

Miller opened an office in Charlottesville

to coordinate these activities in an effort to "rebuild

75

rbid., pp. 4-5; Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1949,
Voice of the People letter from Howard H. Davis.
76 rbid., Oct. 9, 17, Nov. 7, 1949.
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the Democratic party in the State and to broaden the inalienable right of the franchise."

Part of the plan, in

addition to stimulating public discussion of the chnend1
I

ments, was to secure poll workers on election day to explain the reasons for the defeat of the Campbell amendments. 77
The fears of the Byrd organization that the poll
tax repeal forces would analyze the Campbell plan and discover that Virginia's electorate would continue to be
curtailed if the amendments were adopted had been realized.
This had happened even before the primary vote.

J. F.

Wysor confided to Senator Byrd that "it is going to be
difficult to explain these proposals to the people," finding that those he talked to merely threw up their hands
and said "too complicated. 1178 Wysor and Senator Byrd believed, however, that the majority of voters were willing
to follow the advice of leaders in whom they had confidence
and encouraged state leaders to convey their confidence in
the measure to the public. 79
Machine stalwarts took to the stump throughout the
77 J. Deering Danielson to Luther P. Jackson, Oct.
10, 1949; Francis P. Miller to Luther P. Jackson, Oct. 31,
1949, box 76, Miller Papers.
78 J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Jun. 29, 1949 box
1
202, Byrd Papers.

79 J. F. Wysor to E. R. Combs, Sept. 27, Oct. 16,
1949; J. F. Wysor to Watkins Abbitt, Jun. 29, 1949, ibid.
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state.

Stuart Campbell, who was now out of the General

Assembly, enumerated the advantages and improvements his
plan offered.

Bipartisan control of every step iJ the
\
election process, adequate safeguards to prevent fraud and

criminality, fixed electoral responsibility, elimination
of the poll tax, and "indisputable" voter lists were all
benefits that he concluded would come from passage of the
referendwn. 80 Proponents of adoption faced opponents on
radio forums broadcast across the state-

On one such

broadcast, John J. Wicker charged his opponent, Beecher
Stallard, with being associated with anti-organization
men who had deliberately fomented and disseminated false
information and with being allied with the NAACP and the
Conununist party, while Stallard attacked the amendments as
giving the General Assembly a "blank check" for action. 81
To this point the strongest statements of support for
the Campbell plan had come from Attorney General Almond.
As a cue for other members of the Democratic organization
to step forward and volce their support, Governor Tuck
broke his usual silence to announce his support for the
the plan, calling it a "forward step of lasting benefit to

SOTimes-Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1949.
81
undated clipping from Times-Dispatch, series l,
box 10, Whitehead Papers.
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the people of Virginia. 1182

Senator Byrd followed Tuck in

announcing support, declaring that the amendments.repre\

sented the "patriotic judgment, first of the bi-partisan
\

commission appointed to make the recommendations, and
secondly, the judgment of two sessions of the General
Assembly.

...

II

Byrd charged the amendment opponents

with confusing the actual effect of the amendments by
asserting that certain recommendations would be written
in, when, in fact, such provisions were to be left to
83
future action by the General Assembly.
At a meeting in Richmond on October 23rd of 150
Democratic committee chairmen and members of the Third
District, organization heirarchy turned out in force to
support the amendments and attack the opposition for false
and misleading propaganda.

Noting that the amendment

opponents had in the past fought for poll tax repeal,
Attorney General Almond concluded that this group now did
not "want Virginia to get credit for bringing about the
reform they've cried for--they want the alleged reforms to
emanate from Washington."

Lieutenant Governor L. Preston

Collins and Richmond Congressman J. Vaughan Gary predicted
congressional action if the state did not act, while

82 Times-DisEatch, Oct. 23 1949; News Lead'er, Oct.
1
24, 1949.
8311 statement -- Oct. 24, 1949 on the Amendments to
the Virginia Constitution," box 405, Byrd Papers; News
Leader, Oct. 24, 1949.
-
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gubernatorial candidate John

s.

Battle promised the audi-

ence that a statement was forthcoming listing the, reasons
for his support.

\

.

The meeting adjourned after t h e\committee-

men reported the expectation of a big "quiet" vote for
. Nov emb er. 84
th e amen dmen t s in
The fire from the Byrd organization was returned in
kind from the anti-amendment forces.

Martin A.

Hutchinson charged that Almond's judgments about the wisdom, patriotism, and purity of purpose of anti-amendment
forces were much like his legal opinions, "more notable
for their political expediency than for the ennunciation
of wise and sound legal principles. 1185 Asking rhetorically
why the chief supporters of the amendments were the longtime officeholders, Hutchinson concluded that the group
must recognize that the Campbell amendments would make it
easier to control the legislature by limiting and restricting the right to vote.

And if there were still those who

did not fear the arbitrary nature of the legislature,
Hutchinson reminded them of the recent attempts to keep
Truman's name off the Presidential ballot and to vest in
the Democratic State Central Committee the power to cast
the electoral vote ot Virginia for whomsoever it desirea. 86
84 Times-DisEatch, Oct. 24 1949.
1
85 undated typescript replying to charges by Almond,
p. l, box 18, Hutchinson Papers.
86 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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Since amendment proponents predicted confusion and chaos
in the event Congress outlawed the poll tax as a prerequi1

site for voting and Virginia did not adopt the Campbell
i

I

plan, anti-amendment forces saw the proposals as a "loaded
package" being forced on citizens of the state in the name
of political expediency.

"That is the real reason back of
the submission of these amendments," Hutchinson declared. 87
Although tpe Democratic machinery in the state

attempted to deny that the poll tax question was a campaign
issue and stressed the bipartisan formulation of the
Campbell proposals, the amendments had quickly overshadowed
the gubernatorial campaign.

The Republican candidate for

governor in the upcoming election, Walter Johnson, made
what use he could of the Campbell amendments controversy,
attacking the amendments as a good example of the Byrd
organization philosophy of government and character_izing
it as "a bold effort to deprive [Virginians] of your
inherent right to vote. 1188 The anti-repeal forces also
attacked the Democratic organization's bipartisan claim by
attacking its use of party meetings, such as that in
Richmond on October 23rd, as springboards for mounting a
89
campaign for the amendrnents.

SJ Ibid., p. l.
88 Times-Dispa
·
·
t c h , Nov. 6 , 1949 •
8911 statement of Martin A. Hutchinson and Robert
Whitehead, Richmond, Nov. 4, 1949," box 18, Hutchinson

Papers.
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The Virginia Right to Vote League and the other
forces allied with it had conducted a successful campaign.
As election day approached, more and more voices were
raised against the Campbell plan.

Non-metropolitan news-

paper editorials voiced rejection of the plan either because of the vagueness of the power given the General
Assembly or because of the belief that the effect of the
amendments would be to further restrict or retard voting. 90
Usually non-political groups, such as the Virginia Council
of Churches, voiced their disapproval of the plan because
of

.t
.i

s genera 1 vagueness. 91

Negro organizations, such as

local black Democratic clubs, non-partisan leagues and
biracial citizens committees, stirred opposition to the
amendments because of the provisions giving the legislature control over standards to be met for registration. 92
Perhaps the attitude of Negro leaders is best expressed by
the.Virginia Voters' League letter to its members.

"We

want the poll tax abolished," the League director wrote,
"but we want it done in another way and as soon as possible .1193

goEditorials from the Blue Ridge Herald (Purcellville,
Ya.}, Dickensonian (Clintwood, Va.), Bristol Herald Courier,
and News-Virginian (Waynesboro, Va.)_, box 95, Miller Papers.

91 Times-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1949.
92 Journal and Guide, Nov. 5 12, 1949.
1
93 Luther P. Jackson to Francis P. Miller, Nov. 4,
1949, box 76, Miller Papers.
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Surprisingly, the Campbell amendments did receive
support from an important source.

The proposed plan gained

the approval of the state's two largest newspapers, the
Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.
However, the approval of these newspapers came only reluctantly at best.

Both papers saw danger in allowing the

General Assembly to determine the qualifications for voters;
both recognized that annual registration could curtail the
electorate; and both admitted that the wording of the proposal to be submitted in the referendum could not have
been more confusing if a determined effort had been made to
make it so.

The poll tax had played such havoc with the

state's political system, however, that the best judgment
of both newspapers demanded that its removal be accomplished.

Even with its flaws, the Campbell amendments did

provi·d e f or th e remova 1 o f a grea t er flaw.
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Despite the heated debate that accompanied the coming referendum and election, there were still some voters
who did not know which way to turn.

Three weeks before

the election, Wysor informed Senator Byrd that
don•t know what to do about the amendments."

11

the people

"They don't

understand definitely what is proposed and there is no
hope of enlightening them. 1195

One correspondent to the

. l s in
' T'imes-Dispa
•
t c h , Oct. 6, 13, 17, Nov.
· 94 Ed•t
i
oria
6, 1949; Virginian-Pilot, Oct. 12, Nov. 6, 1949.

95 J. F. Wysor to Harry F. Byrd, Oct. 16, 1949, box
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Times-Dispatch offered a bit of poetry entitled "Voters
Soliloquy."
To vote for, to vote against, that is the question.
Whether 'tis better in the State to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous poll tax:
Or to embark amid a sea of sections
That by amending ends it • • • • 96
Despite such lingering confusion, Virginia had probably
not experienced such political debate in over twenty
years, and local sources predicted a voter turnout of
200,000 to 250,000 due to the attention given the
Campbell amendments. 97
When the polls closed on November 8th, the extent of
the success of the anti-amendment forces became apparent.
The referendum results in state districts ranged from two
to six votes against the Campbell plan for every favorable
vote for it. 98 No city or county was carried for the proposals, and in Nelson County, home of Robert Whitehead,
the amendments were defeated by a vote of 127 to 1118. 99
The statewide final tally revealed that the Campbell amendments had been defeated by a margin of almost four to one,

202, Byrd Papers.
96 Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1949, Voice of the People
letter from Adele Clark.
97 rbid., Nov. 7, 1949.
98 vote tally, by districtsf Nov. 9, 1949, box 95,
Miller Papers.
99 Times-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1949.
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and that over 250,000 Virginia voters had participated.loo
CONCLUSION
Careful consideration of the events of 1949 leads to
the conclusion that the chief motivation for formulation
of the Campbell amendments was the fear on the part of the
state Democratic organization of Federal action to repeal
the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in Federal elections.

The fear was a justifiable one, for if Congress

acted, Virginia would have been forced into either maintaining a cumbersome system of dual registration books or
resorting to the existing system of election laws minus the
poll tax provision.

It was difficult to ignore the belief

of Senator Byrd and other state political leaders that
Federal legislative action would soon force repea1. 101
In this light, the charge by the anti-amendment forces of
political expediency does not seem realistic.

The point of

difference between the two groups, however, was that while
the state poll tax repeal forces saw the levy as an impairment of the inherent right to vote in elections, the Byrd

lOOibid. The final vote count was 56 1 687 for the
Campbell plan, 206 1 542 against it.
lOl!bid., Oct. 7, 1949. Senator A. Willis Robertson,
a supporter of the Campbell plan, predicted Federal action
in early 1950, and was fearful for state elections if the
plan did not pass. See also the letter by Representative
Burr Harrison, News Leader, Jun. 21, 1949.
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forces could draw no connection between the payment of
the poll tax, the number of votes cast and the size of
the electorate, thus opening themselves to the charge of
expediency.

102

Throughout the pre-ele6tion debates, the

anti-amendment forces stressed that the features of the
Campbell plan were directed at "creating and maintaining
government of the few in place of represe_ntative democracy. 11103
Two reasons appear as the cause for the ultimate defeat of the Campbell proposals.

Arguments by critics that

the changes contained in the Campbell plan implied worse
restrictions on the electorate than the poll tax were
never effectively answered.

This led naturally to an

examination of possible motives behind the proposals, and
in a state where the General Assembly had only recently
attempted to remove the Democratic Presidential nominee
from the ballot and also give Democratic electors a
carte blanche, the organization's stated motives were
clearly open to question.

Even at best, Democratic stal-

warts had difficulty explaining the confusion of the
wording on the referendum, attributing it to legislative
"inadvertence" and contending that it was overcome by the

102

s ee especia
· 11y, Journa 1 of t h e Senate, 1946,
document no. 8, p. 4.
103 .
.
t c h , Nov. 4 / 1 949, remarks by .Miller
Times-Dispa
at the William and Mary Voters League meeting.

188

"known and obvious. 11104

Secondly, it appears that the

Byrd organization did not send "the word" down the organizational line in time, or with enough force, to be
convincing.

This means that the courthouse, or rural

faction, did not give its wholehearted support.

Even in

the southside districts, where the Byrd machine was
strongest, the referendum returns ran heavily against the
amendments.

Ignorance of the lack of support in the

rural sections cannot be pleaded, for in mid-October the
Times-Dispatch called attention to the necessity of applying "the heat" to the conservative courthouse faction and
stirring enthusiasm among the Governor elect, state
legislators, and the man who had drafted the plan, if
the militancy of the opposition was to be overcome. 105
It is doubtful that the vote on the Campbell plan
was in any way a true test of the strength of the Democratic
state organization.

The lines of conflict over the amend-

ments were not necessarily drawn along pro- or anti-machine
lines.

The reluctance on the part of the courthouse fac-

tion to accept and endorse the amendments sterr.med from the
fact that a large number of the group saw definite advantages to retention of the poll tax, despite impending
Fede~al

action.

In mid-October, Armistead L. Boothe of

l0 4 Ibid., Oct. 5, 1949.
lOSEditorials in ibid., Oct. 17, Nov. 9, 1949.
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Alexandria, a supporter of the Campbell proposals, predieted defeat because "a great many conservatives, who do
not want the poll tax repealed, will vote against the
amendments.

11106

Privately, some organization Democrats

said they would get out of politics if the "rabble" were
allowed to vote without paying the poll tax.

107

For the opponents of the Campbell amendments, the
defeat carried important implications.

Perhaps most im-

portant to this group was the belief that the vote indicated the degree of trust given the General Assembly by
the electorate.

In a post-referendum statement, Martin

Hutchinson declared that the people of Virginia had shown
by their convincing rejection of the Campbell plan "that
they know the difference between constitutional government and government by the legislature. 11108

In addition,

the fight over the Campbell amendments brought together by
means of the Virginia Right to Vote League on the local
level those elements of the electorate that had proved
such a powerful force in national politics, increasing
the contact between independent Democrats, labor forces
and Negro organizations.

The unanimity and strength of

l0 6 Ibid., Oct. 18, 1949.
107
108

Horn, "Growth of the Democratic Party," p. 243.

Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949 1 box 18,
Hutchinson Papers.
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the Negro opposition to the Campbell amendments is especially noteworthy and is evidenced by the fact that in
the predominantly black precincts of Norfolk, the

~ballot-

~

ing on the referendum ran 1,231 votes against the plan
with 62 votes for it.

109

After the results were tabu-

lated, the Negro Norfolk Journal and Guide warned those in
political control to read the returns correctly and make
the necessary changes or they themselves would be overwhelmed as the Campbell amendments had been.

110

In

attempting to combat voter apathy, nothing is more vivid
than

a

demonstration that the individual voter does in-

deed make a difference.
The Virginia referendum also had its national implications.

Using states such as North Carolina as an example,

some Southern Senators had argued against Federal poll
tax legislation by stating that if left alone the Southern
states would solve their own problems, probably by action
t o repea 1 th e po 11 tax levy. lll

Th e V'irginia
' ' vo t e

appeared to be a denial of this claim and weakened one of
the arguments for Federal inaction.
The task ahead of the poll tax repeal forces seemed
to be a clear one:

109

capitalize upon the momentum generated

Journal and Guide, Nov. 12 1 1949.

llOEditorial in ibid.

111New York Times, Nov. 10, 1949, pp. 1, 5.
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by the discussion of the Campbell amendments and the
organization of forces that brought its defeat.

To re-

peal leaders like Miller, Hutchinson and Whitehead,
possibility of removal of the tax never appeared closer
to reality, and they accepted the challenge.

"The fight

to reform the franchise provisions of our constitution
must and will be continued," Hutchinson declared, "until
the people have been given a fair and just opportunity to
vote upon the repeal of the poll tax.

...

112
Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949, box 18
Hutchinson Papers.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Poll tax repeal forces acted quickly to capitalize
on the momentum generated by the Campbell amendments.

The

day following the defeat of the proposals, Martin
Hutchinson, Francis Miller and Robert Whitehead called for
a state constitutional convention to consider removing the
poll tax.

To the anti-amendment forces, the vote against

the Campbell plan was not a vote against repeal of the
tax but rather a vote against a "specious and indefensible
plan to further restrict and encumber the right to vote
put forward by a political leadership which mistrusts the
people."

1

The call for a constitutional convention immediately
raised questions.

The Campbell commission had made statu-

tory recommendations relating to the suffrage system
that could be enacted by the General Assembly.

Was it

therefore necessary for a constitutional convention to be
called?

The

~iclunond

Times-Dispatch, a supporter of the

1 Typescript statement, Nov. 9, 1949, box 18,
Whitehead Papers.
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amendments, believed that it was time for the state political
organization to find a solution to the suffrage problem,
I

but did not favor calling a convention because of lthe time
and money involved. 2 The most important people, ~he top
members of the Byrd organization, sealed the fate of
Hutchinson's proposal with their silence.

Governor-elect

Battle would make no conunent, while Tuck as the outgoing
governor refused to make any recommendations.

The Byrd

organization had decided to let the electorate "stew in
its juices" for awhile. 3
Early in the 1950 General Assembly session, bills were
introduced in both chambers by Whitehead and others to eliminate the poll tax and other restrictive suffrage laws,
along with resolutions calling for a constitutional convention.

The House passed the poll tax repeal measure by a

vote of 73 to 20, but the Senate Privileges and Elections
Conunittee killed it with a five to four vote.
Senator Harry

'F.~"Byra-,~·Jr:,·

State

·sa·id ·the Sena:te "committee had

too little time to consider the measure. 4
Efforts to repeal the tax during the 1952 session
also .met defeat.

After defeating amendments recommended

2 Ed'

' 1 in
' Times-Dispatc
'
'
h , Nov. 11, 1949.
itoria

3 rbid., Nov. 10, 11, 1949.
4Journal of the House, 1950, pp. 246 366, 494, 1049;
1
Journal of the Senate, 1950 1 pp, 87-88; New York Times,
Mar. 13, 1950, p. 2.
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by the House Privileges and Elections Cor:unittee to raise
the tax to three dollars, the House passed a repeal meaI

sure introduced by Walter A. Page by a vote of 60)to 38.
I

When the bill reached the Senate, it, along with all other
poll tax repeal measures, was killed by the Privileges
and Elections Committee.

O~e

General Assembly.member de-

fended the session's action by saying the people had
settled the poll tax question by def eating the Campbell
plan in 1949.

Ignoring the House vote, the Senate committee

said it killed the measure because there was "no demand"
for such legislation.

Their action meant that there was
no possibility for repeal until 1957. 5
During the 1954 General Assembly session, poll tax
repeal supporters could not win approval of their plans in
the House.

The House Privileges and Elections Committee

killed a repeal measure with the clear backing of the Byrd
organization, with Democratic Floor Leader Edmund T.
DeJarnette and House Democratic Caucus Chairman John
Warren Cooke taking the lead.

DeJarnette's objection was

that if approved by the 1954 and 1956 General Assembly
sessions, the repeal measure could possibly be voted on in
the November, 1956 general election for president.

"I do

not believe the questions sliould be submitted to the people
5Journal of the House, 1952, p. 27; Times-Dispatch,
Feb. 22, Mar. 4, 1952.
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during a presidential election year," DeJarnette said in
a statement reminiscent of earlier arguments on the same
issue.

And by the time the 1954 General Assembly\ended,
\I

the attention of state politicians was directed to the
Supreme Court and its decision in the case of Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka.

Subsequently, the debate

over the poll tax was replaced by a more heated debate
6
.
. t ance an d in
. t erposition.
. .
over massive
resis

It would be a mistake to view the failure of poll
tax repeal forces to remove the tax as a conplete defeat.
There were gains incidental to the campaign against the
tax that were of lasting value.
than for the Virginia Negro.

This is in no case truer

The political frustration of

this group, as exemplified by the futile legal attempts
to regain the suffrage immediately after th: constitution
l~ly

of 1902 went into effect and the abortive

black

Republican effort in 1921, eased when the national courts
began to grant admission to the white prima---y and clarified registration procedures.

Neg=o

turned to the problem of the poll
ensure that blacks paid the tax,
efforts to have the tax repealed.

attent~on

~ax,

a~d

firs~

in Virginia

in efforts to

then t:= organized
~e3inning

At the

organization was local, being

enca~raged

social and fraternal groups.

Coor~ination

this

by =eligious,
-:\i'.3.s given when

6 rbid., Feb. 20, 1954; New Yt:-:rk"'Titnes,. Dec. 15, ·1955,
p. 18. -
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the Virginia Conference of Branches of the NAACP was organized, when A. W. E. Bassette established the United
Civic League of Virginia, and when Luther P. Jackson ori

I

ganized the Virginia Voters' League.

Individuals such as

Bassette, Jackson and P. B. Young, Jr., of the Norfolk
Journal and Guide, spoke out effectively against the poll
tax, and began to work effectively with white organizations
with similar goals.
The cooperative organization of Negroes and whites
produced results, as evidenced by the campaigns in
Richmond by Oliver
1945 and 1947.

w.

Hill for a General Assembly seat in

Hill was not successful in his first two

attempts, but the coordination developed as a result between
blacks and the white political powers, especially the
white labor group, set the pattern for later political
unity and revealed to the Democratic organization that as
the strength of the Negro vote increased, it would be
necessary to seek out their leaders in an effort to gain
support.

7

Organized Negroes and whites also tested the since,rity of states' rights politicians of Virginia who
claimed that enactment of civil rights legislation belonged
7News Leader, Aug. 6,.1947,.and Times-Dispatch, Aug.
7, 1947, discuss the outcome of the 1947 effort by Hill,
a Richmond attorney. See also, Henry L~ Moon, Balance of
Power; The Negro Vote (Garden City, N. J., 1949), pp.
164-165~
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not to the Federal government but to the states.

In

February, 1948, the Virginia Civil Rights Organization, a
federation of all bodies working for the attainment of
civil rights, submitted bills to the General Asserribly to
repeal state statutes on the separation of the races on
corrunon carriers and in public assembly.

Challenging the

line of argument that Federal action was an outside interference with Southern affairs, members of the Virginia
Civil Rights Organization went to the General Assembly, not
as outsiders, but as native born Virginia citizens.

The

failure to secure the desired legislation demonstrated that
the arguments against outside Federal interference were at
best specious, that the states' rights group did not want
civil rights legislation regardless of where it was presented or by whom it was presented. 8 When one considers
that this attack was followed by the attack on the Campbell
amendments in 1949, it is apparent that the traditional
political forces in the state were on the defensive both
locally and nationally.
The effects of these coordinated efforts in various
areas, not just the poll tax, appeared in such ways as a
change in regi.strar attitudes.

Luther Jackson reported in

April, 1949, that "among the thousand or more [registrarsl
8Luther P. Jackson, "Virginia and Civil Rights,"
Virginia and the Civil Rights Program (Charlottesville,
Va., 1950), P• 47.

198

in Virginia the overwhelming majority are receptive to
colored applicants and draw no color line," and that in
I

scarcely no instance would a registrar hold out permanently
•I

against a Negro "if he shows a spirit of determination to
become a qualified voter. 119
tion was increasing.

As a result, Negro registra-

And there were signs of Negro poli-

tical consequence -- Oliver Hill was elected to the General
Assembly in 1948 -- and by 1950, the Virginia Voters'
League pamphlet recorded longer lists of Negro candidates
offering for public office. 10
The campaign against the poll tax also had consequences for white Virginians.

With the emergence of

respectable opposition to the tax, Virginians witnessed the
slow challenge to the assumptions upon which the levy was
based.

Westmoreland Davis through the Southern Planter,

and later Virginius Dabney through his books and as editor
of the Times-Dispatch, emphasized the effects of the tax
upon the population of the state, the loss of school
revenue each year because of governmental inefficiency,
and the tardiness of Virginia in the field of ,progressive
social legislation.

The Gooch report, commissioned at the

insistence of Governor James Price, effectively

9 rbid., p. 43.
10

Annual Reoort of the V.
1949/1950, pp. s, 14.

v.

L., 1948/1949, p. 6;
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demonstrated the illogical nature of the argument for retention of the tax as a voting prerequisite.

The scan-

dals in Wise County in 1945, occuring at a time when the
political organization was expounding the virtues of
Virginia's good government, pointed up dramatically the
corruption that was still possible under the existing
election system.

Even the debate and the vote on the

Campbell amendments proved helpful.

After years of hesi-

tation, the Byrd organization finally presented a suffrage
reform plan to the electorate, albeit an imperfect one
designed to assure their continued control, demonstrating
that they were at least capable of some action.

In addi-

tion, the anti-amendment forces could look to the defeat of
the Campbell plan as a victory.

They were given a forum

to educate Virginia voters on the evils of the poll tax and
were able to get over 250,000 people to the polls to vote,
no small feat in itself.

The rejection of the Campbell

plan, much as the rejection a year earlier of the plan to
end segregation on public carriers, weakened the
Southern claim in Congress that if left alone, the Southern
states would. take action to remove suffrage restrictions.
It was becoming
increasingly
evident
by 1950 that Federal
..... __.. ....
...
- -.
. . . .
.
·.~·

.;-

..._

.

.

action was the best hope of forcing some sort of state
action.
Much of the debate over the poll tax between its
inception and 1950 was a struggle to change public opinion.
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Dr; Luther P. Jackson pointed out in 1949 that the changes
brought about in regard to Negro civil rights had come as
a result of a change in public opinion.

Public opinion

also sustained the advances and backed the victories won
in the courts.

"It does not seem likely," Dr. Jackson

said, "that the clock of time will be turned back to the
very inferior position in society the Negro occupied a
half century ago. 1111 In some respects, Dr. Jackson was
correct, but the advances made by the Negro and whites
against the Virginia poll tax were not fully rewarded
until 1964 with the enactment of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution.
11Jackson, "Virginia and Civil Rights," p. 49.
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APPENDIX A

I

The following figures were collected by Tipton
Snavely to illustrate the rising delinquency percentages
for poll tax payment by Negroes and whites in Virginia
from 1903 to 1914.

For the three years prior to the adop-

tion of the state constitution of 1902, white delinquencies
were 26.4%, while Negro delinquency rose from 47.7% to
52.7%. 1

1 snavely, Taxation of Negroes in Virginia, p. 35.
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APPENDIX B
The following charts were prepared by Dr. R. N.
Latture of the School of Conunerce and Administration at
Washington and Lee University for Francis P. Miller in
1934. 1 It is interesting to note that it was not until
the 1920's that the actual vote for President and Governor
reached pre-1902 levels, and that the average percentage
actu~l

vote after 1902 was 17.6% as compared to 56.8%

prior to adoption of the new constitution.

The adoption

of the 15th Amendment, while increasing the number of
potential voters, did not appear to have effected the percentage of votes cast in Virginia.

1 R. N. Latture to Francis P. Millei, Mar. 5 1934, box
1
95, Miller Papers.
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APPENDIX C
The following tabulation of poll tax payments by
month of collection was prepared by LeRoy Hodges for
Robert Whiteheaa. 1 The largest amounts collected for
omitted poll taxes, those taxes left off the poll books
for some reason or another, were made in May, the last
month for payment to qualify to vote in the August primaries.

1

~eRoy Hodges to Robert Whitehead, Aug. 21, 1941,
series 1, box 10, Whitehead Papers.
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AP~ENDIX

D

The following broadside was issued by the Virginia
Right to Vote League, headed by Virgil Goode, prior to the
referendum on the Campbell amendments in 1949.

The broad-

side summarizes the objections of the League and other
anti-amendment forces to the Campbell plan and illustrate
the confused wording of the ballot question.

'
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Vir1Yn1irmiflDlll1l~ ~

..

,.

fil/

Protect Your Right. to Vote by Voting
Against
:···The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution.
. •.

•

<

-~

•

.

I

.

rm

,
If you want to protect your right to vote as now estnblished by the Virginia Constitution, go to the
polls on November 8th and vote atJainst the proposed amendments.
You are now a qualified voter in Virginia; nfter November 8th, you may not be unless these amend·
ments are defeated •
.We now /mow what the quali'fications are to vote in Virginia •
We now have permanent registration.
··
We now register before our Local Registrar for life.
,
.
. .. '.; :.·We now close the registration books 30 days before election day•
.· ·.
We now have· our right to vote guaranteed by the constitution.
. . ...
.
••

·-~.

.

•.·.

• • • * • • • • • • • • * • * •

' · Why take a chance?

.· ... -'

. ·.

:~" .. ~. Why
· /. . Why
· :; •. :
:· : ':' Why
' ·· · · '
Why

exchange a certainty for an uncertainty?
exchange our system of permanent registration for annual renewal of registration 120 days
before any election or primary?
.·
surrender your constitutionally guaranteed right to vote for a right yet to be determined and
fixed by the legislature?
give a State Board of Elections at Richmond the power to make rules and regulations and to
supervise all elections?
.. •.. , Why exchange a $1.50 capitation tax for a pos~ible $3.00 to $4.00 tax under the amendments?
'. : -''.. . Why give up -these known and constitutionally established rights for unknown, uncer. . ain and un·
··
determined rights, yet to be fixed by the Legislature?

..

WORK AGAINST -

TALK AGAINST -

VOTE

IBJ AGAINST_ THE ~ENDMENTS

•'

'

VIRGINIA RIGHT TO VOTE LEAGUE
VIRGIL H. GOODE, Chairman

:··.

HOTEL RICHMOND, RICHMOND, VA.

UC> . -

:_~:.''.

: ':

~:.

QuESTfOH:

Shall

s,c:tio~!

. FORM OF BALLOT
on the 14 proposed amendments
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 31, 35, 38, ::.nd 173 of.the

Cc:mitu~ian or Virg:ni,, which

· : · -~ ..sections relate to the elective franchise, and, among other things, provide for the elimination of the poll tax as a pre•
• . • requisite to voting, registration :ind renewal of registration of voters, the establishment of a State Board of Elections, ::ind
· the levying of a school tax in lieu of the present capitation tax:, be :imended; and shall the Constitution be further amended
by adding Section 31-a, providing for local boards of elections, and Section 38-a, prescribing the effective date of these
.; ..... "··..amendments~
.
.. · ·.
. -'\.
..··
For .
.
.
. .'

.

.'""

D

........

..

. ..··

",

[BJ Against

.:.

·-·.; ..

..

...

.

. '·. r '

•

:,::

•' •·:. ~

.~
..

. .:· '

;

.
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Conley Lee Edwards, III, was born in Riclunond,
Virginia, on November 3, 1944.

He was graduated from

Brandywine High School in Wilmington, Delaware in June,
1963, and entered Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-Sydney,
Virginia the following fall.

Majoring in history and

political science, he was also active as a member of the
college newspaper staff and as a participant in other
college programs.

Upon graduation, he was inducted into the

United States Army, serving two years of active duty at
Fort Knox, Kentucky.

He entered the history department of
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Raymond Edwards, also from Wilmington, Delaware.

